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THE SHERMAN ACT IS A NO-FAULT 
MONOPOLIZATION STATUTE: A 
TEXTUALIST DEMONSTRATION 
ROBERT H. LANDE* AND RICHARD O. ZERBE^ 
The drafters of the Sherman Act originally designed Section 2 to impose 
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless whether the 
firm had engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This conclusion emerges from the 
first ever textualist analysis of the language in the statute, a form of interpretation 
originally performed only by Justice Scalia but now increasingly used by the 
Supreme Court, including in its recent Bostock decision. 
Following Scalia’s methodology, this Article analyzes contemporaneous 
dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases and demonstrates that when the Sherman 
Act was passed, the word “monopolize” simply meant that someone had acquired 
a monopoly. The term was not limited to monopolies acquired or preserved through 
anticompetitive conduct. A textualist analysis accordingly suggests that Section 2 
should be applied to impose liability and corrective remedies on all monopolies and 
attempts to monopolize. 
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A textualist approach to statutory construction would not imply or create 
unstated exceptions. Since Section 2 of the Sherman Act contains no explicit 
exception for a monopoly acquired or preserved without proof of anticompetitive 
conduct, none should be implied or created. Current case law requiring plaintiffs to 
prove the corporation involved engaged in improper conduct should be overturned. 
This Article also briefly analyzes the practical economic implications likely to 
follow if the courts adopt a “no-fault” approach to monopolization law. This 
analysis will demonstrate that the overall economic effects will be uncertain. 
They will depend upon empirical issues whose net effect is speculative or 
ambiguous. They nevertheless are likely to be beneficial on the whole, and this 
provides some support for the no-fault position, and a fortiori demonstrate that 
the Article’s textualist conclusions should be implemented. 
Imposing sanctions on all extremely large monopolies could improve economic 
welfare in many ways. This should increase innovation and international 
competitiveness. It should prevent the allocative inefficiency effects of monopoly 
pricing and the form of exploitation that arises when monopolies acquire wealth 
from consumers. It would be likely to decrease the inefficiencies that result from 
monopolies enjoying a “quiet life.” It should avoid the waste that can arise as a 
firm struggles to attain and protect its monopoly, and some of the time and cost of 
Section 2 litigation. It should improve privacy and decrease income inequality. 
The new standard would admittedly also cause some costs and difficulties. 
For example, imposing sanctions on all monopolies could sometimes send a 
confusing or perverse signal to firms engaging in hard but fair competition, 
especially as a firm’s market share neared the ambiguous level required for a 
violation. No-fault liability could also enable competitors to file baseless 
lawsuits. The transaction costs involved in imposing sanctions on monopolies 
could be significant. It also could lead to difficult remedy issues in cases 
involving natural and patent monopolies. We believe, however, that the benefits 
of no-fault are likely to outweigh the costs. 
Textualism has been used in more and more Supreme Court analyses in recent 
years. Moreover, there recently have been many calls, from very different parts of 
the political spectrum, for imposing sanctions on extremely large monopolies 
without inquiring into whether the firm engaged in anticompetitive conduct. 
This issue has not, however, been analyzed seriously either from a legal or an 
economic perspective in roughly a half century. 
The purpose of this Article is not to resolve all of the relevant questions. Its goal 
is to re-kindle debate about the legal and economic issues involved in imposing 
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize under the Sherman Act 
and also, a fortiori, under Section 5 of the FTC Act. And to demonstrate that its 
textualism-derived conclusions constitute reasonable policy options. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act1 originally was designed to impose 
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize, regardless 
whether the firm engaged in anticompetitive conduct.2 This conclusion 
emerges from the first ever textualist3 analysis of the language in the 
                                               
 1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018). 
 2. See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51–647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 2) (making it unlawful for any person to “monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations”). 
 3. See infra Section II.A (explaining variations of textualism and using the type of 
textualism championed by Justice Scalia). Author Lande is not a textualist. However, 
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statute, a form of interpretation originally performed only by Justice 
Scalia4 but now increasingly used by the Supreme Court, including in 
its recent Bostock v. Clayton County5 decision.6  
Using Scalia’s approach, this Article analyzes contemporaneous 
dictionaries, legal treatises, and cases,7 and demonstrates that when 
                                               
at all times some, and even sometimes all, Supreme Court justices are textualists. See 
infra notes 4–6. For this reason, the goal of this article is to analyze Section 2 using 
textualist principles. 
 4. See Max Alderman & Duncan Pickard, Justice Scalia’s Heir Apparent?: Justice 
Gorsuch’s Approach to Textualism and Originalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 185, 186 
(2017) (referring to Justice Scalia as a “pioneer” of textualism). Indeed, in the past, 
even prominent conservative legal scholars were not textualists. See Robert H. Bork, 
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7 (1966) (basing the 
Sherman Act analysis on Congress’s intent when passing the law and policy 
considerations); see also John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of 
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 193–
94 (2008) (discussing the influence of Bork’s analysis of the Sherman Act’s legislative 
history in interpreting the Sherman Act, including on judges such as Richard Posner 
and Frank Easterbrook). 
 5. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). 
 6. See id. Even though all three opinions in this case employed textualist analysis, 
they disagreed with one another as to the specific results of this analysis. Jonathan 
Skrmetti eloquently observed that in Bostock, 
[A]ll nine justices adopt[ed] a purely textualist approach and disagree[d] only 
about what flavor of textualism the Supreme Court should employ . . . . [T]his 
is a new highwater mark for textualism . . . with the unanimous court 
identifying textualism as the sole appropriate method for resolving an 
important statute’s meaning. Gorsuch’s proclamation that “[o]nly the written 
word is the law” did not stir the slightest disagreement. Various members of 
the court will surely employ other methodologies in upcoming cases, but 
Bostock leaves no doubt that textualism is the predominant method of statutory 
interpretation for the current court. 
Jonathan Skrmetti, Symposium: The Triumph of Textualism: “Only the Written Word Is the 
Law,” SCOTUSBLOG (June 15, 2020, 9:04 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/ 
06/symposium-the-triumph-of-textualism-only-the-written-word-is-the-law 
[https://perma.cc/S4JX-5964]. See Ryan Lovelace, Elena Kagan: The Supreme Court Is a 
‘Textualist Court’ that Reasons More like Scalia than Breyer, WASH. EXAM’R (Oct. 16, 2017, 
7:04PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/elena-kagan-the-supreme-court-is-a-
textualist-court-that-reasons-more-like-scalia-than-breyer [https://perma.cc/7JZV-GERP] 
(reporting that Justice Kagan stated, “[W]e are a generally, fairly textualist court, which 
will generally think when the statute is clear you go with the statute”); see also Alderman 
& Pickard, supra note 4, at 187 (noting that Justice Gorsuch approved of Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan’s textualist analysis in Lockhart v. United States). 
 7. See infra Section II.A (explaining that Justice Scalia’s approach to textualism 
does not consider legislative debates or committee reports; instead, it interprets words 
and phrases in the context of the history of the time in which the statute was enacted). 
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Congress passed the Sherman Act, the word “monopolize” simply 
meant that someone had acquired a monopoly. The term was not 
limited to monopolies acquired or preserved through anticompetitive 
conduct. A textualist analysis accordingly suggests that Section 2 
should be applied to impose liability and corrective remedies on all 
monopolies regardless of “fault.”8 
This textualist analysis also will show that when courts use the 
Sherman Act to impose sanctions on firms that “monopolize[] or 
attempt to monopolize,”9 because the statute contained no exceptions 
for firms that did not engage in anticompetitive conduct,10 contrary 
case law should be overturned.11 
Recent events have transformed this issue into a timely antitrust 
topic.12 Prominent politicians on both the left13 and right14 have called 
not just for an investigation into whether important alleged large 
monopolies, including Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and Google, have 
engaged in anticompetitive conduct. Senators Sanders and Warren, for 
                                               
 8. See infra Part III (conducting a textualist analysis of Section 2 of the Sherman Act). 
 9. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209; see infra Section 
III.A (interpreting the meaning of “monopolize” through dictionaries and legal 
treatises). 
 10. See infra Section III.C and note 168 and accompanying text (explaining no 
exception for a monopoly secured without proof of anticompetitive conduct should 
be implied or created because that exception is not explicit in the Sherman Act). 
 11. See infra Section IV.B (describing the process of overturning statutory 
precedent while noting that courts have not been particularly bound by Sherman Act 
precedent). 
 12. See infra Part V (discussing the recent anti-monopoly political rhetoric arising 
from both parties and explaining the modern economic changes supporting a “no-
fault” analysis). 
 13. See infra Part V; see also infra notes 220–21 (explaining the views of Senators 
Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders). 
 14.  
The enforcers now encircling the four most innovative and investor-beloved 
companies in America[,] [Google, Facebook, Apple, and Amazon,] include 
the Trump Justice Department; the majority Republican FTC; the antitrust 
subcommittees of both the Democratic House and Republican Senate; a posse 
of 51 state and territorial attorneys general pursuing Google, and a squad of 
47 AGs dogging Facebook. 
Roger Parloff, Behind the Big Tech Antitrust Backlash: A Turning Point for America, YAHOO 
FIN. (Dec. 11, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/amazon-facebook-google-
antitrust-backlash-152518336.html [https://perma.cc/6XCZ-TD3V]; see also infra notes 
219, 221 (noting President Trump’s willingness to break up “Big Tech” companies). 
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example, have bluntly said that these “monopolies” should be broken up.15 
They have called for the implementation of no-fault monopolization.16 
This Article will re-examine the appropriateness of the current legal 
standards for what often is called “no-fault monopolization.”17 It will 
demonstrate that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Verizon Communications Inc. 
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,18 which clarified relevant case law 
and emphatically held that fault is required for a Section 2 violation,19 
was wrongly decided. This Article will show how Trinko and other cases 
should have been decided if textualism were applied to Section 2 cases, 
and that these cases should have had no-fault results. 
As background and by contrast, this Article in Part I will first engage 
in a traditional or “purposivist” analysis of Section 2 of the Sherman 
                                               
 15. Elizabeth Culliford, Where U.S. Presidential Candidates Stand on Breaking up Big 
Tech, REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2020, 6:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
election-tech-factbox/where-us-presidential-candidates-stand-on-breaking-up-big-
tech-idUSKBN1ZN16C (reporting Senators Sanders and Warren’s views regarding the 
need to break up Big Tech companies). 
 16. See Lauren Hirsch, Bernie Sanders Wants ‘Criminal’ CEOs Locked up, but Lawyers 
Say that’s Unlikely to Happen, CNBC (Oct. 29, 2019, 4:28 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2019/10/29/bernie-sanders-wants-criminal-ceos-locked-up-but-lawyers-say-its-
unlikely.html [https://perma.cc/4Q5A-M687] (“Bernie Sanders has said he would use 
the Sherman Antitrust Act to put CEOs of monopolistic companies in jail.”); Ted 
Johnson, Democratic Candidates Differ on Ways to Rein in Facebook, Other Big Tech Firms, 
DEADLINE (Oct. 15, 2019, 7:55 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/10/democratic-
debate-facebook-elizabeth-warren-1202761256 [https://perma.cc/F66X-72M7] 
(quoting Senator Elizabeth Warren as saying, “We need to enforce our antitrust laws, 
break up these giant companies that are dominating big tech, big pharma, big oil, all 
of them”); Cristiano Lima, Bernie Sanders Says He Would ‘Absolutely’ Try to Break up 
Facebook, Google, Amazon, POLITICO (July 16, 2019, 10:41 AM) https://www.politico 
.com/story/2019/07/16/bernie-sanders-facebook-google-amazon-1416786 
[https://perma.cc/95WY-5SFX] (reporting that Senator Bernie Sanders stated that he 
would appoint an attorney general “who would break up these huge corporations”); 
see also infra Part V (sharing views of other politicians and economists discussing 
implementation of no-fault monopolization). 
 17. See Marina Lao, No-Fault Digital Platform Monopolization, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
755, 766–70 (2020) (discussing the history of the term “no-fault” monopolization); see 
also Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr. et al., Elimination of the Conduct Requirement in Government 
Monopolization Cases, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 83, 86–88 (1980) (arguing that Congress 
should adopt the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and 
Procedures’s endorsement of a no-conduct, or “no-fault,” monopolization approach). 
 18. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 19. Id. at 407 (“To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly 
power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of 
anticompetitive conduct.”). But see infra Section IV.A (analyzing prior Supreme Court 
opinions that were less clear). 
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Act, relying upon the law’s legislative history. As Part II will then 
explain, a textualist analysis instead determines the meaning of a law 
by examining key statutory words and terms as they were used in 
contemporaneous dictionaries, legal treatises, prior cases, and the 
earliest cases that followed the enactment of the law.20 Every method 
of statutory construction starts with the words of the statute, but 
textualism ignores the legislative debates and committee reports that 
are central to a traditional approach to statutory analysis.21 It does not 
attempt to discern what Congress “intended to do” other than by 
examining the words and phrases in the statute.22 Moreover, under a 
textualist analysis, as Justice Scalia emphasized, no exception can be 
read into a law unless it is explicitly contained in the statute.23 
Textualism is a relatively new method of statutory analysis. Until 
relatively recently, it was not even employed by most conservative legal 
scholars. Perhaps for this reason, before now, no one has undertaken 
a textualist analysis of Section 2 of the Sherman Act to determine 
whether it requires anticompetitive conduct.24 This Article undertakes 
this task in Part III, which demonstrates that Congress intended the 
Sherman Act to impose sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to 
monopolize. 
Part IV will then discuss the relevant Supreme Court Sherman Act 
jurisprudence and other cases where the Supreme Court dramatically 
re-interpreted statutes after a long period. It shows that, despite 
current case law, the Court should similarly re-interpret the Sherman 
Act and hold that it imposes sanctions on all monopolies and attempts 
to monopolize. 
Part V will briefly discuss a half-century of evolving economic 
thinking about the costs and benefits of this issue. This Part shows that 
the economic effects will be uncertain and dependent upon empirical 
issues whose net effect is speculative or ambiguous. They nevertheless 
are likely to be beneficial on the whole, and they provide some support 
                                               
 20. See infra Part II; see also infra note 63–64 (noting the importance of history to 
textualists because they consider a word’s usage and meaning at the time that a statute 
was enacted). 
 21. See infra Part I. 
 22. See infra Part I; see also infra note 39–41 (stating that a traditional legislative 
history analysis for the Sherman Act has been done many times). 
 23. See infra Section III.C and note 168 (citing an opinion written by Justice Scalia 
stating exceptions cannot be read into the law unless explicitly stated). 
 24. See infra Section II.B. 
2020] NO-FAULT MONOPOLIZATION 505 
 
for the no-fault position, and a fortiori demonstrate that the Article’s 
textualist conclusions should be implemented.25 
No-fault could improve economic welfare in many ways. It should 
increase innovation and international competitiveness.26 It should 
prevent the allocative inefficiency effects of monopoly pricing and the 
form of exploitation that arises when monopolies acquire wealth from 
consumers.27 It would be likely to decrease the inefficiencies that result 
from monopolies enjoying a “quiet life,”28 and also the waste that arises 
as firms attain and protect their monopolies.29 It should reduce the 
time and costs of Section 2 litigation.30 It should improve privacy and 
decrease income inequality.31 
The new standard would admittedly also cause some costs and 
difficulties. For example, imposing sanctions on all monopolies could 
sometimes send a confusing or perverse signal to firms engaging in 
hard but fair competition, especially as a firm’s market share neared 
the ambiguous level required for a violation.32 It could enable 
competitors to file baseless lawsuits.33 The transaction costs involved in 
imposing sanctions on monopolies could be significant.34 It also could 
lead to difficult remedy issues in cases involving natural and patent 
monopolies.35 We believe, however, that the benefits of no-fault are 
likely to outweigh the costs. 
                                               
 25. See infra Section V.F. 
 26. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 8–9 (2012) (arguing that 
competition has positive impacts on innovation). 
 27. See infra notes 276–80 and accompanying text (describing the exploitation 
inherent in monopolies). 
 28. See infra note 307 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits to a 
monopoly of living a “quiet life”). 
 29. See infra notes 273–75 and accompanying text (detailing rent-seeking behavior 
and the impacts of such behavior with regards to waste). 
 30. See infra notes 319–21 (debating litigation costs in antitrust cases). 
 31. See infra Section V.B; see also note 239 and accompanying text (examining 
income inequality). 
 32. See infra note 358 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra notes 313–15 and accompanying text (describing research on sham 
litigation involving antitrust claims). 
 34. See infra note 318 (explaining transaction costs for the digital technology 
markets). 
 35. See infra Section V.C. Many of the economic uncertainties involving no-fault 
can be addressed optimally by selecting suitable remedies, and there are a variety of 
remedies available in Section 2 cases. Historically, relatively few monopolies have been 
broken up, and we expect that even fewer would be remedied this way under a no-fault 
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Part VI will discuss the effects this article’s conclusions should have 
on case outcomes under the “monopolize[] or attempt to monopolize” 
portions of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. It will also very briefly discuss 
no-fault monopolization as a violation of Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act.36 
The concluding Part of this Article takes into account the rising 
influence of textualist analysis and calls for a debate into the legal and 
economic issues likely to arise from a textualist analysis of Section 2 
and its no-fault conclusion. This Part argues that because the article’s 
textualist analysis results in a “non-absurd”—and in fact quite reasonable—
policy option, it should be adopted and implemented by the courts. 
I.    A TRADITIONAL OR PURPOSIVIST LEGISLATIVE HISTORY APPROACH: 
USING CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES AND COMMITTEE REPORTS 
To better explain and to highlight by contrast this article’s textualist 
analysis,37 this Part will undertake a traditional (sometimes called 
“purposivist”38) legislative history analysis of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, one that (as is not the case for a textualist analysis) examines the 
relevant legislative debates and committee reports.39 This was the most 
                                               
theory. In other words, even though liability should be determined on a no-fault basis, 
the most useful remedy often will be one that simply limits a firm’s conduct. See infra 
note 306 and accompanying text (detailing economic uncertainty and the incentive to 
compete). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018). 
 37. Author Lande is not a textualist, except in the sense that this term is used by 
Justice Kagan. See supra note 6. Author Lande is a purposivist who believes legislative 
debates should be considered when courts determine the meaning of statutes. See 
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The 
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). However, the goal of this 
article is to determine how a textualist judge should interpret Section 2. 
 38. A traditional analysis of the legislative history of a statute, one that relies upon 
the congressional debates and committee reports, is often called a “purposivist” 
analysis today. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
479, 483, 503 (2013); see ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 18 (2012) (“[Purposivism] has been called ‘the basic 
judicial approach these days . . . .’”). 
 39. A traditional legislative history analysis has been done for the Sherman Act 
many times on a variety of antitrust subjects, most famously by Judge Bork. As Judge 
Bork noted, the task of ascertaining the will of Congress should be “an attempt to 
construct the thing we call ‘legislative intent’ using conventional methods of collecting 
and reconciling the evidence provided by the Congressional Record.” Bork, supra note 
4, at 7 n.2; see also Lande, supra note 37 (conducting legislative history analysis that 
reach different results from Bork); Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 4 (same). 
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common method of statutory analysis until relatively recently and was 
universally used by both conservatives and liberals.40 Like every method 
of statutory analysis, it starts with the words and phrases used in the 
statute, but—crucially—it supplements this with an analysis of the 
relevant legislative debates and committee reports.41 As this Part will 
demonstrate, however, a traditional analysis of Section 2 on the no-
fault issue produces an inconclusive result. 
There appears to be only one reference in the Sherman Act 
legislative debates or committee reports that is relevant to the question 
of whether Section 2 requires anticompetitive conduct.42 It is part of 
an exchange that took place at the very end of the debates. Senator 
John Kenna asked: 
Is it intended by the committee, as the section seems to indicate, that 
if an individual . . . by his own skill and energy, . . . shall pursue his 
calling in such a way as to monopolize a trade, his action shall be a 
crime under this proposed act? . . . Suppose a citizen of Kentucky is 
dealing in shorthorn cattle and by virtue of his superior skill in that 
particular product it turns out that . . . he is conceded to have a 
monopoly of that trade with Mexico; is it intended by the committee 
that the bill shall make that man a culprit?43 
Senator George Edmunds gave a direct response to Senator Kenna’s 
hypothetical: 
[I]n the case stated the gentleman has not any monopoly at all . . . . 
He has not got the possession of all the horned cattle in the United 
States. He has not done anything but compete with his adversaries 
in trade, if he had any, to furnish the commodity for the lowest price. 
So I assure my friend he need not be disturbed upon that subject.44 
Senator Edmund’s response indicates that he believed that no 
monopolization was involved in the hypothetical, so he did not really 
consider the need for an exception for a firm that achieved its monopoly 
solely by superior skill. Senator George Hoar then gave his answer: 
[I]n the case put by [Senator Kenna, if] a man who merely by 
superior skill and intelligence . . . got the whole business because 
                                               
 40. See Pojanowiski, supra note 38, at 483, 503. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Author Lande found only a single reference made in debate to an 
anticompetitive conduct requirement, which is analyzed in this Part. Other 
conventional legislative history analyses have also failed to reveal any other exchanges 
that concern the no-fault issue. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 4, at 29. 
 43. 21 CONG. REC. 3151 (1890) (statement of Sen. Kenna). 
 44. Id. at 3151–52 (statement of Sen. Edmunds). 
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nobody could do it as well as he could was not a monopolist, [unless] 
it involved something like the use . . . [of unfair] competition like 
the engrossing, the buying up of all [rivals].45 
Senator Edmunds then provided the final answer to Senator Kenna’s 
question: 
I have only to say . . . that this subject was not lightly considered in 
the committee, and that we studied it with whatever little ability we 
had, and the best answer I can make to both my friends is to read 
from Webster’s Dictionary the definition of the verb “to 
monopolize”: 1. To purchase or obtain possession of the whole of, 
as a commodity or goods in market, with the view to appropriate or 
control the exclusive sale of; as, to monopolize sugar or tea. Like the 
sugar trust. One man, if he had capital enough, could do it just as 
well as two. 2. To engross or obtain by any means the exclusive right 
of, especially the right of trading to any place, or with any country or 
district; as, to monopolize the India or Levant trade . . . . [W]e were 
not blind to the very suggestions which have been made, and we 
thought we had done the right thing in providing, in the very phrase 
we did, that if one person instead of two, by a combination, of one 
person alone, as we have heard about the wheat market in Chicago, 
for instance, did it, it was just as offensive and injurious to the public 
interest as if two had combined to do it.46 
The Sherman Act, making it illegal to “monopolize” or “attempt to 
monopolize,” was then passed by the Senate.47 
It is difficult to reconcile the statements of Senators Edmunds and 
Hoar. They appear to have been defining the markets differently.48 
Senator Edmunds was discussing a large cattle sale to Mexico while 
Senator Hoar was discussing all of the cattle in the U.S.49 
Alternatively, Senators Edmunds and Hoar may have provided 
different answers to Senator Kenna’s question. Senator Hoar did not 
consider a firm to be guilty of “monopolization” if it “got the whole 
business” by skill and efficiency alone.50 Senator Edmunds, however, 
defined “to monopolize” as merely “[t]o engross or obtain by any 
means.”51 Senator Edmunds believed that “if one person . . . did it, it 
                                               
 45. Id. at 3152 (statement of Sen. Hoar). 
 46. Id. (statement of Sen. Edmunds). 
 47. See id. at 3153 (recording the votes that resulted in passage). 
 48. See supra notes 44–45 (statements of Sens. Edmunds and Hoar). 
 49. See supra notes 44–45 (statements of Sens. Edmunds and Hoar). 
 50. 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar). 
 51. Id. (statement of Sen. Edmunds). 
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was just as offensive and injurious to the public interest as if two had 
combined to do it.”52 Edmunds clearly condemned every monopoly, 
although by his first response he did not consider the hypothetical 
situation given to describe a monopoly.53 
These contradictory statements should be construed as offsetting 
one another, and Edmunds’s statement shows the issue was considered 
but did not result in a change in statutory language.54 Thus, there is no 
evidence of a clear intent of Congress that anticompetitive conduct is 
required for a Section 2 violation. Nevertheless, if a judgment had to 
be made, since Senator Edmunds spoke last and he was one of the 
main drafters and sponsors of the bill,55 his statements could carry 
greater weight. Perhaps this dialogue may constitute some support for 
the no-fault interpretation. Moreover, the fact that this discussion took 
place at the very end of the Sherman Act debate also could very well 
mean that it embodied Congress’s final view on the subject. Perhaps 
Senator Edmunds’s opinion, for this reason also, should be given even 
more weight. Alternatively, one could conclude that because these 
remarks were given so late in the debates, these statements by Senator 
Sherman or other legislators were less able to correct or oppose these 
statements, so perhaps they should carry less weight. 
In summary, a conventional legislative history analysis of the issue 
does not give a clear indication of congressional intent. 
II.    A TEXTUALIST ANALYSIS 56 
A.   Defining a Textualist Analysis: What Would Justice Scalia Do? 
Justice Scalia long was the chief advocate of a method of interpreting 
legislation known as the “textualist,” fair meaning, ordinary meaning, 
or plain meaning approach.57 He often was joined in this methodology 
                                               
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. at 3151–52. 
 54. See supra notes 44–45 (statements of Sens. Edmunds and Hoar). 
 55. See Bork, supra note 4, at 12 (“Edmunds[] [ ] appears to have played the 
primary role in drafting the bill which became the Sherman Act . . . .”). 
 56. Some of the textualist analysis in this Section first appeared in Robert H. 
Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing 
Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349 (2013). 
 57. See Jonathan R. Siegel, Legal Scholarship Highlight: Justice Scalia’s Textualist Legacy, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 14, 2017, 10:48 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/11/ 
legal-scholarship-highlight-justice-scalias-textualist-legacy/amp 
[https://perma.cc/YC4M-72WS] (stating that “perhaps [Scalia’s] greatest legacy” was 
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by other Supreme Court Justices,58 and Justice Neil Gorsuch recently 
told the Federalist Society he has become Scalia’s successor: 
[A] person can be both a publicly committed originalist and textualist 
and be confirmed to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Originalism has regained its place at the table of constitutional 
interpretation, and textualism in the reading of statutes has triumphed. 
And neither one is going anywhere on my watch.59 
Justice Scalia expressly rejected the use of such traditional legislative 
history sources as the debates in Congress and the reports of congressional 
committees.60 He explained: 
In any major piece of legislation, the legislative history is extensive, 
and there is something for everybody. As Judge Harold Leventhal 
used to say, the trick is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick 
out your friends. The variety and specificity of result that legislative 
history can achieve is unparalleled.61 
He explained further: 
                                               
changing “the way we think about statutes”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23 (1997) (“Textualism should not be 
confused with so-called strict constructionism, a degraded form of textualism that 
brings the whole philosophy into disrepute. I am not a strict constructionist, and no 
one ought to be—though better that, I suppose, than a nontextualist. A text should 
not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be 
construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”). 
 58. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV. 
157, 163 n.18 (2018) (providing examples of Supreme Court justices joining in the fair 
meaning approach). 
 59. Elizabeth Slattery & Tiffany Bates, Neil Gorsuch Just Finished Year 1 on the Supreme 
Court. Here’s How He’s Making His Mark, HERITAGE FOUND., (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/neil-gorsuch-just-finished-year-1-the-
supreme-court-heres-how-hes-making-his-mark [https://perma.cc/B3QM-L24B]. 
 60. Debra Cassens Weiss, Scalia Weighs in on Posner’s Controversial Book Review, Calls 
Posner’s Assertion ‘a Lie,’ ABA J. (Sept. 18, 2012, 11:42 AM), http://www.abajournal 
.com/news/article/scalia_weighs_in_on_a_controversial_book_review/?utm_source=
maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email [https://perma.cc/E825-
2NAN] (“To say that I used legislative history is simply, to put it bluntly, a lie.”). 
 61. SCALIA, supra note 57, at 36; see also id. at 17 (“[I]t is simply incompatible with 
democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning 
of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver 
promulgated . . . . It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”); id. at 23 
(“Only a day or two ago—when counsel talked of the intention of a legislature, I was 
indiscreet enough to say I don’t care what their intention was. I only want to know 
what the words mean.’ And I agree with [Justice] Holmes’s [ ] remark, quoted 
approvingly by Justice Jackson: ‘We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask 
only what the statute means.’”) (footnotes omitted). 
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Why would you think this [material—the legislative debates and 
committee reports—] is an expression of the legislature’s intent? 
And the more you use that garbage, the less accurate it is . . . . [O]ne 
of . . . the major[] functions of . . . hot shot Washington lawyers is 
drafting legislative history. You send it up to the [H]ill, and get a friendly 
Senator to read it into the record or something else, to change the 
meaning of the text that’s adopted. So, you know, . . . it’s crazy.62 
Instead, Justice Scalia attempted to ascertain the “fair meaning” of 
the text of statutes by making extensive use of such material as roughly 
contemporaneous dictionaries and legal decisions to define key 
terms.63 Justice Scalia also examined the country’s history at 
approximately the time of the legislation and the legislation’s societal 
context to help define the particular words or phrases in the statutes.64 
If Justice Scalia’s textualist analysis were applied to the Sherman Act, 
neither its congressional debates nor the committee reports would be 
analyzed.65 A textualist analysis would, by contrast, undertake a number 
of inquiries to ascertain what the statute “originally” and “fairly” 
meant.66 To do this, the inquiry would examine: 
1. The definitions of the key terms in dictionaries (Justice Scalia 
seems especially interested in the definitions of key words in 
contemporary dictionaries67), legal dictionaries, and legal treatises 
that existed when these laws were passed. Ideally, we would find 
and analyze sources defining these terms as close as possible to 
when the Sherman Act was passed.68 
                                               
 62. Lande, supra note 56, at 2362. 
 63. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 78 (arguing that “[w]ords must be given 
the meaning they had when the text was adopted”). 
 64. Scalia distinguished his approach from a traditional legislative history approach: 
[A]ny legal audience knows what legislative history is. It’s the history of the 
enactment of the bill. It’s the floor speeches. It’s the prior drafts of 
committees. That’s what legislative history is. It isn’t the history of the times. It’s 
not what people thought it meant immediately after its enactment. 
See Richard A. Posner, Richard Posner Responds to Antonin Scalia’s Accusation of Lying, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 20, 2012) (emphasis added), https://newrepublic.com/article/ 
107549/richard-posner-responds-antonin-scalias-accusation-lying. 
 65. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 369 (referring to the “false notion that 
committee reports and floor speeches are worthwhile aids in statutory interpretation”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 34–35, 37 (citing three sources on guides to statutory interpretation, 
and then—as examples of permissible and useful sources of meaning—four dictionary 
definitions of key terms). 
 68. Id. at 78 (“Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was 
adopted.”); see also Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, app. 1784–90 (2020) 
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2. English common law cases from before 1890 to determine 
whether the federal antitrust statutes borrowed key terms from 
the common law and, if so, what they meant in common law 
decisions.69 We could also make inferences from state antitrust 
statutes that existed when the federal antitrust laws were passed, 
and their interpretations in courts, in case the federal laws 
borrowed key terms from a state statute.70 
3. The use of key terms in federal antitrust cases from the 1890s to 
help determine “what people thought [the statute] meant 
immediately after its enactment.”71 
                                               
(Alito, J., dissenting) (citing five contemporary dictionaries in the appendix of his 
textualist opinion to ascertain what the word “sex” meant in 1964). See generally SCALIA 
& GARNER, supra note 38, app. at 415–24 (explaining the appropriate use of 
dictionaries to analyze text). 
 69. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 320 (“A statute that uses a common-law 
term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning.”); see infra note 77 (stating 
that Justice Scalia cited, with apparent approval, a pre-Sherman Act common law 
antitrust case). 
 70. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), Justice Scalia examined 
roughly contemporaneous state constitutional provisions and statutes to help 
determine what various terms in the Second Amendment meant: 
[N]ine state constitutional provisions written in the 18th century or the first 
two decades of the 19th[] [ ] enshrined a right of citizens to “bear arms in 
defense of themselves and the state” or “bear arms in defense of himself and 
the state.” . . . That was also the interpretation of those state constitutional 
provisions adopted by pre-Civil War state courts. 
554 U.S. at 584–85. Scalia was also guided by analogous state statutes, stating, “Many 
colonial statutes required individual arms bearing for public-safety reasons—such as 
[a] 1770 Georgia law . . . . That broad public-safety understanding was the connotation 
given to the North Carolina right by that State’s Supreme Court in 1843.” Id. at 601. 
This surely is the weakest of the aids to interpretation because state statutes could be 
inconsistent with one another. 
 71. Posner, supra note 64. In Heller, Justice Scalia used statutory interpretations of 
the Second Amendment from the period shortly following its adoption as a guide to 
determining its meaning. As he explained: 
We now address how the Second Amendment was interpreted from 
immediately after its ratification through the end of the 19th century . . . . [We 
conduct an] examination of a variety of legal and other sources to determine 
the public understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment or 
ratification. That sort of inquiry is a critical tool of constitutional 
interpretation. As we will show, virtually all interpreters of the Second 
Amendment in the century after its enactment interpreted the Amendment as 
we do . . . . [The 19th-century cases that interpreted the Second Amendment 
universally] protect an individual right unconnected with militia service. 
Id. at 605. 
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4. The “history of the times.”72 It would use the history of the period 
producing the antitrust laws to help ascertain what Congress 
meant when it used terms like “monopolize” or “attempt to 
monopolize” in the Sherman Act. 
5. A textualist analysis would not imply or invent any exemptions 
that are not plainly evident in the words of the statutes.73 If an 
antitrust law contains an explicit exemption then of course that 
exemption would be respected. But no non-explicit exemptions 
would be inferred in order to achieve some overall goal or 
purpose of the statute.74 
6. A textualist interprets language fairly, ordinarily and reasonably, 
but not “literally.” Justice Scalia said that “the good textualist is 
                                               
 72. SCALIA, supra note 57, at 30; see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 399 (arguing 
that lawyers and judges are qualified to do the historical research that originalism 
requires); see also id. at 400–02 (discussing how the history of gun use in the United 
States helps interpret a gun control statute). Moreover, Scalia quotes, with apparent 
approval, Chief Justice Taney: 
In expounding this law, the judgment of the court cannot, in any degree, be 
influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of 
Congress in the debate which took place on its passage, nor by the motives or 
reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were 
offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the 
only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself; and we must gather their 
intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity 
exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the 
public history of the times in which it was passed. 
SCALIA, supra note 57, at 30 (footnote omitted). 
 73. See infra Section III.C (explaining Scalia’s view that no exception should be 
read into a statue unless explicitly contained therein); see also Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749 
(second alteration in original) (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 101) 
(“[U]nexpected applications of broad language reflect only Congress’s ‘presumed 
point [to] produce general coverage—not to leave room for courts to recognize ad 
hoc exceptions.’”). 
 74. Scalia believed that no exception should be inferred to achieve a greater 
purpose because: 
[E]ven if you think our laws mean not what the legislature enacted but what 
the legislators intended, there is no way to tell what they intended except the 
text. Nothing but the text has received the approval of the majority of the 
legislature and of the President, assuming that he signed it rather than vetoed 
it and had it passed over his veto. Nothing but the text reflects the full 
legislature’s purpose. Nothing. 
Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory Constitutional Interpretation, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1612 (2012). 
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not a literalist.”75 Scalia and Garner explain that the “notion that 
words should be strictly construed” is untrue.76 They quote 
Justice Frankfurter: “Literalness may strangle meaning.”77 As 
Justice Brett Kavanaugh observed in Bostock, “courts must follow 
ordinary meaning, not literal meaning.”78 
7. A textualist tries very hard not to reach an “absurd” conclusion. The 
“absurdity doctrine” means that no statute should be interpreted in 
an absurd manner.79 Justice Scalia adopted a narrow version of this 
doctrine that would limit it to technical or drafting errors.80 
                                               
 75. SCALIA, supra note 57, at 24. 
 76. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 355. They conclude: 
Strict constructionism understood as a judicial straightjacket is a long-outmoded 
approach deriving from a mistrust of all enacted law . . . . Textualists should 
object to being called strict constructionists . . . . [It] is an irretrievably pejorative 
term, as it ought to be. Strict constructionism, as opposed to fair-reading 
textualism, is not a doctrine to be taken seriously. 
Id. at 356 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 77. Id. at 355 (quoting Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (1946)). 
 78. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The “literalism” issue is 
one way of characterizing much of the disagreement between the Court’s two leading 
textualists in the Bostock case. Justice Kavanaugh objected to Justice Gorsuch’s 
interpretation of the operative term, writing: 
[C]ourts must adhere to the ordinary meaning of phrases, not just the 
meaning of the words in a phrase . . . . The “prime directive in statutory 
interpretation is to apply the meaning that a reasonable reader would derive 
from the text of the law,” so that “for hard cases as well as easy ones, the ordinary 
meaning . . . of the relevant statutory text is the anchor for statutory 
interpretation.” . . . [P]roper statutory interpretation asks “how a reasonable 
person, conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions, would 
read the text in context. This approach recognizes that the literal or dictionary 
definitions of words will often fail to account for settled nuances or 
background conventions that qualify the literal meaning of language and, in 
particular, of legal language.” . . . Consider a simple example of how ordinary 
meaning differs from literal meaning. A statutory ban on “vehicles in the park” 
would literally encompass a baby stroller. But no good judge would interpret 
the statute that way because the word “vehicle,” in its ordinary meaning, does 
not encompass baby strollers. 
Id. 
 79. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 234. Perhaps this explains why Justice 
Scalia said, “I’m an originalist and a textualist, not a nut.” Nina Totenberg, Justice 
Scalia, the Great Dissenter, Opens up, NPR (Apr. 28, 2008, 7:32 AM), https://www.npr 
.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89986017 [https://perma.cc/UL2Y-HLUK]. 
 80. See id. at 234, 238. 
Justice Scalia endorsed the [absurdity doctrine], or at least what he called a 
“narrow version” of it. According to the Justice, two conditions must coincide 
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These textualist rules of statutory interpretation do not, of course, 
mean every textualist will always interpret key words and terms identically. 
Indeed, as Jonathan Skrmetti observed, “the three [Supreme Court] 
Bostock opinions are a master class in defining and applying textualism.”81 
B.   Neither Justice Scalia Nor Anyone Else Has Performed a Textualist 
Analysis of the Relevant Sherman Act Terms 
Unfortunately, neither Justice Scalia nor anyone else has ever 
performed a textualist analysis of any of the antitrust laws on the no-fault 
issue. Justice Scalia authored five antitrust opinions,82 three concurrences,83 
and three dissenting84 opinions in antitrust cases. Most do not even come 
close to undertaking a textualist analysis of the no-fault issue.85 
Nevertheless, some are instructive illustrations of textualist analysis. 
                                               
to justify application of the canon. First, the absurdity “must consist of a 
disposition that no reasonable person could intend.” More precisely, and 
quoting Joseph Story, “the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to 
the case [must] be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, 
unite in rejecting the application.” Mere oddity or anomaly does not suffice. 
Second, the absurdity must be “reparable by changing or supplying a 
particular word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a 
technical or ministerial error.” Satisfaction of these two conditions, the Justice 
said, establishes that the apparent anomaly was a drafting error, an error that 
changing or applying a particular word corrects. 
Alan J. Meese, Justice Scalia and Sherman Act Textualism, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2013, 
2036 (2017) (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 81. Skrmetti, supra note 6. 
 82. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013); Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 
499 U.S. 365 (1991); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 83. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 176 (2004) (Scalia, 
J., concurring); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 576 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 84. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1603 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 812 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. 504 U.S. 451, 486 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 333 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 85. Most Scalia decisions did not even come close to undertaking a relevant 
textualist analysis. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., concurring); Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. 
at 486 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Summit Health, Ltd., 500 U.S. at 333 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365. 
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For example, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,86 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority in part and dissenting in part, performed a 
textualist analysis of the term “boycott” as it was used in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act87 exception to the antitrust laws: 
Determining proper application of [section] 3(b) of the McCarran–
Ferguson Act to the present cases requires precise definition of the 
word “boycott.” It is a relatively new word, little more than a century 
old. It was first used in 1880, to describe the collective action taken 
against Captain Charles Boycott, an English agent managing various 
estates in Ireland . . . . Thus, the verb made from the unfortunate 
Captain’s name has had from the outset the meaning it continues to 
carry today. To “boycott” means “[t]o combine in refusing to hold 
relations of any kind, social or commercial, public or private, with (a 
neighbour), on account of political or other differences, so as to 
punish him for the position he has taken up, or coerce him into 
abandoning it.”88 
Justice Scalia then used the Webster’s Dictionary definition to 
resolve a key legal dispute.89 This is significant because it illustrates 
Justice Scalia’s use of a roughly contemporaneous dictionary 
definitions (he used a 1950 dictionary to define a term in a 1946 law), 
a technique that will be discussed below. 
The Scalia opinion that would have been most likely to have 
undertaken the relevant textualist analysis was Trinko because the case 
involved the core meaning of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.90 
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia’s opinion did not undertake a textualist 
analysis of the overall meaning of Section 2. He instead simply cited 
                                               
 86. 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2018). 
 88. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 800–01 (quoting 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
468 (2d ed. 1989)) (second alteration in original). 
 89. 1 WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 321 (2d ed. 1950) (emphasis 
added) (defining “boycott” as “to withhold, wholly or in part, social or business 
intercourse from, as an expression of disapproval or means of coercion”); see Hartford 
Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 801 (citing 1 WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra) 
(alteration in original) (“As the definition just recited provides, the refusal may be 
imposed ‘to punish [the target] for the position he has taken up, or coerce him into 
abandoning it.’ . . . Furthermore, other dictionary definitions extend the term to 
include a partial boycott—a refusal to engage in some, but not all, transactions with 
the target.”). 
 90. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 401 (explaining the issue as whether the complaint states a claim under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act). 
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precedent—the United States v. Grinnell Corp.91 case—for his assertion 
that the Sherman Act contains an exception for a monopolist that 
gains its monopoly through historical accident or superior efficiency.92 
Justice Scalia extensively analyzed the term “restraint of trade” in 
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.93 using a common-law 
based textualist analysis,94 but he was not examining the no-fault issue. 
Rather, he distinguished the idea of a “restraint of trade” from the 
understanding of which specific business practices restrained trade.95 
His opinion considered the common law antecedents of modern 
antitrust law but did not involve the no-fault issue.96 
Finally, although it did not discuss the issue of no-fault monopoly, it 
is instructive that in a concurring opinion in Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck,97 
a Robinson-Patman Act98 case, Justice Scalia wrote: 
The language of the Act is straightforward: Any price discrimination 
whose effect “may be substantially . . . to injure, destroy, or prevent 
competition” is prohibited, unless it is immunized by the “cost 
justification” defense, i.e., unless it “make[s] only due allowance for 
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from 
the differing methods or quantities in which [the] commodities 
                                               
 91. 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
 92. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (citation omitted) (quoting Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–
71) (“The complaint alleges that Verizon denied interconnection services to rivals in 
order to limit entry. If that allegation states an antitrust claim at all, it does so under 
[Section] 2 of the Sherman Act, which declares that a firm shall not ‘monopolize’ or 
‘attempt to monopolize.’ It is settled law that this offense requires, in addition to the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, ‘the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’”). 
 93. 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 94. See id. at 731–32 (explaining that common law meaning is important, but 
Congress intended the meaning of “restraint of trade” to be dynamic). 
 95. Id. at 732 (“The Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with 
its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static 
content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”). Justice Scalia also 
cited, with apparent approval, a pre-Sherman Act common law case. Id. at 731 (citing 
Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889)) (“The changing content of the term 
‘restraint of trade’ was well recognized at the time the Sherman Act was enacted.”). 
 96. Id. at 732 (“[T]he common law, both in general and as embodied in the 
Sherman Act, does not lightly assume that the economic realities underlying earlier 
decisions have changed, or that earlier judicial perceptions of those realities were in 
error.”). 
 97. 496 U.S. 543 (1990). 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2018). 
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are . . . sold or delivered.” There is no exception for “reasonable” 
functional discounts that do not meet this requirement.99 
This textualist discussion is noteworthy because it affirms the “fair or 
ordinary reading” conclusion that no exception should be implied in 
the law unless it is explicitly a part of the statute. This will be important 
infra Section II.B.3 during the discussion of whether Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act actually contains an “exception” for monopolies attained 
by superior efficiency. 
Justice Gorsuch has written one Supreme Court opinion100 and three 
Circuit Court opinions that substantively address Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.101 None perform a textualist analysis of the no-fault issue. 
The majority opinion in Apple Inc. v. Pepper102 does include a textualist 
analysis by Justice Kavanaugh, but it concerns the statute’s language 
concerning a plaintiff’s right to sue, not the issue of no-fault monopoly.103 
III.    A TEXTUALIST ANALYSIS OF SECTION 2 DEMONSTRATES IT DOES 
NOT REQUIRE FAULT 
A.   A Textualist Analysis of “Monopolize” 
A Justice Scalia-inspired textualist analysis of the Sherman Act’s 
approach to the no-fault issue leads to a startling result: courts should 
interpret Section 2 to impose sanctions on all monopolies, not just 
monopolies acquired by anticompetitive conduct. The Sherman Act 
should not contain an exception for efficient monopolists. 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits anyone who shall “monopolize[] 
or attempt to monopolize.”104 The statute never defines “monopolize,”105 
                                               
 99. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. at 579 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alterations in original) 
(citation omitted). 
 100. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1525 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 101. Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013); Kay Elec. Coop. 
v. City of Newkirk, 647 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2011); Four Corners Nephrology Assocs. 
v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 102. 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
 103. See Apple Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1522. 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
 105. Indeed, it was rare for pre-Sherman Act restraint of trade cases to use the term 
“monopolize.” For an exception (which seems to imply a no-fault approach to the 
area), see Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 366 (N.Y. 1888) (implying a no-fault approach 
and asserting that “[c]orporations . . . if allowed to engage without supervision, in 
subjects of enterprise foreign to their charters, or if permitted unrestrainedly to 
control and monopolize the avenues to that industry in which they are engaged, [ ] 
become a public menace . . . .”). 
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and uses it in place of the more straightforward term “monopoly.” Did 
Congress intend “monopolize” to mean the same thing as “monopoly,” 
or was it meant to be a broader or narrower term, or simply to be 
different? 
The Act’s preamble does use the term “monopolies,” calling the statute 
“[a]n act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and 
monopolies.”106 It is unclear, however, whether “unlawful” modifies only 
“restraints,” in which case the words of the preamble would tend to condemn 
all monopolies, or whether “unlawful” also modifies “monopolies,” which 
would be ambiguous. It could mean that all monopolies are illegal, or that 
some monopolies are legal. 
The overriding question is of course whether the statute’s prohibition 
against firms that “monopolize” or “attempt to monopolize” was intended 
to encompass only the subset of cases that created a monopoly through 
anticompetitive means—the current legal requirement for a Section 2 
violation.107 As the next Sections will demonstrate, a “fair meaning” or 
textualist approach to Section 2 leads to a simple conclusion: a firm 
illegally “monopolizes” if it was a monopoly at the time of the suit, and it 
engages in an illegal “attempt to monopolize” if it was in the process of 
seriously attempting to acquire a monopoly. The statute contains no 
exception for a monopoly acquired through superior efficiency.108 
1. Roughly contemporaneous dictionaries 
As noted earlier, Justice Scalia was especially interested in the 
definitions of key terms in contemporary dictionaries.109 Scalia and 
Garner believe that six dictionaries of the 1851 to 1900 period are 
“useful and authoritative.”110 We have checked all six for definitions of 
                                               
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2018). Scalia and Garner write that a textualist should consider 
such prefatory material: “A preamble, purpose clause, or recital is a permissible 
indicator of meaning . . . . The title and headings are [also] permissible indicators of 
meaning.” See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 217, 221. 
 107. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 407 (2004) (noting that to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a business must 
purposefully acquire dominant market power). 
 108. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
 109. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 415.  As noted earlier, immediately after 
Scalia and Garner introduce the “fair reading” method, id. at 33, they cite three 
sources on guides to statutory interpretation, and then, as examples of permissible and 
useful sources of meaning, they provide four dictionary definitions of key terms. Id. at 
37. Their book also has an appendix titled, “A Note on the Use of Dictionaries.” Id. 
app. at 415. 
 110. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, app. at 419, 421. 
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“monopolize” and have also checked other dictionaries, including the 
Oxford English Dictionary, which Scalia and Garner believe to be 
useful and authoritative even though it is from 1908. As will be seen, 
the principle definition of each for “monopolize” was simply that a firm 
had acquired a monopoly. None require anticompetitive conduct for 
a firm to “monopolize” a market.  
The then-highly esteemed111 1897 edition of Century Dictionary and 
Cyclopedia112 defined “monopolize” as: “1. To obtain a monopoly of; 
have an exclusive right of trading in: as, to monopolize all the corn in 
a district . . . . 2. To obtain or engross the whole of; obtain exclusive 
possession of. ‘As if this age had monopolized all goodness to itself.’”113  
Serendipitously, a definition of “monopolize” was given in a dictionary 
that Scalia and Garner believed to be useful and authoritative that was 
cited during the Sherman Act’s legislative debates, just before the final 
vote on the Bill.114 As noted in Part I above, Senator Edmunds cited a 
dictionary to define the term “monopolize.” Although normally a 
textualist would not care about anything uttered during a 
congressional debate, Senator Edmund’s remarks surely should be 
significant to a textualist because his remarks help a textualist do 
exactly what Justice Scalia said we should do: use a dictionary to define 
and demonstrate what Congress was doing when it decided to use the 
term “monopolize” in the Sherman Act. When Senator Edmunds 
noted the meaning of “monopolize” as it was used in a contemporary 
Webster’s Dictionary his remarks should be examined not as legislative 
history, but rather as a piece of evidence as to common linguistic usage 
in 1890: 
[T]he best answer I can make to both my friends is to read from 
Webster’s Dictionary the definition of the verb “to monopolize”: 1. 
To purchase or obtain possession of the whole of, as a commodity or 
goods in market, with the view to appropriate or control the 
exclusive sale of; as, to monopolize sugar or tea . . . . 2. To engross 
                                               
 111. See Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia, BRITANNICA https://www.britannica.com/ 
print/article/102958 [https://perma.cc/46RM-2426] (describing the Century 
Dictionary and Cyclopedia as an American-English dictionary that is “generally 
regarded as one of the greatest ever produced” and that even “[l]ong after it went out 
of print, [it] remained one of the most valuable references for etymologists, 
lexicographers, and historians”). 
 112. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, app. at 419. 
 113. 5 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA 3843 (1st ed., New York, The 
Century Co. 1897). 
 114. See 21 Cong. Rec. 3152 (1890). 
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or obtain by any means the exclusive right of, especially the right of 
trading to any place, or with any country or district . . . .115 
This again shows that “monopolize” primarily and fairly meant to 
acquire a monopoly.116 The definition was not restricted to acquisitions 
of monopoly through anticompetitive conduct.117 It was, moreover, 
essentially the same as the definitions in the 1828,118 1898,119 and 
1913120 editions of Webster’s Dictionary. 
The first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary121 containing the 
definition of “monopolize” was published in 1908 (not too long after 
                                               
 115. Id. Since “monopolize” can be defined in part by using the word “engross” it 
should be noted that the relevant definition of “engross” given in the 1886 Webster’s 
Dictionary is: “4. To purchase either the whole or large quantities of, for the purpose 
of making a profit by enhancing the price; hence to take or assume in undue quantity, 
proportion, or degree; as to engross commodities in market; to engross power.” 
WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 449 (London, George Bell 
& Sons 1886). 
 116. See WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 
115, at 855. 
 117. It is, however, possible that the “with the view to” language could excuse an 
accidental monopoly. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945), Judge Hand famously thought there could be accidental monopolies, noting 
that a monopoly might arise by historic accident or where monopoly had been “thrust 
upon” a firm. See id. at 429. 
  118.  See 2 AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 138 (New York, S. 
Converse 1828) (Defining “monopolize” as “One that monopolizes; a person who 
engrosses a commodity by purchasing the whole of that article in market for the 
purpose of selling it at an advanced price; or one who has a license or privilege granted 
by authority, for the sole buying or selling of any commodity. The man who retains in 
his hands his own produce or manufacture, is not a monopolist within the meaning of 
the laws for preventing monopolies.”); id, (defining “monopolize” as: “1. [t]o purchase 
or obtain possession of the whole of any commodity or goods in market with the view 
of selling them at advanced prices, and of having the power of commanding the prices; 
as, to monopolize sugar or tea. 2.  To engross or obtain by any means the exclusive right 
of trading to any place, and the sole power of vending any commodity or goods in a 
particular place or country; as, to monopolize the India or Levant trade. 3. To obtain the 
whole; as, to monopolize advantages”). 
  119.    WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 540 (Springfield, G. & C. Merriam Co. 
1898) (defining “monopolize” as “[t]o have or get a monopoly of”). 
  120. Monopolize, WEBSTER’S 1913, https://www.websters1913.com/words/Monopolize 
 [https://perma.cc/2Y5T-6NFW] (defining “monopolize” as “[t]o acquire a monopoly 
of; to have or get the exclusive privilege or means of dealing in, or the exclusive 
possession of; to engross the whole of; as, to monopolize the coffee trade; to monopolize 
land”). 
  121.    This is a dictionary that Scalia and Garner characterize as one of the most 
useful and authoritative from the 1901–1950 period. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 
40, app. at 422. 
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1890 and which therefore might be an accurate guide to usage when 
the Sherman Act was passed): “1 . . . . To get into one’s hands the 
whole stock of (a particular commodity); to gain or hold exclusive 
possession of (a trade); to engross . . . . To have a monopoly. . . . 2 . . . . 
To obtain exclusive possession or control of; to get or keep entirely to 
oneself.”122 Not only does the Oxford English Dictionary equate 
“monopolize” with “monopoly,” but nowhere does this definition mention 
a requirement that a monopolist must have engaged in anticompetitive 
conduct.123 
These definitions are in relevant part identical to the definitions in 
four other dictionaries of the period considered reliable by Scalia and 
Garner124 and in five other roughly contemporaneous dictionaries as 
well.125 In sum, all of the surveyed roughly contemporaneous dictionaries 
                                               
 122. 6 A NEW ENGLISH LANGUAGE DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 624 (1st ed. 1908). 
 123. See id. 
 124. See 5 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 113; supra text 
accompanying note 115 (citing the 1886 Webster’s Dictionary definition of 
“monopolize”). 
Stormonth’s dictionary provides a variety of related definitions. JAMES STORMONTH, 
ETYMOLOGICAL AND PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 369 (7th ed., 
Edinburgh and London, William Blackwood and Sons 1882) (defining “monopolise” 
as “[t]o purchase or obtain possession of the whole of anything with the view of selling 
at an advanced price and controlling the market; to obtain or engross the whole”; 
“monopolising” as “obtaining the sole power or right; engrossing”; and “monopolist” 
as “one who has obtained the exclusive power to trade in a certain article, or who has 
the command of the market”). Interestingly, its definition of “monopoly” includes not 
just purchasing all of an article, but also its manufacturer. See id. (defining “monopoly” 
as “ . . . the sole power of selling any article by purchase, by superior manufacture, or 
by patent.” 
Latham’s dictionary contains a similar definition of monopolize. ROBERT GORDON 
LATHAM, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 247 (abridged ed., London, 
Longmans, Green, & Co. 1876) (defining “monopolize” similarly as “[e]ngross, so as 
to have the sole power or privilege of vending any commodity” and defining 
“monopolizer” as “monopolist”); see also 3 UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 3185 (Robert Hunter & Charles Morris eds., New York, Peter Fenelon 
Collier 1897) (defining “monopolize” as “1. To obtain or possess a monopoly of; to 
have exclusive command over for production, sale, or purchase. 2. To obtain or hold 
exclusive possession of; to engross.”); JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 927 (Boston, Hickling, Swan, and Brewer 1860) (defining 
“monopolize” as “[t]o buy up or obtain possession of the whole of, so as to sell at one’s 
own price; to engross the whole of, as of any branch of trade; to obtain a monopoly of; 
to forestall”). 
 125. See JOHN CRAIG, THE UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY 184 (London, George 
Routledge and Sons 1869) (defining “monopolize” as “[t]o engross so as to have the 
sole power, or exclusive privilege of vending any commodity” and “monopolizer” as 
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define “monopolize” as simply to gain a monopoly.126 Some definitions 
included “with a view of” selling the goods at a higher price—language 
that could perhaps create an exception for an accidental monopolist 
(assuming they ever exist).127 
Since many of these dictionaries gave “engross” as one of the ways in 
which a firm could become a monopoly, it is worth noting that this 
term had a similar, but more specific, meaning than “monopolize”. For 
example, the 1897 Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia defined “engross” 
as: 
To monopolize the supply of, or the supplies in; get entire 
possession or control of, for the purpose of raising prices and 
enhancing profits: as, to engross the importations of tea; to engross the 
market for wheat . . . . To occupy wholly; take up or employ entirely, 
to the exclusion of other things: as, business engrosses his attention 
or thoughts; to be engrossed in study.128 
Indeed, the five other dictionaries of the period that Scalia and 
Garner considered useful and authoritative defined “engross” 
similarly—as simply to obtain a monopoly. None of these dictionaries 
required otherwise anticompetitive conduct as a part of engrossing 
(except of course for the very act of obtaining a monopoly).129 By 
                                               
“[o]ne who engrosses a commodity by purchasing the entire article, with a view to 
enhance the price”); THE NEW EXCELSIOR DICTIONARY 183 (Nashua, C.C. Parker 1889) 
(defining “monopolize” as “to engross the whole”); THE AMERICAN POPULAR 
DICTIONARY 196 (New York, Hurst & Co. 1879) (defining “monopolize” as “to obtain 
or engross the whole”); ROBERT SULLIVAN, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 179 
(Dublin, Alexander Thom & Sons 1854) (defining “monopolize” as “to engross all of 
a commodity or business into one’s own hands”). 
 126. For example, Latham’s dictionary used one example involving anticompetitive 
conduct in its definition of “monopolizer”: “There was in it the fraud of some old 
patentees and monopolizers in the trade of bookselling.” LATHAM, supra note 124, at 247. 
 127. See CRAIG, supra note 125, at 184; STORMONTH, supra note 124, at 369. 
 128. 5 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA , supra note 113, at 1934. Similarly, 
“engrosser” was defined as “[o]ne who takes, or gets control of, the whole; a 
monopolizer; specifically, a monopolizer of commodities or a commodity of trade or 
business.” Id. 
 129. See LATHAM, supra note 124, at 481 (defining “engross” as “[s]eize in the gross; 
seize, obtain commodity for the sake of selling at a high price; monopolize”); 
STORMONTH, supra note 124, at 180 (defining “engross” as “to make great, to increase, 
to enlarge—the primary signification being to buy up a commodity in order to increase 
the price, to occupy the whole, as the thoughts; to take or assume in undue quantities 
or degrees," defining “engrossing” as “the invidious occupation of anything which 
ought to be shared with others,” and defining “engrossment” as “the act of 
appropriating things in undue quantities.”); 2 UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
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analogy, to “engross” is similar to the modern idea of acquiring a 
monopoly through merger. If one meaning of “monopolize” in Section 
2 is to “engross,” then the statute specifically prohibited attaining a 
monopoly through merger.  
Crucially, none of the definitions of “monopolize” specifically require 
any conduct that we would today characterize as anticompetitive. A few 
definitions did give specific examples of how a firm might become a 
monopoly by anticompetitive means, or by engrossing (which is similar 
to merging), and some used a phrase like “controlling the market” 
which is ambiguous as to whether anticompetitive conduct must be 
involved.130 Crucially, however, none of these dictionaries exempted 
efficient monopolists from the term “monopolize” or specifically 
restricted the definition of “monopolize” to a monopoly gained by 
anticompetitive conduct. All of the dictionary definitions of the period 
therefore support a no-fault characterization of Section 2. 
2. Roughly contemporaneous legal dictionaries and legal treatises 
We did not find “monopolize” defined in any of the eight 1851 to 
1900 legal dictionaries and treatises characterized by Scalia and Garner 
as “useful and authoritative.”131 The only available contemporary legal 
treatise that define “monopolize” contain virtually the same definition 
of the term as was found in the dictionaries of the period. This can be 
seen in Green’s legal treatise from 1889, which itself cited Webster’s 
dictionary: 
To monopolize, as defined by Webster, is, 1. To purchase or obtain 
possession of the whole of any commodity or goods in the market, 
with the view of selling them at advanced prices, and of having the 
power to command the prices. 2. To engross or obtain by any means 
                                               
LANGUAGE, supra note 124, at 1887 (defining “engross” as to “buy up the whole or large 
quantities of any commodity with the object of controlling the market, and thus being 
able to sell again at an enhanced price”); WORCESTER, supra note 124, at 485 (defining 
“engross” as “[t]o buy up in large quantities in order to raise a demand and sell again 
at a higher price; to forestall; to monopolize” and defining “engrossing” as “[t]he act 
or the practice of buying up or forestalling”); supra note 115 (citing the 1886 Webster’s 
Dictionary definition of “engross”). 
Although the term “engrossing” was mostly concerned with monopolizing commodities, 
it surely would also encompass becoming a monopoly through a series of mergers of 
companies owning the goods in question. 
 130. See STORMONTH, supra note 124, at 369. “Controlling the market” is ambiguous 
because it could be simply a description of a monopoly, or it could imply anticompetitive 
exclusionary conduct. 
 131. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 38, app. at 421. 
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the exclusive right of trading to any place, and the sole power of 
vending any commodity or goods in a particular place or country.132 
See also the “useful and authoritative” 1897 edition of Bouvier’s Law 
Dictionary, which did not directly define “monopolize” but effectively 
defined the term when it discussed a related term, “forestalling the 
market” in a manner that did not require anticompetitive conduct: 
In the United States forestalling the market takes the form of 
“corners” or of “trusts,” which are attempts by one person or a 
conspiracy or combination of persons to monopolize an article of trade 
or commerce, or to control or regulate, or to restrict its manufacture or 
production in such a manner as to enhance the price.133 
Other roughly contemporaneous legal dictionaries such as Black’s 
Law Dictionary defined “engrossing”134 and “monopoly,” but not 
                                               
 132. SANFORD MOON GREEN, CRIME: ITS NATURE, CAUSES, TREATMENT, AND 
PREVENTION 308–09 (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company 1889); see also 1 
MARSHALL D. EWELL, ESSENTIALS OF THE LAW 517–18 (Boston, The Boston Book 
Company 1889) (defining “engrossing” and “monopolies” using terms similar to those 
in Webster’s Dictionary). 
 133. See 1 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 826 (Boston, The Boston Book Company 
1897). Bouvier’s 1856 edition also defined a similar term, “engrosser,” as not requiring 
anticompetitive conduct. See 1 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (6th ed., Philadelphia, 
Childs & Peterson 1856) (defining an “engrosser” as “[o]ne who purchases large 
quantities of any commodities in order to have the command of the market, and to 
sell them again at high prices”). 
 134. See Engrossing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed., St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 
1891) (citation omitted) (defining “engrossing” in English law as “The getting into 
one’s possession, or buying up, large quantities of corn, or other dead victuals, with 
intent to sell them again. The total engrossing of any other commodity, with intent to 
sell it at an unreasonable price. This was a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and 
imprisonment.” and defining “engross” in “old criminal law” as “To buy up so much of a 
commodity on the market as to obtain a monopoly and sell again at a forced price.”). 
Two other law dictionaries in the Scalia and Garner list provide similar definitions. 
See WILLIAM C. ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW 402 (Chicago, T.H. Flood and 
Company 1889) (defining “engross” as “At common law the offense of engrossing was 
the getting into one's possession, or buying up, large quantities of corn [grain] or 
other dead victuals, with intent to sell them again. An injury to the public. If permitted, 
one or more men could raise the price of provisions at will. The total engrossing of 
any other commodity, with intent to sell it at an unreasonable price, was also an 
indictable offense." (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)); J. KENDRICK KINNEY, A 
LAW DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY 282 (Chicago, Callaghan and Company 1893) 
(defining “engross” as “to buy up any commodity in large quantities, so as to obtain a 
monopoly, with an intent to sell it at an unreasonable price” and defining “engrossing” 
in English law as “[t]he buying up of large quantities of grain or other dead victuals, 
with intent to sell again; the total engrossing of any other commodity, with intent to 
sell it at an unreasonable price”). 
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“monopolize.”135 None of these definitions required a monopoly to have 
been formed in part or in whole through the use of anticompetitive 
conduct. 
3. Roughly contemporaneous antitrust cases 
Pre-Sherman Act common law antitrust cases must be interpreted 
with caution because the legal standards were changing. As Professor 
Letwin concluded: 
[A]s a federal judge observed . . . [in 1892,] the English common 
law on monopolies had for some years been drifting toward greater 
leniency while “in the United States there is a tendency to revive, 
with the aid of legislation, the strict rules of the common law against 
all forms of monopoly or engrossing.”136 
                                               
 135. See Monopoly, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 134 (“A privilege or peculiar 
advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive 
right (or power) to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular 
article, or control the sale of the whole supply of a particularly commodity.”). Even its 
1910 edition did not define “monopolize.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 790 (2d ed. 
1910); see also 2 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.), supra note 133, at 186 (defining 
“monopoly” but not “monopolize”); 2 ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, A LAW DICTIONARY AND 
GLOSSARY 207–08 (2d ed., New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1870) (same). Two 
contemporary legal dictionaries favored by Scalia and Garner also define “monopoly.” 
See 2 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 253 (15th ed., Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co. 
1883) (“The abuse of free commerce by which one or more individuals have procured 
the advantage of selling alone all of a particular kind of merchandise, to the detriment 
of the public . . . . A patent for a useful invention, under the United States laws, is not, 
in the old sense of the common law, a monopoly[] . . . .”); 2 STEWART RAPALJE & 
ROBERT L. LAWRENCE, A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW 834–35 (Jersey City, 
Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1883) (“§ 1. A license or privilege allowed by the sovereign 
for the sole buying and selling, making, working, or using of anything whatsoever . . . . 
§ 2. The popular meaning of ‘monopoly’ at the present day seems to be, the sole power 
(or a power largely in excess of that possessed of others) of dealing in some particular 
commodity, or at some particular place or market; or of carrying on some particular 
business. It is generally obtained by engrossing the market or the getting up of a 
‘corner’ in the thing proposed to be made the subject-matter of the monopoly.”). 
 136. William Letwin, The First Decade of The Sherman Act: Judicial Interpretation, 68 YALE 
L.J. 900, 904 (1959) (quoting Oliver v. Gilmore, 52 F. 562, 566 (C.C.D. Mass. 1892)). 
After Congress enacted the Sherman Act, lower court cases came down on both sides 
of the no-fault issue. See id. at 901–05 (discussing early cases arising under the Sherman 
Act). For example, a district court in Louisiana held in 1891 that the concern of 
Section 2 was simply whether the defendant held a monopoly. See Am. Biscuit & Mfg. 
Co. v. Klotz, 44 F. 721, 724–25 (C.C.E.D. La. 1891) (per curiam) (“[T]he law-maker 
has used the word [monopolize] to mean ‘to aggregate’ or ‘concentrate’ in the hands 
of few, practically, and, as a matter of fact, and according to the known results of 
human action, to the exclusion of others . . . . Now it is to be observed that these 
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Moreover, the pre-Sherman Act common law antitrust cases are of 
limited relevance because we found only one that used the term 
“monopolize” (it did so in a manner consistent with a no-fault approach).137 
Some common law cases stated that if entry was easy, a firm could not be a 
“monopoly,”138 but others did not.139 
The Supreme Court decided six Sherman Act cases in the decade after 
the law went into effect.140 The overriding lesson of these cases is that 
these opinions are not helpful in determining whether “monopolize” in 
Section 2 requires anticompetitive conduct. The lower court decisions of 
the period sometimes did, however, require anticompetitive conduct.141 
                                               
statutes outline an offense, but require for its complete commission no ulterior motive, 
such as to defraud, etc . . . .”). The district court thus appeared to expressly reject the 
need for anticompetitive conduct. See id. at 725 (“The offense is defined . . . [as] ‘to 
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, any of the trade or commerce.’ To compass 
either of these things, with no other motive than to compass them, and by any means, 
constitutes the offense.”). 
 137. Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 366 (N.Y. 1888) (“Corporations . . . if allowed 
to engage without supervision, in subjects of enterprise foreign to their charters, or if 
permitted unrestrainedly to control and monopolize the avenues to that industry in 
which they are engaged, [ ] become a public menace . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 138. See, e.g., Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 422 (N.Y. 1887) (“But the 
business is open to all others, and there is little danger that the public will suffer harm 
from lack of persons to engage in a profitable industry. Such contracts do not create 
monopolies.”); Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157, 163 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839) (“That is 
certainly a new kind of monopoly which only secures the plaintiff in the exclusive 
enjoyment of his business as against a single individual, while all the world beside are 
left at full liberty to enter upon the same enterprise.”); Att’y Gen. v. Consol. Gas Co. 
of N.Y., 108 N.Y.S. 823, 825 (App. Div. 1908) (“In no sense can the consolidation of 
the lighting companies in the city of New York into a single corporation be said to 
create such a monopoly for it gains thereby no exclusive right. The field is still open 
to any other company that can obtain the necessary consents from the constituted 
authorities, and neither the production nor the price can be arbitrarily fixed by the 
Consolidated Company.”); Watertown Thermometer Co. v. Pool, 4 N.Y.S. 861, 863 
(Gen. Term. 1889) (“But the business is open to all others, and there is little danger 
that the public will suffer harm from lack of persons to engage in a profitable industry. 
Such contracts do not create monopolies.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 133 (1876); Cravens v. Rodgers, 14 S.W. 
106, 107–08 (Mo. 1890); Angelica Jacket Co. v. Angelica, 98 S.W. 805, 812 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1906); Rafferty v. Buffalo City Gas Co., 56 N.Y.S. 288, 290 (App. Div. 1899). 
 140. See Letwin, supra note 136, at 914, 928. Letwin includes In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 
(1895), but In re Debs is actually about the prosecution’s use of an alternative to a 
Sherman Act proceeding. Id. at 911–14. 
 141. See, e.g., In re Greene, 52 F. 104, 116 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892) (“[A]n ‘attempt to 
monopolize’ . . . must be an attempt to secure or acquire an exclusive right in such 
trade or commerce by means which prevent or restrain others from engaging 
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It should, however, be instructive that these very early Supreme 
Court cases sometimes used the terms “monopolize” and “monopoly” 
interchangeably.142 Although none of the early Supreme Court cases 
explicitly said that Section 2 did not require anticompetitive conduct, by 
equating these two terms, they implicitly support a no-fault approach. 
For example, United States v. E.C. Knight Co.143 was concerned with 
firms that became a “monopoly” and implied that the Sherman Act 
regulated every monopoly.144 Significantly, the Court characterized the 
defendant as a “monopoly” that had “monopolized,” even though it 
only had 98% of the market.145 The Court also held that “all the 
authorities agree that in order to vitiate a contract or combination it is 
not essential that its result should be a complete monopoly, it is 
sufficient if it really tends to that end and to deprive the public of the 
advantages which flow from free competition.”146 In this expansive 
holding, the Court thus held that a company violated Section 2 by 
simply being a monopoly, and that it did not need to have 100% of the 
relevant market.147 
                                               
therein.”). In addition, complaints or indictments that failed to allege exclusionary 
acts were dismissed for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., United States v. Greenhut, 50 
F. 469, 469–70 (D. Mass. 1892) (dismissing a claim notwithstanding allegations that 
the Distilling and Cattle Feeding Company controlled 75% of all the distilled spirits 
manufactured and sold within the United States and increased prices). For a slightly 
later case, see Whitwell v. Cont’l Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454 (8th Cir. 1903). Id. at 462–63 
(noting that while the Sherman Act clearly prohibits clear attempts to monopolize 
where “the necessary effect . . . is to stifle or to directly and substantially restrict 
competition in commerce,” monopolies arising in the natural course of competitive 
commercial markets cannot be illegal “because such attempts are indispensable to the 
existence of any competition in commerce among the states”). 
 142. See infra notes 148–51. 
 143. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 144. See id. at 11 (“The fundamental question is, whether conceding that the 
existence of a monopoly in manufacture is established by the evidence, that monopoly 
can be directly suppressed under the act of Congress in the mode attempted by this 
bill . . . .”). See generally Richard O. Zerbe, The American Sugar Refining Company, 1887–
1914: The Story of a Monopoly, 12 J.L. & ECON. 339, 339 (1969) (discussing the “formation 
and aspects of the operation . . . of the American sugar monopoly”). 
 145. Id. at 3 (noting that the American Sugar Refining Company controlled all U.S. 
sugar refineries except for Revere of Boston, which produced 2% of all refined sugar). 
 146. Id. at 16. 
 147. Id. 
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Most of the other early Supreme Court cases, such as United States v. 
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n,148 Anderson v. United States,149 and Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,150 also appeared to use the terms 
“monopolize” and “monopoly” interchangeably.151 The remaining 
early cases, United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n152 and Hopkins v. United 
States,153 were silent on the issue. In addition, Standard Oil Co. of New 
Jersey v. United States154 and the cases it cited, like E.C. Knight, seemed to 
use the term “monopoly” to even include markets where the defendant 
did not possess 100% of the market.155 
If these very early Supreme Court cases had clearly stated that a 
monopolization violation required anticompetitive conduct (if they 
had stated, for example, that, “It is well established that the word 
‘monopolize’ in Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires anticompetitive 
conduct for a violation”) we would have to reconcile these statements 
                                               
 148. 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
 149. 171 U.S. 604 (1898). 
 150. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 151. See id. at 237 (“But this certainly does not take the contract of association out 
of the annulling effect of the rule against monopolies.”); Anderson, 171 U.S. at 619 (“If 
all engaged in the business were to become members of the association, yet, as the 
association itself does no business, it can and does monopolize none.”); Trans-Missouri 
Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 299–301 (using the term “monopolized” to describe a 
monopoly). 
 152. 171 U.S. 505 (1898). 
 153. 171 U.S. 578 (1898). 
 154. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 155. See id. at 33, 70, 73–74. A pre-Sherman Act case, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 
(1876), essentially equated monopoly and “virtual” monopoly. Id. at 131–32. 
(“[S]omething had occurred which led the whole body of the people to suppose that 
remedies such as are usually employed to prevent abuses by virtual monopolies might 
not be inappropriate here.”). A slightly later Supreme Court case, Swift & Co. v. United 
States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), is difficult to interpret on this point. The Supreme Court, 
per Justice Holmes, sustained an injunction entered in connection with the 
defendants’ violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 398. Holmes noted 
an allegation in the petition pertaining to the Section 2 charge: 
By force of the consequent inability of competitors to engage or continue in 
such commerce [due to defendants’ use of rebates from railroads and other 
devices], the defendants are attempting to monopolize, have monopolized, 
and will monopolize the commerce in live stock and fresh meats among the 
States and Territories, and with foreign countries . . . . 
Id. at 392. The alleged rebates were exclusionary acts, but it is difficult to ascertain the 
extent to which Holmes relied on this allegation to sustain the Section 2 charge. His 
primary focus was on the conspiracy among the defendants. Id. 
The authors are grateful to Dale Collins for this insight. 
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with the absence of an anticompetitive conduct requirement in the 
contemporary dictionary definitions of “monopolize.” But as Section 
IV.A below demonstrates, not until 1966 did the Supreme Court state 
in a relatively clear manner that Section 2 requires anticompetitive 
conduct.156 All of this suggests or is at least consistent with a no-fault 
interpretation of Section 2 as it was drafted. 
It might seem astonishing to many 21st century observers that in 
1890, Congress passed a law that fairly should be read as being 
designed to impose sanctions on monopolies without inquiring into 
whether they engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This sentiment can, 
however, be seen today in the views of Senators Sanders, Warren, and 
others, who have called for the break-up of a large number of alleged 
monopolies, including Facebook, Google, and Amazon, without 
inquiring into whether they have engaged in anticompetitive 
conduct.157 It should not be surprising that the no-fault sentiment 
existed at other points in our nation’s history as well. 
B.   A Textualist Analysis of “Attempt” To Monopolize 
A textualist interpretation of Section 2 also should analyze the word 
“attempt” as it was used during the 1890 period to gain understanding 
as to what Congress meant by the “attempt to monopolize” offense. 
However, no unexpected or counterintuitive result comes from this 
examination. Around 1890 “attempt” had its colloquial 21st Century 
meaning. There was no requirement that an “attempt” to monopolize 
needed anticompetitive conduct. 
The “useful and authoritative” 1897 Century Dictionary and 
Cyclopedia’s defines “attempt” thusly: “1. To make an effort to effect or 
do; endeavor to perform; undertake; essay: as, to attempt a bold flight . . . . 
2. To venture upon: as, to attempt the sea.— 3. To make trial of; prove; 
test . . . . 4. To try with afflictions. 5. To endeavor to obtain or attract.”158 
                                               
156. See infra note 176. The ambiguous 1945 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 
opinion also can be read to require anticompetitive conduct. See infra note 184. 
 157. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text (discussing calls to break up 
present-day technology trusts). 
 158. See 1 CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 113, at 371 (citation 
omitted).  Three other contemporary legal treatises Scalia and Garner deemed reliable 
have a similar definition. See KINNEY, supra note 133, at 81 (defining “attempt” as “[a]n 
act of endeavor to do a particular thing, with intent, by means of that act in whole or 
in part, to do it; more particularly an act of endeavor to commit some offense, carried 
beyond mere preparation, but falling short of actual commission”); see also 1 BENJ. 
VAUGHAN ABBOTT, DICTIONARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN AMERICAN OR ENGLISH 
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The 1898 Webster’s Dictionary gives a similar definition: 
Attempt . . . 1. To make trial or experiment of; to try. 2. To try to move, 
subdue, or overcome, as by entreaty. 3. To attack; to make an effort or 
attack upon . . . .’ An essay, trial, or endeavor; an undertaking; an attack, 
or an effort to gain a point.159 
The 1913 edition of Webster contains a similar definition.160 These 
definitions are essentially identical to its modern definition of 
“attempt”.161 The 1888 Oxford English Dictionary similarly reads: “1. A 
putting forth of effort to accomplish what is uncertain or difficult; a 
trial, essay, endeavour; effort, enterprise, undertaking”.162 
                                               
JURISPRUDENCE 106 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1879) (defining “attempt” as 
“[t]o endeavor; to try to accomplish . . . .  an effort or endeavor; some act tending 
towards the accomplishment of a purpose which exceeds a mere intent or design or 
preparation, and falls short of an execution of it. Usually spoken, in jurisprudence, of 
acts tending towards perpetration of offences.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
134 (citation omitted) (defining “attempt” in criminal law as “An effort or endeavor 
to accomplish a crime, amounting to more than mere preparation or planning for it, 
and which, if not prevented, would have resulted in the full consummation of the act 
attempted, but which, in fact, does not bring to pass the party's ultimate design. An 
intent to do a particular criminal thing combined with an act which falls short of the 
thing intended. There is a marked distinction between “attempt” and “intent”. The 
former conveys the idea of physical effort to accomplish an act; the latter, the quality 
of mind with which an act was done. To charge, in an indictment, an assault with an 
attempt to murder, is not equivalent to charging an assault with intent to murder.”). 
 159. WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 119, at 62. 
 160. Attempt, WEBSTER’S 1913, supra note 120 (“A[n] essay, trial, or endeavor; an 
undertaking; an attack, or an effort to gain a point; esp. an unsuccessful, as contrasted 
with a successful, effort . . . . Attempt to commit a crime (Law), such an intentional 
preparatory act as will apparently result, if not extrinsically hindered, in a crime which 
it was designed to effect. [Synonyms include,] Endeavor, Effort, Exertion, Trial. These 
words agree in the idea of calling forth our powers into action . . . . An attempt is always 
directed to some definite and specific object . . . . [T]o try; to endeavor to do or 
perform (some action); to assay; as, to attempt to sing; to attempt a bold flight.”). 
 161. Attempt, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/attempt 
[https://perma.cc/X5HH-H9VE] (defining “attempt” as “to make an effort to do, 
accomplish, solve, or effect”); see also Attempt, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/12765?rskey=WdNqpF&result=1&isAdvanced=fals
e#eid (defining “attempt” as “[a] putting forth of effort to accomplish what is 
uncertain or difficult; a trial, essay, endeavour; effort, enterprise, undertaking”). 
 162. 1 A NEW ENGLISH LANGUAGE DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 547 (1st ed., 
Oxford, Clarendon Press 1888). In its first edition, the Oxford English Dictionary was 
published in “fascicles,” mini-volumes that would contain one or a few letters. OED 
editions, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://public.oed.com/history/oed-editions/ 
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However, the word “attempt” in a statute had a specific meaning 
under the common law circa 1890. It meant “an intent to do a 
particular criminal thing, with an act toward it falling short of the thing 
intended.”163 Although one definition stated that the act needed to be 
“sufficient both in magnitude and in proximity to the fact intended, to 
be taken cognizance of by the law that does not concern itself with 
things trivial and small.”164 None defined the magnitude or nature of 
the necessary acts with great specificity (indeed, this task might well be 
impossible). However, it is noteworthy that in 1881 Oliver Wendell 
Holmes wrote about the attempt doctrine in his celebrated treatise, 
The Common Law: 
Eminent judges have been puzzled where to draw the line . . . the 
considerations being, in this case, the nearness of the danger, the 
greatness of the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt. When a 
man buys matches to fire a haystack . . . there is still a considerable 
chance that he will change his mind before he comes to the point. 
But when he has struck the match . . . there is very little chance that 
he will not persist to the end . . . .165 
                                               
#first-edition [https://perma.cc/A8J2-536H]. The volume containing the letter “A” was 
published in 1888, while the volume containing the letter “M” was not published until 
1908. Id. 
 163. 6 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 728 (6th ed., 
Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1877). 
 164. Id.; see also SEYMOUR F. HARRIS, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 19 (Cincinnati, 
Robert Clarke & Co. 1883) (“An attempt may be said to be the doing of any of the acts 
which must be done in succession before the desired object can be 
accomplished . . . .”); FRANKLIN FISKE HEARD, HEARD ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 385 (2d ed., 
Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1882) (“An attempt to commit a crime is an act 
done with intent to commit that crime, and forming part of a series of acts which would 
constitute its actual commission if it were not interrupted.”); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 
A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 39 (5th ed., London, Macmillan and Co. 1894) (“An 
attempt to commit a crime is an act done with intent to commit that crime, and 
forming part of a series of acts which would constitute its actual commission if it were 
not interrupted.”); WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, ELEMENTARY LAW § 472 (Boston, Little, 
Brown, and Company 1882) (“An [a]ttempt consists in the intent to commit a crime, 
combined with the doing of some act adapted to, but falling short of, its actual 
commission . . . . The act done must be, in its nature, adapted to accomplish the crime 
intended.”). 
 165. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 68–69 (Boston, Little, Brown, 
and Company 1881); see also WM. L. CLARK, JR., HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 103 (1st 
ed., St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 1894) (footnote omitted) (“An attempt to commit a 
crime is an act done with intent to commit that particular crime, and forming part of 
a series of acts which will apparently, if not interrupted by circumstances independent 
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It was clear, however, that acts constituting mere preparation or 
planning were insufficient.166  
Congress’s choice of the phrase “attempt to monopolize” surely built 
upon the existing common definitions of an “attempt” to commit robbery 
and other crimes.167 It implies that Congress intended a meaning of “attempt 
to monopolize” different from the current requirements of the offense. 
Although the meaning of a criminal “attempt” to violate a law may have 
                                               
of the doer’s will, constitute its actual commission. [ ] The act must be such as would 
be proximately connected with the completed crime.”). 
 166. See BISHOP, supra note 162, § 728 (describing the act as “sufficient both in 
magnitude and in proximity to the fact intended, to be taken cognizance of by the law 
that does not concern itself with things trivial and small”); LEWIS HOCHHEIMER, THE 
LAW OF CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 266 (2d ed. 1904) (footnote omitted) (“In 
order to constitute the offense of attempt, there must be an act in the nature of a direct 
movement towards the commission of the offense and, concurrent with such act, an 
actual purpose, or specific design, to commit the particular crime . . . . It is sufficient 
that one step be taken towards the commission of the contemplated crime; but mere 
preparation or planning is insufficient.”); EDWARD LIVINGSTON, A SYSTEM OF PENAL LAW 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1828) (defining 
“attempt” as “an endeavor to accomplish [an offense], which has failed from some 
other cause than the voluntary relinquishment of the design”); JOHN WILDER MAY, THE 
LAW OF CRIMES § 29 (1st ed., Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1881) (stating that 
to constitute attempt, “it is necessary that some act should be done in the pursuance 
of the intent, immediately and directly tending to the commission of the crime; an act 
which, should the crime be perpetrated, would constitute part and parcel of the 
transaction, but which does not reach to the accomplishment of the original intent”); 
JOHN WILDER MAY, THE LAW OF CRIMES § 18 (2d ed., Boston, Little, Brown, and 
Company 1893) (footnote omitted) (“An attempt is an act done in part execution of 
a design to commit a crime. There must be an intent that a crime shall be committed, 
and an act done, not in full execution, but in pursuance, of the intent.”); EMLIN 
MCCLAIN, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 84–85 (Iowa City, Emlin McClain 
1883) (“[A] criminal attempt is an intent to commit a specific crime, coupled with an 
act adapted to the commission of that crime which the law regards as sufficiently 
tending to its accomplishment to be a part of it, without, in itself, being the 
consummation of the crime.”); FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES 561 (Philadelphia, James Kay, Jun. and Brother 1846) (defining a 
person guilty of attempt as “[e]very person who shall attempt to commit an offense 
prohibited by law, and in such attempt shall do any act towards the commission of such 
offense, but shall fail in the perpetration, or shall be intercepted or prevented in the 
execution of the same.”). 
 167. In Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 402 (1905), Justice Holmes noted 
the common law origin of the attempt to monopolize offense: “The distinction 
between mere preparation and attempt is well known in the criminal law.” 
The authors are grateful to Marc Winerman for suggesting this research issue. 
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evolved since the common law formulations presented above,168 a 
textualist approach to the “attempt to monopolize” prong of Section 2 
would move it a considerable way back towards the common law 
approach to the “attempt” doctrine. Attempted monopolization should 
require the intent to take over a market, planning and preparation, and 
at least one serious act in furtherance of this plan. But attempted 
monopolization should not require anticompetitive conduct. 
C.   No Exceptions Should Be Implied for Monopolization or Attempts to 
Monopolize Not Accompanied by Anticompetitive Conduct 
These definitions of “monopolize” and “attempt to monopolize” 
include all monopolies, even those acquired by luck or superior 
efficiency. Like the actual text of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the 
definitions contain no exceptions. 
Moreover, as Justice Scalia reminded us in Texaco Inc., no exception 
should be read into a statute unless, of course, it is explicitly contained in 
the statute.169 Justice Gorsuch similarly noted in Bostock, “[U]nexpected 
applications of broad language reflect only Congress’s ‘presumed point 
[to] produce general coverage—not to leave room for courts to 
recognize ad hoc exceptions.’”170 Moreover, one of the earliest antitrust 
                                               
 168. The adoption of the Model Penal Code may have changed the classic 
definition of attempt. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
§ 11.4(e) (1986); 4 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 704 (15th ed. 1996). The Model Penal 
Code’s formulation, now adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, requires “an act or 
omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate 
in [the actor’s] commission of the crime.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(c) (AM. L. INST. 
1962). The substantial step must be “strongly corroborative” of the defendant’s 
criminal purpose. Id. § 5.01(2). The Model Penal Code enumerates several examples 
of a “substantial step,” including “lying in wait,” “search[ing] for or following the 
contemplated victim of the crime,” and “enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated 
victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission.” Id. 
 169. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 579 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I 
cannot, however, adopt the Court’s reasoning, which seems to create an exemption 
for functional discounts that are ‘reasonable’ even though prohibited by the text of 
the Act . . . . The language of the Act is straightforward[] . . . . There is no exception 
for ‘reasonable’ functional discounts that do not meet this requirement.”). It is 
difficult to speculate how far Justice Scalia would have taken his belief that no 
exemptions should be implied. For example, the Supreme Court held that the 
Sherman Act was not meant to apply to the activities of states. See Parker v. Brown, 317 
U.S. 341, 351 (1943). Should this statutory exemption not have been implied? 
 170. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (second alteration in 
original) (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 101). 
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cases, Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, explicitly held that no exceptions to 
the antitrust statutes should be implied: 
[W]e are asked to read into the act by way of judicial legislation an 
exception that is not placed there by the lawmaking branch of the 
Government, and this is to be done upon the theory that the 
impolicy of such legislation is so clear that it cannot be supposed 
Congress intended the natural import of the language it used. This 
we cannot and ought not to do . . . . If the act ought to read as 
contended for by defendants, Congress is the body to amend it and not 
this [C]ourt, by a process of judicial legislation wholly unjustifiable.171 
Since the text of Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not contain an 
express exemption for monopolies and attempts to monopolies 
unaccompanied by anticompetitive conduct, none should be implied or 
imposed by courts today. 
IV.    CASES WHERE THE SUPREME COURT HAS DRAMATICALLY RE-
INTERPRETED A STATUTE AFTER A LONG PERIOD 
A.   The Vagueness of Pre-Trinko Section 2 Law 
There is no doubt that in 2004 the Supreme Court in Trinko clearly 
interpreted Section 2 of the Sherman Act as requiring that a firm 
engage in anticompetitive conduct to violate Section 2.172 Scalia’s 
majority opinion also contained much more praise for monopolies 
than had ever before appeared in a Supreme Court decision.173 
Moreover, many agree with Justice Scalia that clear opinions deserve 
more stare decisis deference than ambiguous opinions.174 
Trinko was different in tone and clarity, and arguably even in its 
overall holding, from not only the Section 2 cases decided during the 
1890s and analyzed above in Section III.A.3, but also from the then-
                                               
 171. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 340 (1897); see also 
id. at 328 (“[N]o exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act that 
which has been omitted by [C]ongress.”). 
 172. See supra notes 90–92. 
 173. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2004) (describing “monopoly” as “an important element of the free-market 
system” and stating that it “produces innovation and economic growth”). 
 174. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 
2129, n.40 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)); see also 
Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of Inferential 
Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1741 (2013) (noting the value of stare decisis stems 
from the “benefits of clarity and predictability [that] can outweigh the costs of having 
each judge, in each different case, develop and apply different sets of rules”). 
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existing monopolization standard from the 1966 decision in the United 
States v. Grinnell Corp. case.175 Grinnell merely held that a willfully 
acquired or maintained or “consciously acquired” monopoly should be 
condemned “as distinguished from [a monopoly acquired] as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”176 Grinnell usually is read to require anticompetitive conduct,177 
and the Court in Grinnell found that the defendant in that case had 
engaged in “unlawful and exclusionary” behavior.178 The Grinnell 
Court, however, never explicitly held that a Section 2 violation always 
requires anticompetitive conduct. 
Indeed, Professor Donald Turner interpreted Grinnell to be 
ambiguous on the no-fault issue because it failed to properly 
“distinguish between ‘exclusionary’ conduct and ‘skill, foresight and 
industry.’”179 Turner found the Court’s formulation unhelpful because 
“[a]ny highly successful competitive strategy tends to confer market 
power and tends to ‘exclude’ competitors, and everyone who engages 
in such strategy knows this; thus, power obtained and maintained by 
any highly successful competitive strategy is ‘will[]fully’ acquired.”180 
Turner stated: “I have come to believe . . . that courts can fairly be 
asked to extend the scope of the Sherman Act’s application . . . to 
single-firm monopoly beyond what past precedents, except possibly 
Alcoa, have reached.”181 Ultimately, however, Turner concluded 
                                               
 175. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (“The offense 
of monopoly under [Section] 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition 
or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”). 
 176. Id. at 570–71, 576 n.7. Note 7 states: 
Since the record clearly shows that this monopoly power was consciously 
acquired, we have no reason to reach the further position of the District Court 
that once monopoly power is shown to exist, the burden is on the defendants 
to show that their dominance is due to skill, acumen, and the like. 
Id. at 576 n.7. 
 177. See id. at 570–71; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50, 58 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Grinnell’s elements and reading it as requiring anticompetitive 
conduct). 
 178. Id. (“[A]s the facts already related indicate, this monopoly was achieved in 
large part by unlawful and exclusionary practices.”). 
 179. Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1219 (1969). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1217. 
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Grinnell suggested that monopoly “solely attributable to accident” 
should not be an offense.182 This approach was included in the 1978 
Areeda-Turner treatise, which advocated monopolization without a 
demonstration of fault, with important qualifications that made their 
proposal closer to a presumption of illegality than to true no-fault.183 
Similarly, the immediately prior relevant Supreme Court decision, 
United States v. Griffith,184 was also somewhat ambiguous on the fault 
issue: 
It is, however, not always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain 
trade or to build a monopoly in order to find that the anti-trust laws 
have been violated. It is sufficient that a restraint of trade or 
monopoly results as the consequence of a defendant’s conduct or 
business arrangements. To require a greater showing would cripple 
the [Sherman] Act.185 
The Court then continued with an ambiguous quote from Swift & 
Co. v. United States186: 
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which 
the law seeks to prevent—for instance, the monopoly—but require 
further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that 
result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to 
produce a dangerous probability that it will happen.187 
Similarly, in American Tobacco Co. v. United States,188 a conspiracy to 
monopolize case, the Court held that “[n]either proof of exertion of the 
power to exclude nor proof of actual exclusion of existing or potential 
                                               
 182. Id. at 1219. 
 183. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 
163 n.55 (2005) (discussing the Areeda-Turner proposal and noting it has not been 
adopted by any court). 
 184. 334 U.S. 100 (1948). 
 185. Id. at 105 (citations omitted). The opinion continued: “As stated in United States 
v. Aluminum Co. of America, ‘no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is 
doing.’ Specific intent in the sense in which the common law used the term is necessary 
only where the acts fall short of the results condemned by the Act.” Id. (citations 
omitted); see also id. at 107 (citation omitted) (“So it is that monopoly power, whether 
lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned 
under [Section] 2 even though it remains unexercised. For [Section] 2 of the Act is 
aimed, inter alia, at the acquisition or retention of effective market control. Hence the 
existence of power ‘to exclude competition when it is desired to do so’ is itself a 
violation of [Section] 2, provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise 
that power.”). 
 186. 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
 187. Id. at 396. 
 188. 328 U.S. 781 (1946). 
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competitors is essential to sustain a charge of monopolization under 
the Sherman Act.”189 Two years later, the Court in Schine Chain Theatres, 
Inc. v. United States190 read United States v. Aluminum Co. of America191 (Alcoa) 
as holding that “[t]he mere existence of the power to monopolize, 
together with the purpose or intent to do so, constitutes an evil at which 
the Act is aimed.”192 
One could reasonably conclude that the Grinnell and Griffith Courts—
in opinions written by Justice Douglas, certainly no fan of monopolies—
were being deliberately vague and arguably self-contradictory.193 
Perhaps Justice Douglas was knowingly and deliberately preserving the 
ambiguity of the then-prevailing Alcoa standard,194 which could be read 
either as requiring fault, as not requiring fault, or as a cleverly disguised 
no-fault standard.195 
                                               
 189. Id. at 810. 
 190. 334 U.S. 110 (1948). 
 191. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 192. Schine Chain, 334 U.S. at 130. 
 193. See supra notes 176–87 and accompanying text. 
 194. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429. 
 195. Id. at 431–32. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 
1979), the Second Circuit described the Alcoa decision as “cryptic” and “a litigant’s 
wishing well, into which, it sometimes seems, one may peer and find nearly anything 
he wishes.” Id. at 273. The court continued to explain the contradictory nature of Alcoa: 
“Having stated that Congress ‘did not condone “good trusts” and condemn “bad” ones; 
it forbad[e] all,’ [Judge Learned Hand] declared with equal force, ‘The successful 
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.’” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan criticized Alcoa in an essay 
published in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. Alan Greenspan, Antitrust, in CAPITALISM: 
THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 63, 71 (Ayn Rand ed., 1966). His criticism was in part because he 
believed that it was a no-fault case: “ALCOA is being condemned for being too 
successful, too efficient, and too good a competitor.” Id. See generally William E. Kovacic 
& Marc Weinerman, Learned Hand, Alcoa, and the Reluctant Application of the Sherman 
Act, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 295 (2013) (“[C]onsistent with Hand’s philosophy of legislative 
interpretation, the decision sought to implement [c]ongressional intent as Hand 
perceived it—and that intent was sufficiently clear, Hand believed, that the public 
would ‘quite rightly, write us down as asses’ unless the panel found a [S]ection 2 
violation.”); see also id. at 296 (alteration in original) (quoting Judge Hand as stating, 
“There are two possible ways of dealing with [monopolies]: to regulate, or to forbid, 
them. Since we have no way of regulating them, we forbid them. I don’t think much 
of that way, but I didn’t set it up.”). It seems likely that Judge Hand wrote his opinion 
in a manner that was deliberately ambiguous on the anticompetitive conduct issue 
because Hand’s fair or plain reading of the statute (the term “textualism” didn’t exist 
in 1945) convinced him that Section 2 was supposed to be a no-fault statute. Hand 
might well have been nervous that the Supreme Court would not accept this 
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As noted earlier, when Justice Scalia authored the opinion in Trinko, 
he did not undertake a textualist analysis of Section 2.196 He simply 
cited precedent for his assertion that the Sherman Act contains an 
exception for a monopolist that gained its monopoly through superior 
efficiency.197 
Nevertheless, the pro-monopoly tone of Justice Scalia’s language in 
Trinko went much further than that of any other Supreme Court 
monopolization opinion.198 Elsewhere Justice Scalia has denounced 
the type of expansion of precedent he undertook in Trinko.199 We can 
only speculate why Justice Scalia avoided undertaking a textualist 
analysis in Trinko, but instead used the opportunity to move the law of 
monopolization even further away from the result that should follow 
from a textualist approach. 
B.   Overturning Old Statutory Precedent 
Justice Brandeis articulated the general criteria courts employ to 
guide their use of the doctrine of stare decisis: 
Stare decisis is not[] . . . [an] inexorable command . . . . Stare decisis is 
usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that 
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right . . . . , 
                                               
interpretation—so he obfuscated. This “fair reading” of Section 2 would explain much 
of the self-contradictory Alcoa opinion. See Joshua P. Davis, Note, Cardozo’s Judicial Craft 
and What Cases Come to Mean, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993) (describing Justice 
Cardozo’s oft-used strategy of modifying the law by writing ambiguous interim 
opinions, which evaded easy criticism, and then building on them). 
 196. See supra Section III.A. 
 197. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 407 (2004) (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)) 
(“It is settled law that this offense requires, in addition to the possession of monopoly 
power in the relevant market, ‘the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen, or historic accident.’”). 
 198. Compare supra Section III.A.3 (quoting language from various monopoly cases 
that is less effusive towards monopolies), with Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (“The mere 
possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is 
not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The 
opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts 
‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation 
and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of 
monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of 
anticompetitive conduct.”). 
 199. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 77 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(decrying “sub silentio expansion” of substantive precedent). 
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even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction 
can be had by legislation.200 
More recently, the Court noted a specific complexity relating to 
antitrust: “[S]tare decisis [has] less-than-usual force in cases involving 
the Sherman Act,”201 which gives courts “exceptional law-shaping 
authority.”202 The Court explained: “We have [ ] felt relatively free to 
revise our legal analysis as economic understanding evolves and . . . to 
reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive 
consequences.”203 This is consistent with an explanation in State Oil Co. 
v. Khan204 as to why stare decisis matters less in antitrust cases: 
[T]he general presumption that legislative changes should be left to 
Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of 
the accepted view that Congress “expected the courts to give shape 
to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law 
tradition.” . . . [This] Court [ ] reconsider[s] its decisions construing 
the Sherman Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those 
decisions are called into serious question.205 
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.206 might have gone 
even a step further, stating that “[s]tare decisis is not as significant . . . 
because the issue before us is the scope of the Sherman Act.”207 
Moreover, though the Supreme Court had twice declined to overturn 
                                               
 200. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–06 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 201. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412 (2015); see also Barak 
Orbach, Antitrust Stare Decisis, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/oct1
5_orbach_10_19f.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK4W-BUTM] (noting that 
“Kimble declared that the Court is more willing to overrule antitrust precedents than 
other precedents”). 
 202. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2413. 
 203. Id. at 2412–13. Moreover, because the question in those cases was whether the 
challenged activity restrained trade, the Court’s rulings necessarily turned on its 
understanding of economics. Id. at 2412. 
 204. 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
 205. Id. at 20–21. 
 206. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 207. Id. at 899. However, as Barak Orbach points out, this is not always the case. See 
Orbach, supra note 200, at 8–9 (noting that some antitrust precedent “[is] truly 
anomalous, yet enjoy[s] ‘a super-strong presumption of correctness.’ Two key 
examples are the baseball exemption and the filed-rate doctrine . . . . Neither doctrine 
can be justified other than by the reluctance of the Court to overrule it”). 
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the 1911 precedent implicated in Leegin,208 Justice Scalia—despite 
joining the Court in those instances—ultimately ignored that history in 
Leegin, where he joined Justice Kennedy in the Court’s rebuke of stare 
decisis.209 
Supreme Court precedent, even sixteen years old—such as the opinion 
by Justice Scalia in Trinko, which unequivocally held that Section 2 
requires anticompetitive conduct—certainly deserves deference, and 
should not be overturned lightly. A fortiori, a precedent fifty-four years 
old, such as Grinnell, deserves even more respect under stare decisis. 
However, Grinnell deserves less deference because it is ambiguous.210 
The longest period after which the Supreme Court dramatically re-
interpreted the Sherman Act apparently was ninety-six years, when 
Leegin overturned the holding in the 1911 case, Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. John D. Park & Sons Co.211 decision concerning the legal status of 
resale price maintenance (“RPM”).212 Dr. Miles has been interpreted by 
the Court as making RPM per se illegal,213 but in 2007, the Court 
changed the legal standard to rule of reason.214 
The Court did not make this change, however, because it acknowledged 
it had misread the Sherman Act. Rather, the basis of its reasoning 
concerned evolving or changing economic learning surrounding how 
                                               
 208. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881–82 (overturning Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons 
Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)). 
 209. See id. at 880. Interestingly, on other occasions, Justice Scalia gave more weight 
to precedent. Scalia and Garner wrote: “If a statute uses words or phrases that have 
already received authoritative construction by the jurisdiction’s court of last resort, or 
even uniform construction by inferior courts or a responsible administrative agency, 
they are to be understood according to that construction.” See SCALIA & GARNER, supra 
note 38, at 322. 
 210. See Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1921, 1935 (2017) (“While he did not think that specific dispositions were set in stone, 
he thought that the Court should ‘retain [its] ability . . . sometimes to adopt new 
principles for the resolution of new issues without abandoning clear holdings of the 
past that those principles contradict.’”). 
 211. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
 212. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 877, 882. 
 213. Id. at 887 (noting that “[t]he Court has interpreted [Dr. Miles Medical Co.] as 
establishing a per se rule against a vertical agreement between a manufacturer and its 
distributor to set minimum resale prices.”). The actual history, however, is quite 
complicated. See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory 
in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880–1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 389–91 (1989) 
(expounding upon the complex history of courts interpreting the Dr. Miles holding). 
 214. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899. 
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often RPM is anticompetitive.215 In dissent, four justices cited the 
importance of ninety-six years of precedent as an important reason for 
keeping the Dr. Miles standard.216 Stare decisis was not enough, 
however, for the Court’s majority.217 
Surely the changing state of knowledge or the Court’s views as to the 
economics profession’s changing opinion over time concerning the 
issue of how often, or what percentage of the time, a practice is 
anticompetitive, should count for less than the fair reading of the 
relevant statutory language. Surely the foremost task of the Supreme 
Court should be to determine the fair meaning of the statutes the 
legislative branch enacts. 
V.    THE EVOLVING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
Most economists at first glance probably think a no-fault monopolist 
law would be inefficient. With a second glance the inefficiency is by no 
means clear. The antitrust field has not seriously undertaken an overall 
economic analysis of the no-fault approach to monopolization law in 
half a century.218 Perhaps this is because the subject has not been taken 
seriously on a political level during most of this period so that first 
glances were deemed sufficient. We here take a second glance and find 
the possibility that no-fault is efficient and in other ways desirable. This 
is not only in the usual sense of lower prices and higher levels of quality 
and variety of goods and services for consumers, but also in the 
possibility of improvements according to other relevant criteria 
affecting society’s welfare. 
                                               
 215. See id. at 889 (noting that most literature contains procompetitive justifications 
for using RPM). 
 216. See id. at 918 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had never 
“overturned so well-established a statutory precedent”). 
 217. See id. at 882. 
  218.     Justice Brandeis was the earliest prominent U.S. legal scholar to condemn all 
privately attained monopolies. See infra note 436. No-fault monopolization’s high 
point came in the 1960s and 1970s when a number of mainstream scholars advocated 
for it using their expansive interpretation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Lao, supra 
note 17, at 762 (stating that many antitrust intellectuals, such as Donald Turner, 
Phillip Areeda, and Oliver Williamson, advocated for the no-fault theory in the late 
1960s and 1970s). Their scholarship helped spur the first major no-fault policy 
initiative, President Andrew Johnson’s Neal Task Force, and the first no-fault bill, 
which Senator Philip Hart introduced in 1976. Id. at 769. See generally Lawrence J. 
White, A Proposal for Restructuring the Automobile Industry (I), 7 ANTITRUST L. ECON. 
REV., no. 3, 1975, at 89 (providing an excellent no-fault oriented study of the U.S. 
auto industry from this period). 
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Recently, a significant number of prominent politicians have 
demonstrated an interest in breaking up firms they perceive as being 
“monopolies”—often without inquiring into whether they engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct.219 It is perhaps unsurprising that breaking up 
such possible monopolies220 like Amazon, Facebook, and Google—
without first finding that they engaged in anticompetitive conduct—
has been suggested by politicians on the left of the political spectrum, 
including Senators Warren221 and Sanders.222 What has perhaps been 
surprising, in light of conservatives’ traditional deference towards big 
business, has been harsh criticism from the right, including from 
President Trump,223 and even calls for their break-up or regulation 
                                               
 219. Our view is that if antitrust authorities adequately deal with exclusionary 
practices break up may not be appropriate or necessary. 
 220. See Makena Kelly, Donald Trump on Tech Antitrust: ‘There’s Something Going On,’ 
VERGE (June 10, 2019, 11:51 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/10/18659619/ 
donald-trump-facebook-google-amazon-apple-antitrust-european-union-eu (reporting 
that, in reference to Google and Facebook, President Trump said, “I think it’s a bad 
situation, but obviously there’s something going on in terms of monopoly”). We make 
no judgment as to whether Google or Facebook is a monopoly. We merely note that 
some prominent politicians believe that they are. 
 221. See Elizabeth Warren, Here’s how we can Break up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 
2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad 
9e0da324c [https://perma.cc/3ZVW-Y9YF]. 
 222. Senator Bernie Sanders, when asked whether he would break up Facebook, 
Google, and Amazon if he were elected President, responded “absolutely,” adding that 
he would appoint an attorney general “who would break up these huge corporations.” 
Lima, supra note 16. Senator Sanders also introduced a bill that would break up the 
largest financial institutions in the United States and establish a cap on size going 
forward. Bernie Sanders, Sanders, Sherman Introduce Legislation to Break up Too Big to Fail 
Financial Institutions (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/sanders-sherman-introduce-legislation-to-break-up-too-big-to-fail-financial-
institutions [https://perma.cc/Q23M-VWEF]. Senator Sanders said he would “use the 
Sherman Antitrust Act to put CEOs of monopolistic companies in jail.” Hirsch, supra 
note 16. 
 223. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 24, 2017), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/889675644396867584 (arguing that 
Amazon constitutes a “no-tax monopoly”). President Trump also said he was looking 
at breaking up all three companies. Kim Hart & Sara Fischer, Trump’s Big Tech 
Contradictions, AXIOS (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.axios.com/trump-big-tech-google-
amazon-facebook-957600ac-2d45-476c-a5ee-9bf534c85f80.html 
[https://perma.cc/CNA8-5V2F]; see also Emily Stephenson, Trump Vows to Weaken U.S. 
Media ‘Power Structure’ if Elected, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2016, 1:25 PM), https://www. 
reuters.com/article/usa-election/trump-vows-to-weaken-u-s-media-power-structure-if-
elected-idUSL1N1CS08H (opposing the AT&T-Time Warner merger and advocating 
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from a large number of other leading conservative figures, including 
Steve Bannon224 and Senator Ted Cruz.225 
This Article will not undertake a complete analysis of the economics 
of no-fault monopolization. This Article’s much more modest goal is 
to present an overview of many of the most important economic issues 
involved. Even this brief overview will demonstrate, however, that this 
is a topic that deserves careful analysis and debate by the antitrust 
community. It will suggest only that sanctioning all monopolies is a 
reasonable proposal that is worth considering seriously. 
Our analysis begins with a brief historical overview of the evolution 
of the profession’s scholarship concerning the no-fault issue, and then 
briefly discusses one of its most important economic facts: the probable 
effects of a no-fault policy on innovation.226 The Article then gives an 
overview of its possible effects on international competitiveness, on 
allocative inefficiency, and on the prevention of wealth transfers from 
consumers to monopolies.227 The Article then briefly discusses its 
possible effect on income equity and equality, and then on privacy.228 
As a part of these discussions it will note the inefficiencies that can arise 
as firms attain and protect their monopoly.229 
This Article also will consider the downsides of this approach, 
including the possibility that it could send a confusing or perverse 
signal to firms engaging in hard but fair competition.230 This approach 
                                               
Comcast’s divestiture of NBC Universal because “[d]eals like this destroy democracy” 
and “concentrat[e] [ ] power in the hands of too few”). 
 224. See Robinson Meyer, What Steve Bannon Wants to Do to Google, ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/08/steve-bannon-google- 
facebook/535473 (reporting that Steve Bannon, a right-wing ideologue and President 
Trump’s former chief strategist, called for public utility regulation of tech platforms 
like Facebook and Google). 
 225. Jessica Guynn, Ted Cruz Threatens to Regulate Facebook, Google and Twitter over 
Charges of Anti-Conservative Bias, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2019, 3:41 PM), https://www. 
usatoday.com/story/news/2019/04/10/ted-cruz-threatens-regulate-facebook-twitter-
over-alleged-bias/3423095002 [https://perma.cc/VHE7-6Z6C]; see also Robert H. 
Lande & Sandeep Vaheesan, Preventing the Curse of Bigness Through Conglomerate Merger 
Legislation, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 75, 91–99 (2020) (providing examples of current 
conservative and liberal political leaders calling to break up firms that allegedly have 
market power). 
 226. See infra Section V.A–B. 
 227. See infra Section V.B. 
 228. See infra Section V.B. 
 229. See infra Section V.B. 
 230. See infra Section V.C. 
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could be especially likely to discourage firms from competing hard 
when a firm’s size nears the ambiguous market share levels required 
for a violation. Moreover, at least 90% of antitrust cases are private 
actions. A relevant question is: what are the effects of no-fault on such 
actions? Would it increase or decrease the extent to which firms use 
the Sherman Act for protectionist business purposes? In addition, the 
transaction costs involved in sanctioning monopolies could be 
significantly changed under no-fault. No-fault could also lead to special 
problems for natural monopolies and patent monopolies, so it seems 
virtually certain they would require conduct remedies rather than 
structural relief.231 
It must be emphasized that we will not attempt to fully analyze these 
issues to determine the overall net effects of no-fault on economic 
welfare. Its modest goal is to encourage the antitrust profession to re-
start the analysis and debate over sanctioning all monopolies. The 
indeterminacy can support arguments for either “no-fault” actions or 
for a “no-action-at-all” policy as it is easy to marshal economic 
arguments on both sides. The balance of these arguments necessarily 
depends upon an evaluation of how effective and efficient antitrust 
policy is likely to be (including the number and magnitudes of false 
positive and false negative errors) while also considering litigation and 
other costs generated by the policy.232 We only suggest that the existing 
literature contains enough support for a no-fault position so that the 
doctrine is not a priori unreasonable.233 
A.   Economists’ Evolving Opinions 
The Sherman Act initially had broad appeal.234 Later surveys suggest 
that in general, economists continue to favor the Act. In a survey of a 
                                               
 231. This article will not, however, undertake an extensive analysis of monopolies 
achieved through merger because, in light of the Clayton Act, this is a rarity. See 
generally Peter C. Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the 
Importance of “Redundant” Competitors, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 783 (analyzing monopolies 
obtained through mergers). 
 232. These concerns are sometimes called Type I, Type II, and Type III errors. See 
Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 
CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1670–71 (1983) (discussing the different type of errors that can 
underlie merger policy decisions). 
 233. See infra Section V.F. 
 234. See William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887–1890, 23 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 221, 221–22 (1956) (“In the years immediately before the Sherman Act, 
between 1888 and 1890, there were few who doubted that the public hated the trusts 
546 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:497 
 
random sample of economists, 75% agreed that the antitrust laws 
should be used aggressively to reduce monopoly power.235 More than 
a half-century ago there were, however, plenty of opinions on the 
subject, but little evidence about the economic effects of monopolies.236 
One of the earliest important attempts to determine the efficacy of 
antitrust was by Nobel Laureate George Stigler.237 In 1952, Stigler was 
a proponent of no-fault monopolization, although later he changed 
his view.238 Although we will not attempt to trace the evolution of 
economists’ analysis since Stigler, we note that quite recently, Thomas 
Philippon argued that oligopoly is now pervasive in the U.S. and costs 
the typical American household more than $5,000 per year.239 The 
following is a brief survey of a number of possible economic effects of 
a no-fault monopoly proposal. 
                                               
fervently.”); see also Arthur Robert Burns, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regulation of Price 
Competition, 4 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 301–02 (1937) (highlighting the 
Sherman Act’s appeal at the time of its enactment); Sanford D. Gordon, Attitudes 
Towards Trusts Prior to the Sherman Act, 30 S. ECON. J. 156, 157–58 (1963) (surveying a 
broad array of academic and mainstream sources from the 1880s and concluding that 
they were almost ubiquitously hostile to trusts). 
 235. Bruno S. Frey et al., Consensus and Dissension Among Economists: An Empirical 
Inquiry, 74 AM. ECON. REV., 986, 988 (1984); see also J.R. Kearl et al., What Economists 
Think: A Confusion of Economists?, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 28, 30 (1979) (providing statistical 
data on the percentage of economists that believed government should use the 
antitrust laws to vigorously reduce monopoly power). 
 236. See generally ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: 
A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966) (summarizing what could be called the no-
fault approach to the monopoly problem during the Great Depression). Hawley 
thoroughly discusses the opinions of prominent government officials, academics, and 
businesspeople on monopoly and the no-fault approach during the Great Depression. 
Id. at 12. It shows the substantial sentiments against not just monopoly, but also against 
corporate size itself. Id. These sentiments were associated with what Hawley called the 
“Brandeisians,” intellectuals that felt that small business promoted equity and an 
ambience of community. See generally id. at 281–89 (discussing the scholars that 
adhered to Brandeis’s philosophy). 
 237. George J. Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 J.L. & ECON. 225, 
225 (1966) (quantifying the effects of antitrust laws). 
 238. See Lao, supra note 17, at 766–67. 
 239. David Leonhardt, Opinion, Big Business Is Overcharging You $5,000 a Year, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 10 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/10/opinion/big-business-
consumer-prices.html. 
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B.   Overview of Economic Effects Mostly Supporting No-Fault 
1. Likely effects on innovation 
A trenchant argument in favor of no-fault antitrust actions lies in the 
evidence that monopoly on average retards innovation.240 By 
innovation, we mean both technological invention and better ways of 
doing things. Carl Shapiro’s review of the literature finds that “[t]he 
unifying principle . . . is that innovation, broadly defined, is spurred if 
the market is contestable; that is, if multiple firms are vying to win 
profitable future sales.”241 In other words, competition is usually good 
for innovation. 
As Whinston notes in his review of Carl Shapiro’s work, the forces 
determining innovation are complex, but market structure is itself 
important.242 The major thrust of the literature is that the rate of 
innovation tends to be greatest when a market is competitive.243 This 
result is consistent with the work of Pakes and McGuire244 and is 
illustrated in the following diagram, which shows low levels of 
innovation with very competitive markets, high research and 
development (“R&D”) rates for contestable markets, and a leveling off 
of innovation for markets with little competition, with monopolies 
innovating the least. 
                                               
 240. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 74 (1942) 
(arguing that large firm market share enhances innovation but only up to a point). 
Schumpeter noted, for example: “[What] counts . . . [is] competition from the new 
commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of 
organization . . . competition [that] . . . strikes not at the margins of the profits and 
the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives.” Id. 
 241. Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED 361, 401 (Josh Lerner & Scott 
Stern eds., 2012). 
 242. Michael D. Whinston, Comment, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE 
ACTIVITY REVISITED (citing Shapiro, supra note 241, at 404–05). 
 243. Shapiro, supra note 241, at 362. 
 244. Ariel Pakes & Paul McGuire, Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical 
Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model, 25 RAND J. ECON. 555, 573, 575, 
577 (1994). 




Recent empirical scholarship has also shown that more competitive 
markets result in more innovation245 and that “market power tends to 
slow innovation and productivity improvements in the affected 
markets.”246 Carstensen and Lande note that “[i]t is extremely difficult 
to determine [a theory that offers an] a priori” “prediction about the 
effects of competition on innovation that is robust to all of these 
                                               
 245. BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 26, at 8–9. 
 246. Jonathan B. Baker, Market Power in the U.S. Economy Today, WASH. CTR. FOR 
EQUITABLE GROWTH 9 (Mar. 2017), http://equitablegrowth.org/research-
analysis/market-power-in-the-u-s-economy-today [https://perma.cc/2BX4-S5VV]; see 
also id. (summarizing literature on market power and innovation). Professor Baker 
explains this new learning: 
The modern Schumpeterian growth literature concludes that greater product-
market competition fosters R&D investment by all firms in sectors where the 
firms operate at the same technological level, and suggests that in the event 
that product markets were to grow more competitive, the innovation 
incentives of a dominant firm with a technological lead would remain high. 
Id. at 15 n.57. He also notes: 
At one time, empirical economists who studied the question thought that some 
market power but not extensive market power would be best for innovation, 
based on cross-industry studies that found an “inverted-U” relationship between 
market concentration. But those studies did not successfully control for 
differences in technological opportunity across industries. 
Id. at 15 n.58 (citing Wesley M. Cohen, Fifty Years of Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity 
and Performance, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 129, 146–48, 154–
55 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010)); Shapiro, supra note 241, at 
380; see also DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 34 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing increases in innovation during periods 
when there is an increase in the number of mergers). 
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different market and technological conditions”247 or predict “which 
innovation will be successful and which will prove a failure.”248 Thus, it is 
vital to continue to explore and develop many innovative options at the 
same time. 
Recent literature shows some enforcement authorities, concerned with 
dynamic competition, have implicitly recognized the need to maintain a 
larger group of competitors in “innovation markets” because “innovation 
suffers when . . . companies merge.”249 Similarly, Professor John Kwoka, in 
his review of the merger literature, concludes that: 
Overall, the careful economic studies in the literature as well as 
other relevant evidence do not support the proposition that industry 
consolidation results in more R&D or greater R&D efficiency. In 
fact, there is evidence in the best of these studies that suggests that 
these mergers may adversely affect R&D.250 
Nearly all studies found that increases in competition led to 
increases in industry productivity.251 With greater competition, there is 
greater fear of innovation by competitors, so investment in innovation 
is more likely. These cases illustrate another reason why monopoly is 
bad for investment and innovation: if a firm has no competitors, then 
its input suppliers have a greater incentive to invest in their own market 
                                               
 247. Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-
Innovation Debate, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159, 162 (Adam B. Jaffe, 
Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds. 2006). 
 248. Carstensen & Lande, supra note 231, at 813. Some argue that the difficulty of 
making predictions about innovation in individual cases means that these dynamic 
issues should not be the basis for merger enforcement decisions. See, e.g., Richard T. 
Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis, 64 Antitrust 
L.J. 19, 20, 24, 26 (1995). 
 249. See, e.g., Justus Haucap & Joel Stiebale, Research: Innovation Suffers when Drug 
Companies Merge, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/08/research-
innovation-suffers-when-drug-companies-merge (looking at innovation among drug 
companies). 
 250. See John Kwoka, The Effects of Mergers on Innovation: Economic Framework and 
Empirical Evidence 29–30 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors). 
 251. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Economic Growth in the Long Run: A Model of Discovery, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 337, 341 (2009) 
(noting that higher quantities of goods are sold under competition); Jan De Loecker 
& Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, Firm Performance in a Global Market, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 
201, 202 (2014) (stating that economists have long postulated that competition makes 
firms more efficient). 
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power and thereby extract surplus from the monopoly.252 This indeed 
appears to be a potent source of monopolistic waste.253 
2. Effects on international competitiveness 
Professor Michael Porter finds that the prevalence of domestic rivals 
tends to lead to an international advantage stimulates improvement 
and innovation.254 He further notes that firms that do not innovate will 
not succeed.255 
Porter finds that a key role of the government in advancing the 
economy is promoting “vigorous domestic rivalry” since the lack of 
domestic competition tends to hinder international competitiveness.256 
Porter, analyzing a number of countries over time, further notes that 
firms that do not have to compete at home rarely succeed abroad, and that 
economies of scale, “the most potent determinants of competitiveness,” are 
best achieved through global sales rather than domestic dominance.257 
According to Porter, the practicalities of politics create bad policy in a 
market of one or two firms as policymakers tend to accord such firms 
special treatment that reduces the incentive to compete.258 
Porter’s work is not alone in finding that domestic competition is 
central to economic growth.259 In Latin America, where economic 
growth has been slow, markets are often characterized by highly 
concentrated industrial sectors, lack of a strong competition policy, 
large informal economies, and historically close links between business 
                                               
 252. See, e.g., James A. Schmitz Jr., What Determines Productivity? Lessons from the 
Dramatic Recovery of the U.S. and Canadian Iron Ore Industries Following Their Early 1980s 
Crisis, 113 J. POL. ECON. 582, 591 & n.16 (2005); see also Thomas J. Holmes & James A. 
Schmitz, Jr., Competition at Work: Railroads vs. Monopoly in the U.S. Shipping Industry, 25 
FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV. 3, 3–4 (2001) (discussing competition in the long-
distance transportation industry); Thomas J. Holmes & James A. Schmitz, Jr., 
Competition and Productivity: A Review of Evidence, 2 ANN. REV. ECON. 619, 620–21 (2010) 
(reviewing literature that examines the link between competition and productivity). 
 253. Schmitz Jr., supra note 252, at 26–27. 
 254. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, HARV. BUS. REV. (1990), 
https://hbr.org/1990/03/the-competitive-advantage-of-nations. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. This echoes Schumpeter’s statements about the effect of monopoly on 
political structure. Schumpeter, supra note 240, at 47. 
 259. Id.; see, e.g., Federico J. Díez et al., Global Market Power and Its Macroeconomic 
Implications 1 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 18/137, 2018). 
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and the political community.260 Stronger competition policy can be 
part of changes in competition that might help promote economic 
growth and competition.261 
Spurred by increasing globalization, there is increasing interest in 
international cooperation with respect to antitrust.262 Globally, 
antitrust law is characterized by a striking mixture of promoting 
competitiveness on the one hand and protection of favored industries 
and cartel exemptions on the other.263 There are clear attempts of 
nations to slant antitrust in ways that favor the home country at the 
expense of others.264 As each country does this, it would seem to result 
in harm to each country’s trade and to lower welfare.265 A global no-
fault approach could help address this collective action problem. 
3. Effects on allocative inefficiency & wealth transfers 
In 1954, Economist Arnold Harberger estimated that the costs of 
monopoly that resulted from misallocation of resources across industries 
were trivial.266 Harberger’s focus was on the deadweight loss (“DWL”) 
from monopoly pricing.267 This research led to the near consensus in the 
                                               
 260. See R. Shyam Khemani & Ana Carrasco-Martin, The Investment Climate, 
Competition Policy, and Economic Development in Latin America, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67, 
68–70, 74, 78 (2008). 
 261. See OECD, FACTSHEET ON HOW COMPETITION POLICY AFFECTS MACRO-ECONOMIC 
OUTCOMES 3 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2014-competition-
factsheet-iv-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR88-9QZQ] (“[P]olicies that lead to markets 
operating more competitively . . . will result in faster economic growth.”). 
 262. See, e.g., INT’L COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMM., ICPAC FINAL REPORT 33–
34 (2000) (finding that the increased interest in cooperation between U.S. antitrust 
authorities and their counterparts across the globe is due to an “increase in the 
number of international cartel cases prosecuted by the Antitrust Division,” barriers to 
market access from anticompetitive private barriers to trade, and an increased number 
of mergers). 
 263. See Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 
355, 356 (2004) (noting that American law provides an explicit exception for export 
cartels). 
 264. Id. (providing examples of how countries “slant” their antitrust laws to favor 
local companies). 
 265. See id. at 357–58 (explaining how a country’s antitrust policymaking decisions 
affect the country’s consumers). 
 266. See Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 
77, 87 (1954) (“[M]onopoly does not seem to affect aggregate welfare very seriously 
through its effect on resource allocation.”). 
 267. Id. at 78 fig.1. See generally RICHARD O. ZERBE & DWIGHT D. DIVELY, BENEFIT-COST 
ANALYSIS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1994) (defining deadweight loss from monopoly 
pricing). 
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economics profession that monopoly’s effects on efficiency are of little 
significance.268 Economists Scherer and Ross evaluated several empirical 
estimates of the relative sizes of the DWL to get somewhat higher values 
(0.5% to 2.0% of GNP).269 
In sharp contrast to Harberger’s finding, more recent studies show 
that the allocative inefficiency (deadweight welfare losses) costs 
associated with monopoly are large, even quite large.270 Further, since 
firms can spend resources to convince the government to implement 
policies that will create or preserve monopoly, there can be competition 
for these monopoly profits.271 These costs can be pure waste, or income 
or wealth transfers272 without accompanying productive gains: rent-
seeking.273 Professor Gordon Tullock introduced the rent-seeking idea 
in 1967 and Anne Kreuger expanded and labeled it in 1974.274 In 1975, 
                                               
 268. See, e.g., David Schwartzman, The Burden of Monopoly, 68 J. POL. ECON. 627, 630 
(1960) (agreeing with Harberger’s conclusion that the welfare loss from monopoly is 
small). Other authors have also attempted to measure the costs of monopoly power. 
See, e.g., Keith Cowling & Dennis C. Mueller, The Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 88 ECON. 
J. 727, 727 (1978) (stating that the “conventional wisdom” is that ““welfare losses from 
monopoly are insignificant”); Joaquín Maudos & Juan Fernández de Guevara, The Cost 
of Market Power in Banking: Social Welfare Loss vs. Cost Inefficiency, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 
2103, 2106 (2007) (finding that for fifteen EU countries between 1993 and 2002, “the 
welfare gains associated with a fall in market power may be far larger than the loss of 
bank cost efficiency . . . . show[ing] the importance of the economic policy measures 
aimed at removing the barriers . . . [to] outside competition.”). But see S.C. Littlechild, 
Misleading Calculations of the Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 91 ECON. J. 348 (1981) 
(criticizing Herberger’s and Cowler and Mueller’s studies, among others). See generally 
Jan De Loecker et al., The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications, 135 
Q.J. ECON. 561 (2020). 
 269. Compare Harberger, supra note 266, at 86 (“[W]e have labored . . . to get a big 
estimate of the welfare loss, and we have come out in the end with less than a tenth of 
a per cent of the national income.”), with F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 675–76 (3d ed. 1990). 
 270. See, e.g., James A. Schmitz, Jr., FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, NEW AND 
LARGER COSTS OF MONOPOLY AND TARIFFS 5 (2012) (“[T]he historical studies . . . call 
the Harberger consensus into question. At least in the industries studied thus far, 
monopoly and tariffs have led to significant welfare losses.”). 
 271. See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. 
ECON. REV. 291, 292 (1974) (“[C]ompetition can also occur through allocating 
resources to influencing the probability, or expected size, of license allocations.”). 
 272. See, e.g., Ronald L. Goettler & Brett R. Gordon, Does AMD Spur Intel to Innovate 
More?, 119 J. POL. ECON. 1141, 1188 (2011) (finding that while Intel would have 
innovated more as a monopoly, most consumers were better off with slightly less 
innovation and the stronger price competition of AMD). 
 273. See Krueger, supra note 271, at 293. 
 274. See generally id. 
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Richard Posner argued that competition to engage in rent-seeking could 
raise costs until all monopoly profits were transformed into costs.275 
Further development has both attempted to quantify these costs and 
shown that rent-seeking occurs both within a monopoly firm and 
outside it.276 These estimates come from examining histories of 
industries in which a monopoly is destroyed or created.277 Rent-seeking 
behavior by different divisions within the firm and between the firm 
and its unions is quite costly, resulting in: (1) lower productivity at each 
factory and (2) misallocation of resources between high and low 
productivity plants.278 
As economist James Schmitz notes, “[w]hen a monopoly is created, 
‘rents’ are created.”279 Schmitz states that “[c]onflict emerges among 
shareholders, managers, and employees of the monopoly as they 
negotiate how to divide these rents.”280 Stakeholders establish new 
mechanisms to split these rents in order to reduce competition among 
members of the monopoly.281 But mechanisms can destroy rents as 
well—they can reduce productivity and result in misallocation.282 The 
costs due to low productivity alone are large.283 In fact, factory 
productivity raised significantly when monopolies were broken up in 
each industry.284 Schmitz noted that it was common for factory 
productivity to double within a few years.285 Schmitz calculated that as 
much as 20% to 30% of industry value to be wasted inputs.286 
                                               
 275. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. 
ECON. 807, 824 (1975). 
 276. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 270, at 1 (“In standard economic theory, 
monopoly leads to a welfare loss . . . . stem[ming] from a misallocation of resources 
across industries . . . . Recently, a new literature has taken a different approach . . . . 
[l]ooking within industries . . . .”). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 1–2. 
 279. Id. at 2; see also id. at 2 n.1 (defining rent as “the difference between what a factor 
of production is actually paid and what it would need to be paid to remain in use”). 
 280. Id. at 2. 
 281. See id. at 16 (“Rules to reduce competition (such as quotas and work rules) 
were an indirect means to split rents between groups.”). 
 282. Id. at 2. 
 283. See id. (“In sharp contrast to Harberger’s finding, these studies show that 
welfare costs associated with monopoly and tariffs are not small.”). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
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4. Effects on income equity & equality287 
In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Professor Thomas Piketty notes 
that between 1980 and the present, there has been an unprecedented 
increase in income inequality in the United States and Europe, and 
that it is likely to become much more unequal unless new remedies are 
applied.288 
Research associates higher levels of inequality with social instability 
and lower growth rates.289 Piketty sees inequality challenging 
democracy and leading to oligarchy, if left unabated.290 He predicts 
dire consequences in the absence of remedies.291 Similarly, Professors 
Jonathan Baker and Steven Salop show how inequality can undermine the 
legitimacy of our social order, given the wealthiest have a disproportionate 
influence on public policy and reduce economic growth.292 
                                               
 287. We also note a cultural argument for breaking up large firms—an argument 
that stems from existence values. Existence values occur when there is a willingness to 
pay for existence of a good, apart from its market value, which can arise when the 
market does not exist. See Note, Existence-Value Standing, 129 HARV. L. REV. 775, 775–76 
(2016). Consider that large firms drive out small firms when in fact people would 
rather have smaller firms, but because of collective action costs, larger firms 
win. Suppose for example, that people favor small local stores as part of their 
culture. They tend, however, to buy from large price cutters as their prices are 
lower. The result is the loss of local stores which they did not want and if acting 
collectively would pay to avoid. Each person, however, buying from the large stores 
fails to account for the effects of their action on the structure of businesses as a whole. 
Krutilla published the original article on existence values. See John V. 
Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779–80 (1967). 
 288. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 294 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2013) (2014) (“Since 1980, however, income 
inequality has exploded in the United States . . . . The shape of the curve is rather 
impressively steep[;] . . . if change continues at the same pace, for example, the upper 
decile will be raking in [sixty] percent of national income by 2030.”); see also RICHARD 
O. ZERBE, THE PATH OF HUMAN PROGRESS 141 (2017) (estimating that while in 2015 the 
top 1% had about seven times the per capita wealth of the bottom 50%, by 2065 this 
will grow to a factor of 185 if the present trend continues). 
 289. See RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER 
EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 23 (2010) (noting that health and social 
problems are strongly correlated to income inequality). 
 290. See PIKETTY, supra note 288, at 463 (“[A] threat [that] . . . seems [ ]credible and 
dangerous [is] an oligarchic type of divergence, that is, a process in where the rich 
countries would come to be owned by their own billionaires.”). 
 291. See id. at 571. 
 292. See Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and 
Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 8 (2015). 
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Part of the cause for rising inequality lies in competition policy. An 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) 
paper covering eight OECD countries—Canada, France, Germany, 
Korea, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States—
finds that for the average country in the sample, market power 
increased the wealth of the richest 10% and by between 12% and 21% 
for a range of reasonable assumptions about savings behavior, while it 
reduces the income of the poorest 20% by 11% or more.293 The paper 
suggests that lack of competition is an important source of economic 
inequality.294 Greater equality may then be a byproduct of a strong 
competition policy.295 
5. Effects on consumer and user privacy 
Monopolies are less likely to protect the privacy of consumers, users, 
and affected friends and associates. A recent article by Professors 
Gregory Day and Abbey Stemler provides several reasons why 
monopolies are likely to protect privacy suboptimally296: (1) it will be 
difficult for users, consumers, or third parties to punish monopolies 
that violate their privacy by switching to other firms; (2) because of the 
nature of privacy, it will be more difficult for people even to ascertain 
whether a breach occurred, from where it occurred, or the true costs 
of preserving their privacy; and (3) other firms will be less likely to 
compete on the basis of privacy with incumbent monopolists that 
appear to offer “free” goods or services,297 such as the use of Google, 
                                               
 293. Sean Ennis et al., Inequality: A Hidden Cost of Market Power, OECD 1, 21 (2017), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Inequality-hidden-cost-market-power-
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F6N-4NPR]. 
 294. See id. at 23 (“Policies that enhance competition—by reducing anti-competitive 
regulation or trade barriers, empowering consumer choice, fighting illegal cartels, 
empowering consumers through market studies, preventing mergers that create 
market power, or the abuse of market power—can therefore help reduce inequality.”); 
see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 140–41 (3d ed. 
1950) (stating that a nation is “profoundly affected by the elimination of a host of small 
and medium sized firms” and that monopolies can give rise to substantial political and 
welfare effects). 
 295. See Ennis et al., supra note 293, at 23. 
 296. See Gregory Day & Abbey Stemler, Infracompetitive Privacy, 105 IOWA L. REV. 61, 
92 (2019) (presenting the implications of recent technology for privacy and how this, 
in turn, can affect competition and become an antitrust concern). 
 297. Products like Google and Facebook are not really free if the user is providing 
valuable data on themselves and on the users’ friends and business associates. Id. at 
63–64. 
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Facebook, etc. It is especially difficult to enter a market for apparently 
free products, so monopolies of these products are likely to persist. 
The amount of privacy protection a monopoly is likely to provide for 
consumers and users will often be suboptimal because the technology 
that collects valuable data can impose more costs on society—in the 
form of necessary privacy protections and the costs of security breaches 
and unconsented-to sales of data—than efficiencies.298 These costs are 
often relatively hidden, so consumers, users and affected third parties 
often will have a hard time valuing them, and the market often will 
have a difficult time curing any problems optimally.299 Antitrust, with 
its traditional focus on consumer prices, will not be as cognizant of the 
true costs of privacy breaches and misuse as it should be.300 
A deeper privacy problem is that firms with a large online presence, 
such as Google, Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft, gain from collecting 
customer or user data mainly in order to discover and create preferences.301 
Moreover, collecting consumer data is most useful for larger firms than for 
their smaller counterparts. However, often in doing so, these larger firms 
potentially implicate consumer privacy.302 
C.   Overview of Economic Arguments That Mostly Weigh Against No-Fault 
1. Incentives to compete less vigorously 
The effects of incentives on business behavior are complex and 
sometimes counter-intuitive, so prediction in the case of no-fault is 
difficult.303 One would think, however, that the possibility of an antitrust 
                                               
 298. See id. at 64 (“The issue is that platforms enjoy data’s economic potential 
without bearing the full costs of protecting privacy.”). 
 299. See id. at 93 (“[C]oncentrated markets have enabled tech firms to ignore 
privacy concerns as few rivals exist to shed light on the problems borne from their 
treatment of personal information.”). 
 300. See id. at 66–67 (discussing the growing momentum to expand the scope of the 
Sherman Act to promote more than competitive prices). 
 301. See id. at 68–72 (describing how companies with an online presence use 
personal data to create individualized experiences). 
 302. Id. 
 303. See, e.g., Soledad Artiz Prillaman & Kenneth J. Meier, Taxes, Incentives, and 
Economic Growth: Assessing the Impact of Pro-Business Taxes on U.S. State Economies, 76 J. 
POL. 364, 376–77 (2014) (finding that state tax decreases have little effect on business 
location or behavior); see also Susanna Gallani, Incentives, Peer Pressure, and Behavior 
Persistence 22–23 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 17-070, 2017) (finding that 
explicit monetary incentives for workers are less successful in achieving persistent 
2020] NO-FAULT MONOPOLIZATION 557 
 
action against a firm achieving monopoly without engaging in 
anticompetitive behavior would have some deterrent effect on 
monopoly formation.304 This deterrent effect could send a confusing 
or perverse signal to firms engaging in hard but fair competition, 
especially when a firm’s market share nears the minimum required for 
a Section 2 violation.305 Economist George Bittlingmayer, for example, 
believes that “whatever the ability of antitrust to lower prices and 
increase output in theory or in isolated circumstances, one actual 
effect of antitrust in practice may have been to curtail investment.”306 
However, when a monopolist is shielded from hard competition, it 
may be able to relax and enjoy a quiet life.307 Professor Jonathan Baker, 
                                               
performance improvement when compared to implicit incentives, such as horizontal 
monitoring and peer pressure). 
 304. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(“The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon 
when he wins.”); see also Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the 
concomitant charging of monopoly prices . . . is an important element of the free-
market system.”). 
 305. See infra Part VI and notes 358, 425 (discussing the minimum market share 
levels usually required for a Section 2 violation). 
 306. George Bittlingmayer, Regulatory Uncertainty and Investment: Evidence from 
Antitrust Enforcement 20 CATO J. 295, 322 (2001). 
 307. See J.R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 
ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935) (“[Monopolists] are likely to exploit their advantage much 
more by not bothering to get very near the position of maximum profit, than by 
straining themselves to get very close to it. The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet 
life.”). Economists have written about the inefficiencies that result when a monopolist 
is shielded from hard competition. See, e.g., Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. 
“X-Efficiency,” 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392, 408–09 (1966) (arguing that the motivations and 
incentives of workers and managers are different when their firm does not have to face 
competition). Professor Leibenstein explains: 
In situations where competitive pressure is light, many people will trade the 
disutility of greater effort, of search, and the control of other peoples’ activities 
for the utility of feeling less pressure and of better interpersonal relations. But 
in situations where competitive pressures are high, and hence the costs of such 
trades are also high, they will exchange less of the disutility of effort for the 
utility of freedom from pressure, etc. 
Id. at 413. 
Similarly, some economists believe that it is “eminently plausible” that inefficiencies 
resulting from weak competitive pressures “are at least as large as the welfare losses 
from [allocative inefficiency].” See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 269, at 672. This is 
because monopolies can create organizational slack by tolerating inefficiency and 
waste. Id. at 667. Without competition, monopolies have less incentive to cut waste or 
to search for ways to reduce costs. Monopolies may, instead, have the discretion to 
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for example, believes there is a positive and large welfare effect from 
the antitrust deterrence of anticompetitive activity.308 Baker examines 
the implications of socially beneficial federal antitrust challenges 
against collusive behaviors like price fixing, mergers likely to adversely 
affect competition, and monopolists who use anticompetitive 
exclusionary practices to obtain and maintain their market power.309 
He then reviews systematic empirical evidence on the value of antitrust 
derived from informal experiments involving the behavior of U.S. 
firms during periods without effective antitrust enforcement, and the 
behavior of firms across different national antitrust regimes.310 Overall, 
he finds benefits of antitrust enforcement to consumers and social 
welfare appear to be far larger than what the government spends on 
antitrust enforcement and firms spend directly or indirectly on 
antitrust compliance.311 
Of course, reduced incentives to compete vigorously are far from no 
incentives. Even if a monopolist or would-be monopolist’s incentives 
to compete are reduced, no-fault could also increase incentives for 
rivals and potential rivals to compete harder as the monopolist is 
somewhat constrained by no-fault. Similarly, it could serve to reduce 
the presence of monopoly less expensively than conventional antitrust 
actions.312 This would be similar to a firm refraining from establishing 
a monopoly in the expectation that the rents would all go to elsewhere, 
e.g., to a union. 
2. Incentives to engage in sham litigation 
Sham litigation is non-legitimate litigation whose purpose is to raise 
rivals’ costs relative to those of the firm filing the lawsuit.313 It is a type 
                                               
make a comfortable profit while tolerating a substantial amount of “fat” in their 
organizations and further wasting of society’s resources. Id. 
 308. Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 
2003, at 27, 27 (“Overall, the benefits of antitrust enforcement to consumers and social 
welfare . . . seem likely to be far larger than what the government spends on antitrust 
enforcement and firms spend directly or indirectly on antitrust compliance.”). 
 309. Id. at 28–35. 
 310. See id. at 36–40 (“In sum, studies of firm behavior during these four periods 
demonstrate that without antitrust, firms can and do exercise market power, to the 
detriment of consumers and other buyers.”). 
 311. Id. at 27. 
 312. See infra note 319 and accompanying text (discussing transaction costs of 
antitrust suits). 
 313. See, e.g., William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert 
Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247, 247–48 (1985) (discussing how firms bring private 
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of non-price predatory behavior.314 A study by economist Christopher 
Klein suggested economic criteria for determining whether such 
litigation is sham or legitimate.315 He examined 117 Sherman Act 
countersuits alleging sham litigation.316 He found that while fewer 
countersuits were litigated than had been expected according to his 
criteria, more of the countersuits were allowed to pass summary 
judgment than his criteria predicted.317 The implication for no-fault is 
that developing and applying economic criteria in rejecting no-fault 
cases may not result in significant untoward legal costs associated with 
sham litigation. 
3. Increased transaction costs 
Another argument against no-fault is the transaction costs that would 
necessarily be involved in the resulting cases. The cases’ relief could 
entail significant transaction costs, regardless whether it is structural or 
                                               
sham litigation but also attempt to induce the government to pursue enforcement 
action against their competitors); see also R. Preston McAfee et al., Private Antitrust 
Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?, 282 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS 453, 
453–55 (“Firms may have incentive to use the antitrust laws strategically, which may 
hinder rather than promote competition.”). Despite the clear costs of sham litigation, 
legislative safeguards against it present challenges. See 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION 248 (4th ed. Supp. 2015) (noting that protections against sham litigation 
run the risk of chilling access to one’s First Amendment right to free speech). 
 314. See Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. 
REV. 267, 267 (1983) (“To a predator, raising rivals’ costs has obvious advantages over 
predatory pricing . . . . In contrast to pricing conduct, where the large predator loses 
money in the short run faster than its smaller ‘victim,’ it may be relatively inexpensive 
for a dominant firm to raise rivals’ costs substantially.”). 
 315. See CHRISTOPHER C. KLEIN, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE ECONOMICS OF SHAM 
LITIGATION: THEORY, CASES, AND POLICY 1 (1989) [hereinafter THE ECONOMICS OF SHAM 
LITIGATION] (“A definition of sham litigation that is more in keeping with economic 
reasoning would identify sham litigation as predatory or fraudulent litigation with 
anticompetitive effect . . . against rivals to achieve anticompetitive ends.”); see also 
Christopher C. Klein, Strategic Sham Litigation: Economic Incentives in the Context of the 
Case Law, 6 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 241, 243 (1986) (“An economic approach to sham 
litigation must treat this strategy as it would any scheme to deter entry or to reduce 
competition.”). 
 316. See THE ECONOMICS OF SHAM LITIGATION, supra note 315, at 48. 
 317. See id. at 69–70 (explaining that finding fewer countersuits as legitimate was 
more likely attributable to the study’s predation criteria as opposed to inconsistency 
between the case law and economic reasoning). 
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conduct-oriented.318 Moreover, virtually every antitrust case is 
expensive for both sides.319 No-fault would surely increase the number 
of Section 2 cases filed. Yet, each case would be simpler, because there 
would be no need to litigate whether the case involved anticompetitive 
conduct. Moreover, a major component of how many cases are 
brought, settled, or move to trial is the clarity of the law.320 Thus, a major 
determinant of the transaction costs involved would be the care with 
which a violation of the Sherman Act under no-fault would be crafted. 
The brighter the line, the fewer the cases that would be brought or go 
to trial. 
D. Special Issues Involving Natural Monopolies and Patents 
Non-structural relief is the traditional kind of relief ordered in 
monopolization cases, even in cases not involving natural monopolies 
or patents.321 This is because the Supreme Court observed that structural 
remedies are “more drastic” than injunctive relief.322 For example, in 
United States v. Microsoft Corp.,323 the D.C. Circuit said that “structural 
relief, which is ‘designed to eliminate the monopoly altogether . . . 
                                               
 318. See Diana L. Moss, Breaking up Is Hard to Do: The Implications of Restructuring and 
Regulating Digital Technology Markets, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Oct. 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/2018
-2019/atsource-october2019/oct19_mossc.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQ3G-EDY8] (considering 
possible transaction costs that would stem from breaking up tech companies). But see Rory Van 
Loo, In Defense of Breakups: Administering a “Radical” Remedy, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (manuscript at 1) (arguing that structural remedies are not “unadministrable”). 
 319. See Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical 
Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269, 1276–78 (2013) 
(discussing the high costs of antitrust litigation). 
 320. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 232, at 1654–55 (“Uncertainty entails several 
costs: it can increase firms’ costs of finding desirable mergers and may even deter firms 
from attempting some potentially desirable mergers.”). 
 321. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961). 
 322. Id. (describing divestiture as a “most drastic” remedy); see 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA 
ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 
§ 990c (3d ed. 2009) (stating that an injunction “prior to consummation of [a] merger 
transaction is the least disruptive” remedy for all involved parties); see also 2A PHILLIP 
E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION § 325 (4th ed. 2014) (“Because [the equity suit under antitrust law] 
controls future behavior rather than punishing past acts . . . . [i]ts main purpose is to 
restore competitive conditions rather than to penalize conduct or compensate injured 
parties.”). 
 323. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam), aff’d, 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004). 
2020] NO-FAULT MONOPOLIZATION 561 
 
require[s] a clearer indication of a significant causal connection between 
the conduct and creation or maintenance of the market power.’”324 In 
other words, the standards for a court ordering a structural remedy are 
higher than they are for conduct-oriented remedies.325 
Indeed, in the monopolization case against it, Microsoft asserted, 
“[l]eaving aside negotiated consent decrees, no court has ever split 
apart a unitary company not formed by mergers.”326 “The fact that no 
court has ever ordered the breakup of a unitary company like Microsoft 
demonstrates the extreme nature of the district court’s decree.”327 Even 
if Microsoft’s absolutist assertion is, as Professor Kovacic demonstrates, 
a significant exaggeration,328 there is no doubt that divestiture is an 
unusual remedy in a monopolization case. 
                                               
 324. See id. at 106 (alteration in original) (quoting 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION § 653b (1996)); see also United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 903 (D. 
Md. 1916) (“I am frankly reluctant to destroy so finely adjusted an industrial machine 
as the record shows the defendant to be.”). 
 325. Franklin Fisher, Professor Emeritus, MIT, Remarks at the Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act Hearings of the Federal Trade Commission 110 (Mar. 28, 2007), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/section-2-
sherman-act-single-firm-conduct-related-competition/070328.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PK9V-VXSY] (“[C]ourts are traditionally reluctant to grant 
structural relief . . . . [C]rafting [a structural remedy] is not easy and may sometimes 
be impossible.”). 
 326. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 128, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 
34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-5212). 
 327. See id. 
 328. See William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future 
of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1111–12 (1989) 
(classifying deconcentration suits by significance of resultant divestiture and finding 
thirty-four cases in which the government “secured substantial divestiture”). For 
example, Professor William E. Kovacic derived statistics for the success of relief efforts 
in government monopolization cases: 
When classified by outcomes, these deconcentration suits fall into three 
categories. The first category consists of thirty-four cases in which the 
government secured substantial divestiture. This set contains such landmark 
decisions as Standard Oil Co. v. United States and United States v. American Tobacco 
Co. A second category of prosecutions consists of cases such as United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of America, in which the government prevailed on liability but 
failed to gain significant divestiture. The final category includes cases such as 
United States v. United States Steel Corp. (U.S. Steel) in which the government 
failed to establish the defendant’s liability under the Sherman Act. This 
Section identifies and analyzes the historical patterns in which these 
deconcentration measures have emerged. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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This would surely mean that if Section 2 of the Sherman Act is 
interpreted to be a no-fault statute, monopolies convicted under this 
approach would rarely, if ever, be broken up. No-fault cases surely 
should not qualify as the highly exceptional cases in which a monopoly 
should be broken up. Rather, we would expect remedies in no-fault 
cases to be similar to those under consideration in Europe, which is 
considering conduct proposals forbidding technology firms, such as 
Google, to benefit in certain circumstances from using information 
they collect as part of their normal business.329 There are in fact a 
number of suggested remedies short of breakup, such as data sharing, 
open platforms, and other solutions.330 
1. Natural monopoly 
Natural monopolies are those for which economies of scale or scope 
exceed sustainable market size.331 A major modern concern relating to 
                                               
 329. See JACQUES CRÉMER ET AL., EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE 
DIGITAL ERA 92–93 (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/ 
kd0419345enn.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB49-2Y5Z] (advocating for the pro-
competitive outcomes resulting from data holders granting access to their 
competitors). 
 330. See Moss, supra note 318, at 10 (“[O]ther policy tools should be added to the 
mix to achieve well-defined goals for addressing identified problems in the digital 
technology sector. Those policies can be framed to complement antitrust.”); Van Loo, 
supra note 318, at 39 (“Access remedies have the potential to improve consumer 
welfare, particularly in the context of financial and technology platforms or when a 
breakup would destroy what consumers value most in a company.”). 
 331. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 
548 (1969) (“If the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at lowest 
cost by one firm . . . the market is a natural monopoly, whatever the actual number of 
firms in it.”). The costs of natural monopolies are those whose costs decline with 
volume so that competition tends to be unviable. Id. at 587 (“Suppose that, due to 
economies of scale, a particular market will accommodate only three firms . . . . If one 
of those firms drives out the others, it may be able to raise its price [ ] without attracting 
entry by a new firm, because of the difficulty involved in large-scale entry.”). Although 
network effects can be due to economies of scale, they similarly arise when there are 
economies in the production of a variety of related products, called “economies of 
scope.” See Joel D. Goldhar & Mariann Jelinek, Plan for Economies of Scope, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(1983), https://hbr.org/1983/11/plan-for-economies-of-scope (“[N]ew technical 
capabilities rest on economies of scope—that is, efficiencies wrought by variety, not 
volume.”). In this sense, the no-fault rule can legitimately apply to the case of a natural 
monopoly short of breakup, suggesting restraints on the use of monopoly positions. 
See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 169 (1982) (pioneering a definition of natural monopoly based 
on the concept of subadditivity). A cost function is “subadditive” when any given total 
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natural monopoly is network externalities, which include both scale 
and scope economies.332 A classic example of a natural monopoly is the 
type of networks that exist in the telecommunications field.333 The more 
people sign up, the cheaper it is for the provider per unit of service.334 
What would happen if no-fault were applied to natural monopolies? 
We address this only to note that there are several possible remedies 
short of break up for monopolies, both in general and especially for 
monopolies involving natural monopolies or patents. Natural 
monopolies strengthen their power by their ability to collect and use 
information, and can themselves reasonably be tempered by requiring 
them to share data acquired from customers.335 Moreover, if plaintiffs 
were so unwise as to seek the break-up of a natural monopoly under a 
no-fault theory, it seems likely that the reaction of the court would be 
to dismiss the case entirely.336 
                                               
output can be produced more cheaply by a single firm than by two or more firms. An 
industry in which the cost function is subadditive is therefore regarded as a natural 
monopoly. See id. 
 332. See, e.g., Allison Schrager, A Nobel-Winning Economist’s Guide to Taming Tech 
Monopolies, QUARTZ (June 27, 2018), https://qz.com/1310266/nobel-winning-
economist-jean-tirole-on-how-to-regulate-tech-monopolies [https://perma.cc/7224-
UF56] (“[A]t the platform level [of tech companies], competition confronts the 
existence of large returns to scale and/or network externalities, leading to natural 
monopoly situations and a winner-take-all scenario.”). 
 333. See, e.g., Emily Stewart, America’s Monopoly Problem, Explained by Your Internet Bill, 
VOX (Feb. 18, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2020/2/18/21126347/ 
antitrust-monopolies-internet-telecommunications-cheerleading 
(“[T]elecommunications companies . . . are a sort of natural monopoly, meaning . . . 
costs and other barriers to entry give early entrants a significant advantage. It costs 
money to install a cable system . . . and once one company does that, there’s not a ton 
of incentive to do it all over again.”). 
 334. See John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of Antitrust Law’s Natural Monopoly Cases, 
88 W. VA. L. REV. 677, 684 n.52 (1986) (“The rise in the exchange cost per subscriber as 
their number increases is the counterpart of an improvement in the quality of service 
rendered: each telephone is thereby enabled to reach more and more customers . . . . 
at zero additional costs.”). 
 335. See, e.g., Natalia Drozdiak, EU Asks: Does Control of ‘Big Data’ Kill Competition?, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 2, 2018, 9:34 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-competition-
chief-tracks-how-companies-use-big-data-1514889000 (“In cases where data is found to 
be unique or essential, European regulators have considered requiring dominant 
companies to share information with rivals—an approach that U.S. regulators have 
rejected.”). 
 336. See William E. Kovacic, Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public Competition 
Laws, in 2 CURRENT COMPETITION LAW 167, 176 (Mads Andenas, Michael Hutchings & 
Philip Marsden eds., 2004) (“My intuition is that courts . . . were ill at ease with the 
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2. Patents 
A no-fault Sherman Act implies that a monopoly legally gained 
through patents could face prosecution upon expiration of the crucial 
patent. However, this would mean that the firm had already enjoyed 
twenty years in which to earn monopoly returns. The monopolist 
could, moreover, avoid private damages suits by lowering its price to 
some negotiated level or a level its potential prosecutors or judges are 
likely to deem competitive. Thus, there would be significant incentives 
for firms having patent monopoly status to quickly lower their prices. 
Moreover, Economists Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine find little 
evidence that patents spur innovation.337 If they are correct, and we are 
by no means certain that they are, the current patent system may be 
misguided.338 If they are correct, no-fault would not cause any patent-
related harms. 
E.   Micro-Studies of Two Huge Monopolization Cases: AT&T and IBM 
One approach to predicting the probable effects of no-fault 
monopoly would be to systematically study the results of a large 
number of cases where a defendant had been subjected to a remedy in 
a Section 2 case. Although this would not address, let alone answer, all 
the economic questions involved, it would further the analysis 
considerably. We present two microanalyses of Section 2 remedies only 
to suggest what type of analysis a court could perform on a much more 
detailed level and for a much larger number of cases. 
The Justice Department filed possibly the two largest Section 2 cases 
in history against IBM and AT&T.339 In 1982, the Justice Department 
                                               
possibility that a finding of illegal monopolization would trigger the imposition of 
massive damage[s] . . . . The courts in these matters could not refuse to treble 
damages . . . , but they could interpret the law in ways that resulted in . . . no liability.”). 
 337. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP., 
Winter 2013, at 3, 20 (concluding patents “block innovation and inhibit competition”). 
 338. Id. (“In general, public policy should aim to decrease patent monopolies 
gradually but surely, and the ultimate goal should be the abolition of patents.”). 
 339. See James B. Stewart, Whales and Sharks, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 1993, at 38 
(stating that the I.B.M. and AT&T cases were “the largest antitrust cases in living 
memory.”). 
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announced that they were abandoning the IBM case and that AT&T 
had capitulated.340 AT&T lost their case.341 IBM won theirs.342 
Yet, eleven years later on January 28th, 1993, four days after IBM 
posted a quarterly loss of $5.46 billion, AT&T reported record 
quarterly earnings of $1 billion and a yearly profit of $3.8 billion on 
sales of $65 billion.343 Robert Morris, a telecommunications analyst at 
Goldman Sachs, correctly predicted that AT&T will be “an awesome 
multimedia communications giant by the turn of the century.”344 
Robert Allen, the chairman of AT&T, noted, “We were forced by the 
divestiture to make changes that probably were good for us . . . . We 
went through some tough years, but it paid off. We may have been 
more fortunate than I.B.M. in that change was forced on us.”345 
Although the decision to break up AT&T was controversial at the time,346 
the facts “don’t lie.”347 Since the break-up, the telecommunications field 
has gone from high-cost, long-distance phone calls and rotary dial 
phones to smart phones, wireless technology, and the development of 
the Internet.348 As one account notes of the break-up: “In the aftermath, 
AT&T reduced long distance rates by 40% over six years, though local 
carriers added access charges that prevented consumers from seeing 
all of the cost reduction. The local operating companies . . . also began 
                                               
 340. Id. 
 341. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub 
nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (entering a consent decree requiring 
AT&T to divest from its regional Baby Bells). 
 342. In re IBM Corp., 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982) (directing the district court to 
allow the parties’ stipulation of dismissal to move forward). 
 343. Stewart, supra note 339, at 38. Note that these effects were before the impact 
of the Telecommunication Act of 1996. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. OECD, SUPPORTING INVESTMENT IN KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL, GROWTH AND 
INNOVATION 161 (2013) (noting that the decision to break up AT&T was highly 
controversial, with critics arguing that “quality of service would decline, national 
security would be endangered, . . . and shareholders would suffer”). 
 347. See TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 96–97 
(2018) (“Some economists point to lower prices in the wake of the dissolution [of 
AT&T], but the real impact[,] [increased innovation,] was . . . far more important.”). 
 348. See Jay L. Zagorsky, Rise and Fall of the Landline: 143 Years of Telephones Becoming 
More Accessible—and Smart, CONVERSATION (Mar. 14, 2019, 6:39 AM) (“Phone call prices 
plummeted after the breakup of the U.S. telephone monopoly in the 1980s. And the 
invention of technologies like ‘voice over IP’—popularized by Skype—pushed prices 
down even further.”). 
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offering mobile service in the 1980s after it had been developed by Bell 
Labs.”349 
As Professor Wu has noted, “It became apparent, in retrospect, just 
how much innovation the Bell system monopoly had been holding 
back. For out of the carcass of AT&T emerged entirely new types of 
industries unimagined or unimaginable during the reign of AT&T.”350 
Michael Porter also concluded that telecommunications services 
became a hotbed of innovation after that breakup of AT&T.351 
Would it have been better for IBM to also have capitulated? Probably! 
John Shenefield, President Carter’s Assistant Attorney General in 
charge of antitrust from 1977 to 1979, presided over both cases: 
[I]f I.B.M. had gone through the divestiture it would have had to 
develop new entrepreneurial opportunities. With real competition, 
who knows what imagination and creativity that process might have 
invited? Competition theorists think the industry as a whole would 
have been better off if I.B.M. had been broken up, and if it would 
have been better for the public I think it would have been better for 
the shareholders, too.352 
F.   Economic Conclusions: Summary of Probable Gains and Losses 
Any summary of probable gains and losses from no-fault or no-action 
is problematic. It depends upon empirical data that—because no-fault 
has never before been tried—simply does not exist. The best we can 
do is to present conclusions from roughly comparable areas and to 
make inferences from them that might hold true to some extent. This 
uncertainty is true both in general and especially for the effects of no-
fault on particular industries. Thus, the table below is meant as a guide 
for further discussion—not to provide a definitive answer. 
The following Table shows the costs and benefits of three possible 
policy options: (1) The “Present Status Base Case Costs” column gives 
the positives and negatives of the current Section 2 regime (which 
requires anticompetitive conduct for a violation); (2) The “Costs of No 
Action on Antitrust” column considers what would be likely to happen 
                                               
 349. JOHN M. JORDAN, INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND INNOVATION: RESOURCES FOR 
GROWTH IN A CONNECTED WORLD 173 (2012). 
 350. WU, supra note 347, at 96–97. 
 351. See MICHAEL PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS: CREATING AND 
SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 531 (2011) (“The breakup of AT&T . . . has led to 
dramatic improvements in service and a rapid rate of innovation . . . .”). 
 352. Stewart, supra note 339, at 38–39. 
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if no Section 2 cases were brought; (3) The “Costs of No-Fault” column 
refers to the results if a no-fault policy was implemented. The terms 
“smaller” and “larger” refer to costs and benefits of no-fault or no 
action compared to the current situation (the “Base Case”). 
For example, the first item is “Allocative Loss Due to DWL.” “No 
action” would be likely to produce larger allocative losses, and “no-
fault” would be likely to reduce allocative losses substantially. Of 
course, as we have indicated, a summary such as contained in the table 
below is speculative. Our goal has been to suggest that a no-fault policy 
could well be positive and that it certainly would be worthwhile for the 
antitrust field to consider it seriously, not that it is the obvious choice. 
 





Base Case Costs 





Allocative Loss Due 
to DWL 
Small Larger Smaller 
Allocative Costs 
Due to Rent-
seeking and Higher 
Production Costs 
Substantial Larger Smaller 
Loss Due to less 
Innovation 
Medium Larger Smaller 
Cost of Cases to 
Firms 
Substantial Small Unclear 
Cost of Cases to 
Prosecutors 
Substantial Smaller Larger 
International 
Competitiveness 
Medium Larger Smaller 
Income Inequality Substantial Larger Smaller 
Wealth Transfers to 
Monopolists 
Substantial Larger Smaller 
 
Privacy Costs Substantial Larger Smaller 
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VI.    SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF TEXTUALIST ANALYSIS ON ANTITRUST LAW 
A.   Effects on Monopolization Law 
Every circa-1890 dictionary and legal treatise cited earlier defined 
“monopolize” as simply to acquire a monopoly position, and all of the 
earliest Supreme Court Sherman Act cases that used the terms 
“monopolize” and “monopoly” equated them.353 None of the early 
Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting the Sherman Act required 
that a “monopoly” or a firm that “monopolized” must have engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct.354 Thus, a textualist interpretation of Section 
2 is in most respects simple and straightforward. 
Nevertheless, a complete analysis of the issue should consider three 
issues: (1) Must markets be defined and, if so, could less than a 100% 
market share suffice to make a “monopoly” illegal; (2) Does the possibility 
of treble damages mean Section 2 is not actually a no-fault statute, and (3) 
Do the statute’s criminal penalties mean that Section 2 is really not a no-
fault statute? All three of these questions should, moreover, be considered 
in light of textualism’s “absurdity” doctrine, which prevents statutes from 
being interpreted irrationally.355 
1. Could less than a 100% market share suffice to make a monopoly illegal? 
Applying textualism’s “literalness” doctrine 
Would a textualist interpretation of Section 2 require a firm to have 
captured a 100% share of its relevant market to “monopolize” the market? 
Or could a lower market share suffice, because a textualist would interpret 
the term “monopoly” fairly and reasonably, but not literally? 
Courts today sometimes find the “monopoly power” required for the 
offense of “monopolization” when a firm has significantly less than 100% 
                                               
 353. See supra Section III.A.3 and note 151. 
 354. See supra Section III.A.3. 
 355. See supra note 80 (explaining Justice Scalia’s narrow application of the 
absurdity doctrine); see also infra Section VI.A.3 (discussing the finer contours of the 
absurdity doctrine in textualist interpretation). 
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of a market.356 This is because the current requirement is not that the 
firm have a 100% complete “monopoly,” but rather that the firm have 
the power to “control prices or exclude competition.”357 This ability 
can be found in some situations when a firm’s market share is as low as 
70%, and possibly even lower.358 Indeed, the vast majority of firms 
found to have engaged in illegal monopolization had market shares 
significantly less than 100%.359 If a textualist approach to a 
“monopolization” violation required a 100% market share, this would 
dramatically limit Section 2’s reach. 
It is likely, however, that a textualist interpretation of Section 2 
would not require a “monopolizing” firm to have 100% of the relevant 
market. As noted earlier, textualism does not call for literalism or for 
                                               
 356. See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 
OHIO STATE L.J. 115, 150–51 (1993) (“These results imply an ‘average’ monopolist 
market share of between seventy-five and eighty-five percent.”). 
Moreover, “monopoly” might have been used colloquially the same way—to only 
apply to firms with 100% of a market. See, e.g., 1 IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE 
STANDARD OIL COMPANY 236 (1904) (emphasis added) (“The extent of their (the 
Standard’s) business and control over pipe-lines and refineries . . . . by virtue of their 
monopoly of the business of refining and transportation of oil[] . . . [made them] at 
times almost the only buyers in the market.”) (emphasis added). In referring to the 
Standard Oil Company’s beginnings, Tarbell states that after John Rockefeller secured 
a lower shipping rate for his company’s oil in 1870, he had achieved a complete 
monopoly just a few years later. Id. at 217 (“[I]n December, 1877, after the monopoly 
was completed . . . .”) (emphasis added). In 1872, Rockefeller created the South 
Improvement Company with the goal of buying and controlling Cleveland oil 
refineries to the advantage of the Standard Oil Company. Id. at 57. 
The owner of a competing refinery, in explaining why he chose to sell his business 
to the South Improvement Company, said it was easier to sell “than fight such a 
monopoly.” Id. at 65. As the South Improvement Company grew, the press and the 
public heard rumors of its advantageous deals with railroads. Id. at 83–84 (“It was 
evident to everybody that if the railroads had made the contracts as charged . . . 
nothing but an absolute monopoly of the whole oil business by this combination could 
result.”). Finally, Tarbell notes that the Standard Oil Company’s competitors, like the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, “raised a cry of monopoly.” Id. at 149. 
 357. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
 358. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 230–31 
(8th ed. 2017) (footnotes omitted) (“A market share in excess of 70 percent generally 
establishes a prima facie case of monopoly power, at least with evidence of substantial 
barriers to entry and evidence that existing competitors could not expand output. In 
contrast, courts rarely find monopoly power when market share is less than about 50 
percent. The greatest uncertainty exists when market shares are between 50 percent 
and 70 percent.”). 
 359. See Lande, supra note 356, at 148–50 (surveying the market shares of firms held 
to be monopolies). 
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construing words and phrases strictly.360 Rather, textualists interpret 
statutes “fairly,” the way a “reasonable person” would at the time a law was 
enacted, and give a statute’s words and phrases their “ordinary” meaning.361 
Thus, a textualist would ask how a reasonable person in 1890 would 
fairly or ordinarily interpret the word “monopolize.” Would interpreting 
Section 2 as only encompassing firms with a 100% market share be the 
type of “strict constructionism” or “straightjacketing” that Justice Scalia 
denounced?362 After all, a firm with a 98% market share as a practical 
matter is usually as likely to have monopoly power as a firm with a 100% 
share.363 Indeed, the 1895 Supreme Court E.C. Knight case referred to 
a firm with a 98% market share as a “monopoly.”364 Standard Oil in 1911 
held that something could be deemed a monopoly if it produced 
                                               
 360. See supra Section II.A. 
 361. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. Professor May, in one of his 
many helpful comments to the authors, noted that: 
Charles Whiting Baker’s 1889 Monopolies and the People, at pages 71–72, 
declared that ‘in dealing with the question of monopolies we must not 
conclude that the absolute control of supply is at all necessary to the existence 
of a monopoly.’ Similarly, in 1893, in A Treatise on the Law of Monopolies 
and Industrial Trusts, as Administered in England and in the United States of 
America, in discussing continuing common law condemnation of the creation 
of a monopoly even after an English statute sought to relax statutory 
prohibitions against monopolies, Charles Fisk Beach, Sr., declared that the 
courts put their own construction upon the enactment and continued to hold 
that the creation of a monopoly was an offense at common law. It was held 
that in order to create a monopoly, in the legal sense of that term, it was not 
necessary to obtain possession of the whole of any product, or even of any 
large part of it. It was sufficient that the[re] was engrossing to such an extent 
as to enable the holders to increase the price at a specified time and place. 
 362. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 38, at 355–56. 
Textualism does not purport to exclude all consideration of purpose or policy 
from statutory interpretation. To the contrary, because all statutory language 
is at least somewhat open-textured, textualists acknowledge that a “certain 
degree of discretion” is inevitable in “most” judicial decisionmaking. When 
statutory ambiguity leaves room for the exercise of such discretion, textualists 
believe it is appropriate, if not necessary, for an interpreter to consider a 
statute’s apparent background purpose or policy implications in choosing 
among competing interpretations. 
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2408 (2003) (footnote 
omitted). 
 363. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 5, 16 (1895) (acknowledging 
that a firm need not control all of a market to be a monopoly); see also id. at 44 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant “controls the price of [sugar] everywhere” 
by virtue of controlling 98% of the market). 
 364. Id. at 11, 16. 
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“some of its baneful effects,” even if the defendant did not possess a 
100% monopoly.365 
A “fair reading” of Section 2 should mean that a firm with somewhat 
less than 100% of a market that otherwise exhibits the characteristics 
of a monopoly should be included within Section 2’s prohibitions. This 
is especially true because otherwise a potential defendant usually could 
render the monopolization offense a nullity by deliberately leaving 2% 
of a market to others.366 As Justice Scalia noted, “Some outcome-
pertinent consequences . . . are relevant to a sound textual decision—
specifically, those that: [] cause a private instrument or governmental 
prescription to[] be ineffective.”367 
Moreover, to construe the “monopoly” requirement in a manner that 
neutralizes the statute would be an arguably absurd result. As Justice 
Scalia368 and Justice Kavanaugh noted, the absurdity doctrine369 can, in truly 
extreme situations, prevent statutes from being interpreted irrationally. 
Even though the Supreme Court in 1895 was correct to characterize 
a firm with a 98% market share as a “monopoly,” it is a difficult judgment 
call as to when a reasonable person in 1890 (or today!) would consider 
a firm’s market share to be too low to be one. Could a monopolist only 
                                               
 365. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54–55 (1911) (emphasis 
added) (citing Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347; 1 P. Wms. 181) (“[B]y 
operation of the mental process which led to considering as a monopoly acts which although 
they did not constitute a monopoly were thought to produce some of its baneful effects so also 
because of the impediment or burden to the due course of trade which they produced, 
such acts came to be referred to as in restraint of trade . . . . [B]y the common law 
monopolies were unlawful because of their restriction upon individual freedom of 
contract and their injury to the public . . . . And that at common law the evils 
consequent upon engrossing, etc., caused those things to be treated as coming within 
monopoly, and sometimes to be called monopoly, and the same considerations caused 
monopoly, because of its operation and effect, to be brought within and spoken of 
generally as impeding the due course of or being in restraint of trade.”). We are 
indebted to Prof. Meese for directing us to this and many other relevant references. 
Of course, Standard Oil was issued twenty-one years after the Sherman Act was passed, 
so it should carry less weight than a more contemporaneous opinion. 
 366. See Diane Capri, John D. Rockefeller: Creative or Killer?, DIANE CAPRI (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://dianecapri.com/2016/12/john-rockefeller-creative-or-criminal (quoting John 
D. Rockefeller as saying “the only reason he didn’t take over 100% of the world’s oil 
refining market was because he didn’t want public sentiment to be 100% negative against 
him”). 
 367. Scalia & Garner, supra note 38, at 352. 
 368. Id. at 234. 
 369. See Kavanaugh, supra note 174, at 2156–57. 
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have a market share of 88%, the percent of the U.S. oil market 
possessed by the Standard Oil Trust in 1890?370 
Should the 70% minimum that usually suffices today continue to be 
the benchmark? A minimum or virtually-always minimum line should 
be drawn, but where? Indeed, would a reasonable person instead just 
conclude that if a firm had the power to “control prices or exclude 
competition,”371 then it is for all practical purposes a monopoly? Perhaps 
the monopoly power standard for Section 2 should not change. 
2. Treble damages for a no-fault violation: absurd or appropriate? 
Would it be “absurd” to impose treble damages on a firm that was 
not found to have engaged in anticompetitive conduct? Does the 
possibility of a private treble damages action mean that Section 2 could 
not have been intended to be a no-fault statute? Would this be the type 
of “absurd” result that Justice Scalia cautions should not result from 
textualism?372 
Reasonable people certainly can disagree over whether treble 
damages would be too large for a no-fault violation. It often is believed 
that treble damages were necessary to give victims the requisite incentive 
to bring and litigate cases against large and powerful defendants, as well 
as to deter violations optimally.373 This is especially true because Section 
2 antitrust violations and damages often are so difficult to detect and 
prove.374 Regardless whether a contemporary judge or justice thought 
this policy position was wise, should they find it to be absurd? 
The “treble damages” remedy should be considered an approach 
that reasonable policy makers might implement, regardless whether it 
is considered from a deterrence or a compensation perspective. This 
is especially true because if antitrust law’s so-called “treble damages” 
remedy is analyzed empirically, with consideration given to its lack of 
                                               
 370. Mark V. Siegler, An Economic History of the United States: Connecting the 
Present with the Past 207 (2017). One might even ask whether Congress would have 
considered it “absurd” if Rockefeller were not found to have “monopolized” the oil 
industry as this term was used in Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
 371. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) 
(stating that monopoly power is the power to “control prices or exclude competition”). 
  372.    See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (describing Justice Scalia’s 
narrow approach to the absurdity doctrine).  
 373. Lande, supra note 356, at 124 (summarizing the prevailing “Optimal Deterrence 
Framework” theory of antitrust damages). 
 374. See id. at 129 nn.54–55 (noting the reasons for disparities between damages 
caused and damages awarded in antitrust cases). 
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prejudgment interest, lack of payments for the allocative inefficiency 
effects or umbrella effects of monopoly pricing, and other factors, even 
a “treble damages” award is probably on average really only around 
single damages.375 In other words, a monopolist paying nominal damages 
of three times its overcharges would probably only be paying one times 
the actual damages it caused. 
Moreover, private antitrust cases rarely produce even nominal treble 
damages for victims of anticompetitive behavior.376 Even in cartel cases, 
as a practical matter most private cases settle, and the settlements 
average only 37% to 66% of single damages.377 Only 20% settled for 
single damages or more.378 
If a court did believe that the prospect of awarding treble damages 
in a no-fault case was absurd, it could do what courts often do even in 
routine cases where fault has been established but the court believed 
it would be unjust to order “excessive” damages. Professor William 
Kovacic pointed out that in many circumstances, 
[A] court might fear that the US statutory requirement that successful 
private plaintiffs receive treble damages runs a risk of over-deterrence. 
A court might seek to correct such perceived infirmities in the anti-
trust system by recourse to means directly within its control—namely 
by modifying doctrine governing liability standards or by devising 
special doctrinal tests to evaluate the worthiness of private claims.379 
Using these same techniques, as a practical matter, courts would be 
extremely unlikely to award even nominal treble damages in a no-fault 
monopolization case.380 A court which believed this result to be absurd 
easily could avoid this outcome. 
                                               
 375. See id. at 162 tbl.2. 
 376. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are 
Mostly Less than Single Damages, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2015) (noting that almost 
every successful antitrust damages action settles for less than treble damages). 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Kovacic, supra note 336, at 173–74; see also Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About 
Antitrust Damages, 40 S.F. L. REV. 651, 663, n.49 (2006) (analyzing this and other sources 
making similar points). 
 380. If a no-fault case reached the damages stage, the measurement issues might be 
simpler than in other Section 2 cases. In a fault-based Section 2 case, courts have to 
determine the overall monopoly profits, but award only those monopoly profits 
attributed to the anticompetitive conduct. This parsing is extremely difficult. Under 
no-fault, the court would just have to determine the total monopoly overcharges. 
Moreover, for similar reasons, structural remedies have been relatively unusual in 
Section 2 cases and have traditionally been saved for the most egregious violations. See 
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3. Criminal sanctions for a no-fault case? Applying the absurdity doctrine 
The Sherman Act of 1890 contained criminal penalties. A violation 
of Section 1 or 2 could result in a $5,000 fine and a year in prison (a 
misdemeanor at the time).381 A reasonable person might ask whether 
the inclusion of possible criminal penalties for a Section 2 violation 
meant that Congress did not intend for it to be a no-fault statute and 
thus argue that a no-fault interpretation of Section 2 is “absurd.”      
This is incorrect for three reasons: (1) While Congress would have 
thought it “absurd” to imprison a tiny monopolist that was not believed 
to affect interstate commerce, Congress might not have thought it 
absurd to imprison a “robber baron” like John D. Rockefeller; (2) 
There are many other plausible reasons why Congress could have 
included criminal penalties in a no-fault statute; and (3) Other 
antitrust laws could be applied criminally in ways that could lead to 
absurd results, but this does not mean these laws were not meant to 
apply at all to the types of conduct in question. 
First, one might ask what would have happened during the floor 
debates if a senator had asked whether a manufacturer achieving a 
monopoly in a small market by making a better product could be put 
in prison under Section 2.382 Similarly, suppose there were a small town 
                                               
supra notes 321–25 and accompanying text. Surely structural relief would not be the 
norm in no-fault cases. 
 381. See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51–647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018)). For the history of the Sherman Act, see D. 
Daniel Sokol, Reinvigorating Criminal Antitrust?, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1545, 1554–55 
(2019). 
 382. One might ask: “Does the language of Section 2 suggest that Congress meant 
for the Department of Justice to prosecute, and for juries to convict, executives of all 
companies that achieved monopoly positions? And of course, what about the 
companies themselves? If Congress did not intend for there to be an ‘efficiency’ 
defense, doesn’t it follow that criminal prosecutions of individual executives in charge 
of monopolists (however the monopoly was attained) would be fair game for criminal 
sanctions? 
“Alternatively, wasn’t the judicial interpretation of the statute to require ‘bad acts’ 
inevitable in light of the criminal nature of the Sherman Act? A textualist interpretation 
of the 1890 legislation would mean that criminal remedies would be available to 
prosecute firms and individuals who achieved their preeminence without fault. 
“Imagine an extension to the floor debates in 1890: Question for Senator Edmunds: 
‘Suppose I make the best buggy whip you ever saw. Nobody else comes close. I am a 
monopolist. Have I violated Section 2 of the draft statute, and can I be sent to jail for 
the offense?’ What would Edmonds have said in reply?” 
The authors are grateful to Professor Kovacic for suggesting this hypothetical and 
many other insights. 
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with only two barbers, and one of them died. The surviving barber 
would be a monopolist. Could this barber have been prosecuted 
criminally?383 Do these possibilities mean that Section 2 was never 
intended to be a no-fault statute? 
Recall that a textualist analysis should ignore the legislative debates, 
but that they should consider the “history of the times.”384 A textualist 
should use the history of the period producing the antitrust laws to help 
ascertain what Congress meant when it used a term like “monopolize” 
and decided to impose sanctions on firms that monopolized. 
The absurdity doctrine could be appropriate if either of these two 
hypotheticals (involving the small innovative company or the last 
barber in town) actually occurred. A textualist could reason that the 
types of monopolies that were the target of the Sherman Act were 
extremely large firms like the Standard Oil Trust.385 This is especially 
true because the very definition of “interstate commerce” was so 
restricted in 1890 that the Sherman Act would not have governed the 
activities of a monopoly-barber in a small town.386 
A textualist might also ask whether ordinary Americans in 1890 fairly 
could have assumed the law could have been used to impose criminal 
sanctions on small town barbers or small firms that succeeded through 
innovation. This is especially true due to the belief by Scalia and others 
that ambiguous statutes should be read in a manner that does not 
result in a criminal sanction.387 
But the absurdity doctrine should not rescue the CEOs of companies 
like the Standard Oil Trust even if Section 2 was being used on a no-
fault basis. During the late 19th and early 20th Centuries many called 
                                               
 383. The authors are grateful to James May for suggesting this hypothetical and 
many other insights. 
 384. See supra note 72. 
 385. See Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2279, 2280, 2334 (2013) (noting that calls to break up trusts in the 1880s were 
the result of shifts in income distribution that “accompanied the rapid industrialization 
of the decade”); Lande, supra note 37, at 96–105 (discussing the relevant history of the 
time when Congress enacted the Sherman Act). 
 386. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20, 23 (1888) (distinguishing commerce and 
manufacturing within the regulation of “interstate commerce” and ruling that 
manufacturing was not considered a part of “interstate commerce”). The incredibly 
restrictive application of the term “interstate commerce” in 1890, when Congress 
passed the Sherman Act, surely meant that the Sherman Act similarly would not have 
been intended to include the only barber in a small town. 
 387. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 38, at 296 (“Ambiguity in a statute defining a 
crime or imposing a penalty should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.”). 
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not just for an investigation into the activities of John D. Rockefeller, 
in 1890 the head of the Standard Oil Trust, but his imprisonment.388 
Would imprisoning Rockefeller even on a no-fault theory really have 
been “absurd” in the minds of these people, any more “absurd” than 
what some politicians have called for recently? Some contemporary 
politicians have not just called for an investigation into whether certain 
large and powerful high-tech companies engaged in anticompetitive 
                                               
  388. Keith Poole, Biography: John D. Rockefeller, Senior, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/americanexperience/features/rockefellers-john [https://perma.cc/S8DC-
B9DZ]. For example, in 1894 the Governor of Texas wanted to arrest John D. 
Rockefeller for violating the Texas Antitrust laws. See Condensed Dispatches, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 1, 1894, at 7 (“A requisition has been made by the Governor of Texas upon Gov. 
Flower, of New York, for the arrest of John D. Rockefeller . . . for violation of the Texas 
anti-trust law.”); see also Called Rockefeller Names, CAMAS PRAIRIE CHRONICLE, Aug. 4, 1905 
(quoting the then-governor of Wisconsin as saying “John D. Rockefeller is the greatest 
criminal of the age,” a declaration that was met with cheers); Fearful of Arrest, DAILY 
LEADER, Apr. 10, 1895 (“John D. Rockefeller does not dare to leave New York for fear 
of arrest on warrants already issued in the various states”); Jail Rockefeller and Other Trust 
Magnates, Says Bryan, LANCASTER NEWS, July 10, 1907 (quoting William J. Bryan, the 
Democratic nominee for President in 1896 and 1900, as saying “Send John D. 
Rockefeller and a dozen other trust magnates to prison for a long term of years and 
one of the most vital questions before the people will have been solved”); Rockefeller a 
Highwayman, EVENING STATESMAN, Dec. 19, 1903 (“Ther[e] is no difference in principle 
between holding up a nation for $1,000,000 at the mouth of a pipe line and holding 
up an individual at the muzzle of a gun for what he has on his person. The man who 
is looked on as the most successful man in the country is, in the last analysis, a gambler 
or highway robber. He is not even a creator of money, much less of manhood, but a 
highway bandit who has held up producers and public for millions. . . . John D. 
Rockefeller and J. Pierpont Morgan and men of their class in the financial world are 
really responsible for such a reign of crime as now exists in Chicago . . . .”); Sage and 
Rockefeller, EVENING STATESMAN, Aug. 26, 1905, at 4 (“Rockefeller in his business lifetime 
has destroyed the old way of doing business. He has substituted combination for 
competition; secrecy for publicity; mendacity for truth; bribery for brains. He buys 
lawyers who buy for him laws: he crushes rivals relentlessly or kills them by the slower 
torture of starvation. The mere fact that a rival exists is reason enough for killing him. 
Mr. Rockefeller is a law unto himself. Is it a wonder that he is hated, feared and 
admired? . . . [Rockefeller is like a] boa constrictor.”); Try the Criminal Law, TIMES & 
DEMOCRAT, Jan. 14, 1908, at 2 (“If the government in its pretended war on the 
Standard Oil and other trusts would invoke the aid of the criminal law[] . . . it would 
accomplish something. If old John D. Rockefeller, for instance, was sent to prison for 
twenty-four hours for violating the trust law, you would soon see a change, and the 
trusts would soon be all good.”); Walsh Urges Prison for Rockefellers, SUN, July 12, 1915, at 
3 (“If the next Congress represents the people of the United States, its first act will be 
to cite before it John D. Rockefeller . . . and if these men continue to defy the nation 
they should be indicted for crime against the Government and sent to jail.”). 
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conduct: Bernie Sanders declared he would use the Sherman Act to 
“jail” CEOs of “monopolistic companies.”389 
Some may denounce Senator Sanders’s plan as foolish on policy 
grounds. And we could speculate about what a politician like Senator 
Sanders actually would do if he were elected president and could enact 
legislation he favored. However, his harsh rhetoric reminds us that 
political views of many Americans towards alleged monopolies at times 
have been extremely antagonistic.390 
Second, Congress might have enacted a law containing criminal 
penalties with full knowledge that they would be unlikely to be applied 
vigorously or at all. During the early years of the Sherman Act, 
corporate executives were not sent to prison for any antitrust offenses. 
No corporate official was imprisoned, even for price fixing, until more 
than thirty years after the Sherman Act was passed.391 No corporate 
official has ever been imprisoned for any Section 2 offense,392 and 
during its early years Section 2 seldom was enforced, even civilly.393 
Section 2’s framers might well have included criminal provisions 
                                               
389.    Ryan Grim, Bernie Sanders Vows to Revive Criminal Prosecutions of CEOs for Unfair 
Trade Practices, INTERCEPT (Oct. 23, 2019, 4:18 PM), https://theintercept.com/2019/ 
10/23/bernie-sanders-sherman-antitrust-act-monopolies/ [https://perma.cc/8VJR-KMUL]. 
In a statement to The Intercept, Sen[ator] Elizabeth Warren’s campaign said 
she would also pursue criminal prosecutions of monopolists under the 
Sherman Act. “When she’s president, Elizabeth will enforce our antitrust laws 
to their fullest extent including their criminal provisions. She will also break 
up Big Tech, break up Big Ag[riculture], and break up Big Banks,” said 
spokesperson Saloni Sharma. 
Id.; see also Hirsch, supra note 16. 
 390. Lydia Saad, Do Americans Like or Dislike ‘Big Business’?, GALLUP (Dec. 13, 2019), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/270296/americans-dislike-big-
business.aspx?version=print [https://perma.cc/6TWW-Y9S5] (reporting that roughly 
half of the country has negative views of big business); see also supra note 385 (showing 
Rockefeller’s opinions). 
 391. See Sokol, supra note 381, at 1555 (footnote omitted) (“Members of cartels were 
incarcerated once in 1921, but not again until 1959.”). One necessary element for a 
criminal conviction is mens rea: “The general rule of law is that a person cannot be 
convicted and punished in a proceeding of a criminal nature unless it can be shown 
that he had a guilty mind.” A.M. WILSHERE, THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 6–7 (2d ed. 1911). This requirement would, however, be met in Section 2 
cases because only “competent age, sanity, freedom from some kinds of coercion[,] 
and to some extent knowledge of fact are essential to criminality.” Id. at 7. 
 392. See Sokol, supra note 381, at 1570. 
 393. Id. at 1571. 
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without giving them much thought, or perhaps only as a threat,394 or 
only for political reasons. 
It certainly is possible that Congress did not give much thought to 
whether, on policy grounds, Section 2 should contain criminal 
sanctions. Regardless, all this is speculation that a textualist should not 
engage in.395 If a judge re-interpreted the words of a statute because they 
believed it was unwise policy to impose criminal penalties in a no-fault 
case, this would not be textualism.396 
Third, the possibility that a prosecutor would attempt to secure 
criminal penalties in a no-fault case against a major U.S. corporation 
                                               
 394. For a recent example of the seriousness with which Big Tech leaders take these 
threats, Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s CEO, called Warren’s presidential campaign 
and her desire to break up Big Tech an “existential threat.” Lauren Feiner, Zuckerberg 
Blasts Elizabeth Warren’s Plan to Break up Facebook and Says It’s an ‘Existential’ Threat, CNBC 
(Oct. 1, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/01/audio-from-zuckerberg-
meeting-with-facebook-employees-leaked.html [https://perma.cc/Z4HM-URV5]. 
Zuckerberg and Warren traded blows in discussing a potential antitrust suit: 
“I would bet that we will win the legal challenge,” [Zuckerberg] said. “Does 
that still suck for us? Yeah. I mean, I don’t want to have a major lawsuit against 
our own government . . . . But . . . if someone’s going to try to threaten 
something that existential, you go to the mat and you fight.” Warren hit back 
on Twitter. “What would really ‘suck’ is if we don’t fix a corrupt system that 
lets giant companies like Facebook engage in illegal anticompetitive practices, 
stomp on consumer privacy rights, and repeatedly fumble their responsibility 
to protect our democracy,” she wrote. 
Adrian Carrasquillo, Why Elizabeth Warren Is the VP Pick Facebook Doesn’t Want to See, 
NEWSWEEK (June 26, 2020, 5:02 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/why-elizabeth-
warren-vp-pick-facebook-doesnt-want-see-1513754 [https://perma.cc/3Z6R-2ZFR]. 
 395. Even if the above hypothetical dialogue had occurred, and one of the bill’s 
sponsors had said, “Do you realize this bill could put a monopolist in prison even 
though he did nothing wrong,” the dialogue would be irrelevant because a textualist 
ignores legislative history. Perhaps if this hypothetical has been considered by 
Congress it would have resulted in the law being changed. But this is the kind of 
speculation a textualist should not engage in. Similarly, a textualist does not attempt 
to put themselves in the hypothetical “mind of Congress” and determine what would 
have been logical to a reasonable congressperson, other than by a fair and 
straightforward reading of a statute’s language. As Justice Scalia noted, it is a “false 
notion that when a situation is not quite covered by a statute, the court should 
reconstruct what the legislature would have done had it confronted the issue.” SCALIA 
& GARNER, supra note 38, at 349. A textualist would not ask how a hypothetical member 
of Congress would have responded if someone had asked them, “Are you sure you 
want to put people in prison for violating every part of the statute? Maybe instead you 
should only impose criminal penalties for Section 1 violations.” A textualist would deal 
with the statute that is in front of them. 
 396. Id. 
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like Amazon, Facebook, or Google would be no more “absurd” than 
three other types of criminal antitrust cases that have been or could be 
brought under the Sherman Act or Clayton Act397: in tiny collusion 
cases, RPM cases, and Robinson-Patman Act cases. 
First, suppose two tiny businesses sell the same products (such as 
bicycles) and they are on the opposite ends of a large metropolitan 
area. Assume they fixed prices. Assume interstate commerce was 
impacted and their agreement did not result in significant efficiencies. 
If the government charged them with a criminal Section 1 violation, 
they would not be able to defend on the basis that no prices actually 
increased, that they competed with internet sales, that entry was easy, 
etc.398 They would be guilty of a felony.399 Apparently no criminal 
prosecution of this nature ever has taken place. But if it did, would a 
court conclude that Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not cover price 
fixing?  Or would it instead act as Professor Kovacic noted, that courts 
sometimes find a way to exonerate defendants, or at least to subject 
them to no more than a nominal penalty, in situations where they 
believe that harsh remedies are inappropriate.400 
Second, in 1980, the Department of Justice, followed by fifteen state 
Attorneys General, prosecuted RPM criminally in United States v. 
Cuisinarts, Inc.,401 and succeeded in obtaining a nolo contendere plea 
and a $250,000 fine.402 At the time RPM was per se illegal, but today it 
is judged under the rule of reason,403 and many respected scholars 
believe it should be taken off the list of antitrust offenses entirely.404 
Nevertheless, in theory, RPM could today be prosecuted criminally. If 
this were to happen, surely the court handling the case would do as 
Professor Kovacic described and find some way to exonerate the 
defendant or treat them leniently.405 This is precisely what would 
                                               
 397. 15 U.S.C. § 12–27 (2018). 
 398. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 358, at 224, 233, 235, 243–45. 
 399. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
 400. See Kovacic, supra note 336, at 173–74. 
 401. No. H80-559, 1981 WL 2062 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 1981). 
 402. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1008, 1009–10 
(D. Conn. 1981), aff’d, 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 403. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007). 
 404. See id. 
 405. See Kovacic, supra note 336, at 173–74 (noting how courts have interpreted 
antitrust laws in ways resulting in no liability when uneasy with the imposed penalties). 
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happen if the Department of Justice tried to prosecute a monopolist 
criminally under a no-fault theory.406 
In addition, the Robinson-Patman Act, which prevents certain 
instances of price discrimination, contains criminal penalties407 which 
were last imposed in the 1950s.408 This statute has fallen into severe 
bipartisan disrepute today, and the government has barely enforced it 
civilly for a generation.409 Nevertheless, like tiny collusion cases and 
RPM cases, the federal government could today pursue criminal 
enforcement under the Robinson-Patman Act. 
If any of these violations were prosecuted criminally today, not only 
could the courts do as Professor Kovacic suggested and find some way 
to exonerate the defendant—there are other methods courts could use 
to achieve justice. Professor Sokol persuasively argues that any attempt 
to impose criminal penalties on an alleged antitrust violation after an 
unduly long period of non-criminal enforcement could result in a 
successful defense of the doctrine of desuetude (void due to non-
use),410 or in a due process violation of the U.S. Constitution where the 
provision would be held void for vagueness and a lack of notice.411 
                                               
 406. One might also ask: “Suppose DOJ tried to prosecute individuals criminally for 
no-fault offenses. Would this destroy the statute by creating massive political backlash?” 
This certainly is a possibility. At a minimum it would ruin the reputation of the 
enforcer who attempted it. But it is not relevant to the textualist interpretation of 
Section 2. Similarly, a Supreme Court interpretation of Section 2 as a no-fault statute 
similarly might spur congress to amend the Sherman Act, in ways that might or might 
not be confined to a narrow change in Section 2, with uncertain results. 
The authors are grateful to Professors Kovacic and May for these and many other 
thoughtful insights. 
 407. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (2018); see also Sokol, supra note 381, at 1573 (reviewing the 
history of Robinson-Patman Act enforcement). 
 408. See Sokol, supra note 381, at 1573. 
 409. Id. (“There has been only a single government enforcement action of 
Robinson-Patman since the George H.W. Bush administration.”). 
 410. Id. at 1564 (footnotes omitted) (“Desuetude is a concept where a practice that 
has been fixed by law loses its authority due to a lack of usage. When this lack of usage 
has been long enough, a ‘negative custom’ of nonusage replaces the usage of the law. 
Nonusage for a lengthy period of time suggests either that the legal practice is obsolete 
or was never legitimate in the first place.”); see id. at 1564–76 (providing an insightful 
analysis of desuetude in an antitrust context). 
 411. Id. at 1576 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (“Void for vagueness is 
a doctrine where the law in question is too vague to provide notice of the type of 
conduct that is to be deemed illegal. The linkage between desuetude and vagueness is 
that ‘[a] penal enactment which is linguistically clear, but has been notoriously 
ignored by both its administrators and the community for an unduly extended period, 
imparts no more fair notice of its proscriptions than a statute which is phrased in vague 
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Under either doctrine, a firm prosecuted by the Department of Justice 
for a no-fault violation today could argue that it lacked the intent 
necessary for a criminal violation. Professor Sokol also argues that an 
“accidental” monopolist (assuming, consistent with Professor Turner, 
that accidental monopolists exist), would lack the intent necessary for 
a criminal or even a civil law monopolization violation.412 
Even the theoretical possibility of criminal sanctions resulting from 
a no-fault case is an undesirable feature of Section 2. But as Justice 
Scalia noted concerning the interpretation of statutes, “[w]hen once 
the meaning is plain, it is not the province of a court to scan its wisdom 
or its policy.”413 
In summary, a textualist interpretation of Section 2 shows that a 
violation does not require anticompetitive conduct. Nor should the 
“monopolization” offense be limited to firms with 100% market shares. 
This is true even though in theory—although not as a practical matter—
a no-fault case could result in treble damages or criminal penalties. 
B.   Effects on “Attempt to Monopolize” Law 
A textualist interpretation of the “attempt to monopolize” language 
in Section 2 should greatly restore the statute’s vigor. Defendants would 
                                               
terms.’”); see also id. at 1576–96 (analyzing persuasively the void for vagueness doctrine 
and the fair warning requirement as applied to antitrust laws). Professor Sokol 
elaborates further that: 
In Lanier, the U.S. Supreme Court offered guidance as to the ‘three related 
manifestations of the fair warning requirement’ that are required whether or 
not a criminal statute may be unconstitutionally vague. These include: (1) the 
vagueness doctrine, (2) the rule of lenity, and (3) retroactive application of a 
new construction of the statute. The purpose of the fair warning requirements 
is to ensure that the ‘statute, either standing alone or as construed, ma[k]e[s] 
it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant’s conduct was 
criminal. 
Id. at 1580 (first alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
  412.    Email from D. Daniel Sokol, Professor, U. of Fla. Levin Coll. of Law, to 
Robert H.  Lande, Professor, U. of Baltimore Sch. of Law (Nov. 5, 2020) (on file with 
author). 
 413. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 353 (quoting G. GRANVILLE SHARP & BRIAN 
GALPIN, MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 5 (10th ed. 1953)); see also 
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1827 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) 
(“Justice Scalia explained the extraordinary importance of hewing to the ordinary 
meaning of a phrase: Adhering to the fair meaning of the text (the textualist’s 
touchstone) does not limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of each word in the text. 
In the words of Learned Hand: ‘a sterile literalism . . . loses sight of the forest for the 
trees.’”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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only be required to engage in a serious and concrete “attempt” to gain 
a monopoly,414 a requirement that should be construed as requiring 
only the intent to take over a market, planning and preparation, and 
one concrete, significant act in furtherance of this intent. The act 
could be required to be “sufficient, both in magnitude and in 
proximity to the fact intended, to be taken cognizance of by the law 
that does not concern itself with things trivial and small.”415 
What type of act would be required in which market contexts? This 
would be as difficult to define precisely as the current requirements for 
the offense. And the necessary lines would be as difficult to draw. 
Would market definition and a “dangerous probability of success” 
be required under a textualist approach to the attempt to monopolize 
portion of Section 2? The statute makes it unlawful for any person to 
“attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among 
the several States.”416 A straightforward textualist reading of the statute 
therefore could be very similar to Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.’s417 reading 
of Section 2 in a way that eliminated both the dangerous probability418 
and the market definition requirements419 in attempted monopolization 
cases. Alternatively, a court could reason that defendants are only 
prohibited from attempting to monopolize something, so market definition 
is required. 
Moreover, the attempted monopolization doctrine could be applied 
only to firms attempting to take over an entire market—or, since a 
textualist should not construe the word “monopoly” literally or 
strictly,420 perhaps a firm attempting to take over virtually all of a 
market. Suppose, for example, a firm with 50% of a relevant market 
conceived of and attempted to implement a serious plan that would, if 
                                               
 414. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 353. 
 415. See BISHOP, supra note 163, § 728; supra Section III.B; see also Lessig v. Tidewater 
Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir. 1964), abrogated by, Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. 
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993) (stating that “probability of actual monopolization” is 
not an “essential element of proof of attempt to monopolize). 
 416. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 417. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964). 
 418. Id. at 474 (rejecting the notion that a “[dangerous] probability of actual 
monopolization is an essential element of proof of attempt to monopolize”). 
 419. Id. at 474 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (“When the charge is attempt 
(or conspiracy) to monopolize, rather than monopolization, the relevant market is ‘not 
in issue.’ Section 2 prohibits attempts to monopolize ‘any part’ of commerce . . . .”). 
 420. See supra note 360 and accompanying text. 
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successful, give it 70% of that market.421 This is far short of a 100% 
market share, and this defendant arguably should not be convicted of 
attempted monopolization.422 Alternatively, since a 70% market share 
is the minimum that usually suffices today to meet the “monopoly 
power” prong of monopolization cases,423 perhaps a firm should be 
guilty of attempted monopolization if its implemented plan would, if 
successful, give it 70% of a market? Or 90%? 
Although the courts would of course have to draw a line, this line 
should be different from the line courts draw today, which requires 
defendants to have a “dangerous probability”424 of acquiring monopoly 
power. Today, a firm with only 50% of the market could only rarely 
meet the “dangerous probability” threshold, and a firm with only a 
30% market share could never or almost never meet the threshold.425 
Today, very few attempted monopolization suits are successful.426 But 
under a textualist analysis a firm with a 50% market share often should 
                                               
 421. Although firms’ plans to expand market share significantly (but remain far 
short of a 100% share) may be common, courts should of course be skeptical of 
manufactured self-serving evidence that a defendant was not actually trying to achieve 
complete control of a market. As an example of a plan not to gain complete control 
of a market, in the FTC case against DuPont involving the titanium dioxide market, 
the defendant had approximately a 40% market share and engaged in conduct 
designed to give it approximately 60% of the relevant market. It never had an 
actionable plan to reach a 100% market share. See F.T.C. Case on Du Pont Dismissed, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 18, 1979) https://www.nytimes.com/1979/09/18/archives/ftc-case-on-
du-pont-dismissed-judge-finds-no-monopoly-bid-largest.html?auth=link-dismiss-
google1tap, at D5. 
 422. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 358, at 230–31. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. at 336. The “dangerous probability” requirement comes from Swift & Co. v. 
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905), where Justice Holmes noted the common law 
origin of the attempt to monopolize offense: “The distinction between mere 
preparation and attempt is well known in the criminal law.” Id. at 402. His “dangerous 
probability [of success]” formulation is of only limited help in ascertaining which 
conduct should suffice. 
 425. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 298–99 
(4th ed. 1997) (footnotes omitted) (“Although there are no precise market share 
boundaries, and while [defendant’s ability to lessen or destroy competition in that 
market, intent, etc.] affect the analysis, courts often find a dangerous probability [of 
monopolization] where the defendant starts with a market share of more than 50 
percent; they rarely find market shares between 30 percent and 50 percent sufficient; 
and they virtually never find shares of less than 30 percent sufficient.”). 
 426. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2010–
2019, https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download [https://perma.cc/3RCN-
V5PU]. 
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be found to engage in a serious “attempt to monopolize” a market, given 
certain assumptions like barriers to entry. 
In sum, a textualist approach to the “attempt to monopolize” portion 
of Section 2 should not require defendant to have undertaken 
anticompetitive conduct. The statute should only require that defendant 
had the intent to acquire a monopoly (or a near-monopoly) and had 
taken a serious, significant and concrete step in this direction. A 
defendant’s market share as low as 50%, and perhaps even 30%, 
assuming barriers to entry, etc., should sometimes suffice. 
The line of illegality would, as a practical matter, be as uncertain as 
the current “dangerous probability” requirement.427 But the textualist 
version of the “dangerous probability” requirement should allow more 
successful cases. And the lack of an anticompetitive conduct element 
should permit many more successful cases. 
C.   No-Fault Monopolization as a Violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act 
Despite the existence of the Sherman Act, Congress in 1914 decided 
that additional, more encompassing, legislation was needed, so it 
enacted Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of 
competition.”428 A traditionalist analysis of Section 5 of the FTC Act 
demonstrates that the statute was intended to prohibit not only every 
violation of the Sherman Act, but also (1) incipient violations of this 
law, (2) conduct violating the spirit of the Sherman Act, and (3) 
conduct violating recognized standards of business behavior.429 The 
                                               
 427. As Oliver Wendall Holmes noted in his discussion of attempts: 
Eminent judges have been puzzled where to draw the line . . . . the 
considerations being, in this case, the nearness of the danger, the greatness of 
the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt. When a man buys matches to 
fire a haystack . . . there is still a considerable chance that he will change his 
mind before he comes to the point. But when he has struck the match . . . 
there is very little chance that he will not persist to the end . . . . 
HOLMES, JR., supra note 165, at 68–69. 
 428. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018). 
 429. See Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 299–300 (1980). 
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Supreme Court has explicitly adopted this interpretation of the FTC 
Act,430 although the relevant precedent is more than a generation old.431 
Although the task is beyond the scope of this article, the FTC Act 
should be analyzed in a textualist manner to determine whether the 
statute would still produce these interpretations of the phrase “unfair 
methods of competition.” If so, the FTC Act might be an optimal 
vehicle for no-fault monopolization for several reasons. 
Section 5 is a civil statute—its violation cannot result in criminal 
penalties.432 Section 5 actions cannot be brought by private parties, and 
do not constitute Sherman Act precedent that gives rise to treble 
damages liability unless the court specifically finds that the practices at 
issue also violate the Sherman Act.433 
Section 5 could be used as a way to implement no-fault if the Court 
is willing to undertake a textualist analysis of Section 2 but is reluctant 
to overturn Trinko and other Section 2 precedent. Another reason for 
the use of Section 5 to impose sanctions on monopolies would arise if 
the Court is willing to re-think Section 2 using a textualist approach, 
but decides to do so in a relatively non-expansive manner because it 
does not want no-fault cases to be brought by private parties, or for 
there to be even a theoretical fear that no-fault could lead to criminal 
penalties. 
The FTC Act could be a perfect vehicle for a textualist court that is 
reluctant for any of these reasons to find that a firm violated Section 2 
of the Sherman Act under a no-fault theory. Instead, the Court might 
hold that defendant had committed an incipient violation of Section 
2, or a violation of the spirit of Section 2, and thus that the firm had 
violated Section 5 of the FTC Act using a no-fault approach. A textualist 
Court might well find that Section 5, but not Section 2, imposes 
sanctions on all monopolies and attempts to monopolize. 
                                               
 430. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–40 (1972) (stating 
that Congress intended for the FTC to have broad power to proscribe business 
practices even if such practices are not anticompetitive but instead “unfair or 
deceptive”). 
 431. The Supreme Court’s most recent expansive interpretation of Section 5 was in 
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). Id. at 454 (characterizing section 5 as 
including traditional antitrust violations and also “practices that the Commission 
determines are against public policy for other reasons”). 
 432. See Averitt, supra note 429, at 251 n.112. 
 433. Id. 
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CONCLUSION: AN INCREASINGLY TEXTUALIST SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
IMPLEMENT NO-FAULT MONOPOLIZATION 
For many years, textualism was only the concern of Justice Scalia and 
academics not within the antitrust mainstream. Even conservative 
members of the antitrust community rejected or ignored this method 
of statutory analysis. But in recent years, textualism increasingly has 
emerged from the shadows. Indeed, in 2020, all nine justices, in all three 
opinions in an important Supreme Court case, employed textualism.434 
Bostock certainly increases the hope of the possibility that the Court also 
will analyze Section 2 of the Sherman Act using textualist principles.435 
This possibility is especially true because a textualist approach might 
even appeal to those justices who normally are not textualists. This is 
because a traditional or purposivist approach to Section 2 is ambiguous 
on the no-fault issue.436 If a traditional analysis of Section 2 had found 
that anticompetitive conduct was required for a violation, but a textual 
                                               
 434. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 1754, 1822 (2020). 
 435. See Krishnakumar, supra note 58, at 228–33 (providing a pre-Bostock chart with 
a breakdown of judicial decisions involving a textualist approach and which Justice 
authored each one). Krishakumar considers Justice Thomas a “textualist” and Justices 
Roberts and Alito as “textualist-leaning.” Id. at 163 n.18. If Justices Gorsuch and 
Kavanaugh are additionally considered textualists, it appears that the Supreme Court 
has 5 textualist or “textualist-leaning” Justices. See Lovelace, supra note 6 (quoting 
Justice Elena Kagan as saying, “[W]e are a generally, fairly textualist court.”). Similarly, 
Bryan Garner’s 2019 pre-Bostock ABA Journal posting characterized the approach of 
two Justices not usually considered textualists, Justice Breyer and the late Justice 
Ginsburg, as looking primarily to text. Bryan A. Garner, Old-Fashioned Textualism Is All 
About Interpretation, Not Legislating from the Bench, ABA J. (Apr. 1, 2019, 1:15 AM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/textualism-means-what-it-says 
[https://perma.cc/XCJ4-LE6T]. Garner asserted that they typically analyze 
interpretive questions by focusing on four elements in this order: (1) text, (2) 
structure, (3) purpose, and (4) legislative history. Id. 
 436. See supra notes 48–55 and accompanying text. A no-fault analysis of Section 2 
would, moreover, be consistent with the thoughts of Justice Brandeis: 
[N]o monopoly in private industry in America has yet been attained by 
efficiency alone . . . . It will be found that wherever competition has been 
suppressed it has been due either to resort to ruthless processes, or by 
improper use of inordinate wealth and power. The attempt to dismember 
existing illegal trusts is not, therefore, an attempt to interfere in any way with 
the natural law of business. It is an endeavor to restore health by removing a 
cancer from the body industrial. 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS BRANDEIS 
114–16 (Osmond K. Fraenkel, ed. 1965). 
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analysis did not, the traditionalists on the court would of course be less 
likely to embrace textualism. But this tradeoff is not present. 
There is an old saying that “th[e] [S]upreme [Cou]rt follows th[e] 
[ele]ction returns.”437 Is there even a small chance the current 
conservative—but increasingly textualist—Supreme Court would hold 
that Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not require anticompetitive 
conduct? If in the future an election gives our country a President and 
a Congress that, like some politicians today,438 believe in imposing 
sanctions on all monopolies, is there even a small chance the Supreme 
Court (or a future, changed Supreme Court) might be open to the 
possibility that the Sherman Act (or perhaps the FTC Act439) is a no-fault 
statute? 
Everyone agrees that courts should faithfully interpret and 
implement the words of statutes when they are clear.440 But whether a 
statute is “clear” often is in the mind of the judge.441 As a practical 
matter, the Court’s view regarding whether the Sherman Act is a no-
fault statute could depend in part upon what particular justices think 
about the net economic effects of sanctioning all monopolies. As 
Justice Kavanaugh noted, the “absurdity doctrine”442 prevents statutes 
from being interpreted irrationally. If a majority of Supreme Court 
justices believe that no-fault is, from an economic perspective, 
“absurd,” they surely won’t find that the Sherman Act embodies a 
congressional intent to impose sanctions on all monopolies. Although 
the Court surely would not convict a tiny local monopoly or a modestly 
sized innovative company of a no-fault violation, a court might not find 
this doctrine “absurd” if it were applied to such extremely large alleged 
contemporary monopolies as Google, Facebook, Amazon and Apple.443 
                                               
 437. See FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901). 
 438. See supra notes 220–25 and accompanying text. 
 439. Use of the FTC Act would have the advantage that its violation cannot result in 
criminal penalties, and a violation of the Act does not automatically lead to private 
cases with their potential for treble damages. Moreover, the Court would not have to 
overturn an FTC Act precedent as clear as Trinko. See supra Section V.C. 
 440. See Scalia, supra note 57, at 16 (“[W]hen the text of a statute is clear, that is the 
end of the matter.”). 
 441. See Kavanaugh, supra note 174, at 2118–19. As Justice Kagan noted, “[P]retty 
much all of us now look at the text first and the text is what matters most . . . . And if 
you can find clarity in the text that’s pretty much the end of the ballgame. Often texts 
are not clear, you have to look [farther].” See Lovelace, supra note 6. 
 442. See Kavanaugh, supra note 174, at 2156–57. 
 443. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text. 
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The justices may believe, as we do, that reasonable people can 
disagree over no-fault’s net economic effects. This Article has shown 
that no-fault’s overall net effects on economic welfare depend upon a 
number of empirical issues whose effects are unknown and ambiguous 
from both an overall perspective and in particular contexts. If the 
justices believe that the net effects of no-fault are close from an 
economic perspective, and not “absurd,” they should be more likely to 
implement a “fair reading” of the words of Section 2 and impose 
sanctions on all monopolies. We wrote this Article because we believe 
these issues deserve thoughtful analysis and debate.444 
In 2016, (then) Judge Gorsuch observed: “[A] judge who likes every 
result he reaches is very likely a bad judge, reaching for results he 
prefers rather than those the law compels.”445 If the current 
conservative Supreme Court does not want Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act to impose sanctions on all monopolies, it should heed the more 
recent advice of Justice Gorsuch: “If a statute needs repair, there’s a 
constitutionally prescribed way to do it. It’s called legislation.”446 
                                               
 444. There is, of course, a huge difference between interpreting Section 2 to be a 
no-fault statute with no efficiencies defense, and the enforcers bringing a case, and 
requesting a remedy, that the enforcers do not believe is in the public interest. We 
hope and expect enforcers would never bring any type of antitrust case or impose a 
remedy in these cases they thought to be unwise, simply because defendant had 
violated the law. This should apply a fortiori to no-fault cases. We hope and believe the 
enforcers would believe that, even though anticompetitive conduct was not a 
requirement of a violation, the remedy sought would benefit consumers and in other 
respects be in the public interest. 
 445. A.M. ex rel. FM v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1170 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, 
dissenting). 
 446. Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 137 S. Ct. 1975, 1990 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). For an excellent analysis of these two Gorsuch references, see Robert 
Connolly, Supreme Court Review Sought for Per Se Rule in Criminal Cases, CARTEL CAPERS 
(Oct. 30, 2019), http://cartelcapers.com/blog/supreme-court-review-sought-for-per-
se-rule-in-criminal-cases [https://perma.cc/TB48-9RMU]. 
